2 June 2009
Picture of Air France F-GZCP Airbus A330-20 missing crashed at sea after it broke up in flight ~ Rudder/VS loss/failure
Speculations. rudder inputs....
"there is a potential for pilots to make large and/or sequential rudder inputs in response to unusual or emergency situations, such as an unusual attitude or upset, turbulence....situation."
Leaky toilet/// Well so much for that one....!!
From the FAB photos yesterday, Row 42 was the only visible seating that I was able to identify from the wreckage. Additional clues are starting to trickle out with the evening article from Le Journal du Dimanche quoting an informed source saying:
“one of the avenues explored by the BEA is a leak in a waste water circuit of the device, reported shortly after take-off by a first automated message warning”
Now this is were the “leakage” problem starts to become very interesting after takeoff. Obviously, Air France, BEA, and the French Government have looked over the history string of warning/maintenance messages from ACARS for this aircraft. Note 2245 first reported problem with toilet:
22 10/06 WRN WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF 09-06-01 AF 447
38 31/06 FLR FR0905312245 38310006VSC X2 ,,,,,,, LAV CONF 09-05-31 AF 447
From my previous post:
I found it curious this door was not in any of the pictures when the wreckage was arranged inside the hangar for the press last week. As I noted here on June 9th, and also here, this door was getting special attention by investigators. As suspected, now we know that BEA has known the reason for the aircraft loss since the first night.
The below reference requires an ACARS expert verification, however some researchers believe the ACARS messages for the leaking toilet was first reported May 9, 2009. From the ACARS Database (ACARS Mechanics Code Listing / Fault Codes), I show A332 (F-GZCP) report for May 12, 2009:
ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332] ACARS mode: 2 Aircraft reg: F-GZCP [Airbus A332] Message label: B0 Block id: 2 Msg no: J29A Flight id: AF0031 [IAH-CDG] [Air France] Flight id: AF0031 [IAH-CDG] [Air France] Message content: – /KZWY.AFN/FMHAFR031 F-GZCP 045907/FPON38124W078339, 1/FCOADS,01/FCOATC, 01E36F / —-[ 12/05/2009 06:59 ]- —
Rudder stomp and loss of tail???
The cause of the crash is unknown. France's Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA) is in charge of the official investigation. The BEA released a press release on 5 June, that stated: 
A large quantity of more or less accurate information and attempts at explanations concerning the accident are currently being circulated. The BEA reminds those concerned that in such circumstances, it is advisable to avoid all hasty interpretations and speculation on the basis of partial or non-validated information. At this stage of the investigation, the only established facts are:
the presence near the airplane’s planned route over the Atlantic of significant convective cells typical of the equatorial regions;
based on the analysis of the automatic messages broadcast by the plane, there are inconsistencies between the various speeds measured.
The main task currently occupying the investigators is recovering parts of the aircraft, primarily the flight recorders. BEA chief Paul-Louis Arslanian said that he is not optimistic about finding them since they may be under as much as 3,000 m (9,800 ft) of water and the terrain under this portion of the ocean is very rugged. Investigators are hoping to find the aircraft's lower aft section, since the black box is located there. Although France has never recovered a black box from similar depths, there is precedent for such an operation: in 1988, an independent contractor was able to recover the cockpit voice recorder of South African Airways Flight 295 from a depth of 4,900 m (16,000 ft) in a search area of between 80 and 250 square nautical miles (270 and 860 km2). The black box contained a water-activated acoustic "pinger", which should have remained active for at least 30 days, allowing search for the location of the signal origin.
On 2 July 2009, the BEA released a detailed intermediate report which detailed descriptions of all known facts, and a summary of the visual examination of the rudder and the other parts of the aircraft that had been recovered at that time. According to the BEA, this examination showed that:
the aircraft was likely to have struck the surface of the sea in a straight line, with high vertical acceleration;
there were no signs of fire or explosion;
the aircraft was not destroyed in flight.
Prior to the disappearance of the aircraft, the automatic reporting system, ACARS, sent messages indicating disagreement in the indicated air speed (IAS) readings. A spokesperson for Airbus claimed that "the air speed of the aircraft was unclear" to the pilots. Paul-Louis Arslanian, of France's air accident investigation agency, confirmed that F-GZCP previously had problems calculating its speed as did other A330 aircraft stating "We have seen a certain number of these types of faults on the A330 ... There is a programme of replacement, of improvement". The problems primarily occurred on the Airbus A320, but, awaiting a recommendation from Airbus, Air France delayed installing new pitots on A330/A340 yet increased inspection frequencies.
There have been several cases where inaccurate airspeed information led to flight incidents on the A330. Two of those incidents specifically involved pitot probes, one of the types of sensor used to measure airspeed.[Note 3] In the first incident, an Air France A340-300 (F-GLZL), en route from Japan to France, experienced an event at 31,000 feet (9,400 m) in which the airspeed was incorrectly reported and the autopilot automatically disengaged. Bad weather together with obstructed drainage holes in all three pitot tubes were subsequently found to be the cause. In the second incident, an Air France A340-300 (F-GLZN) en-route to New York encountered turbulence followed by the autoflight systems going offline, warnings over the accuracy of the reported airspeed and two minutes of stall alerts.
On 6 June 2009, Arslanian said that Air France had not replaced pitot probes as Airbus recommended on F-GZCP, saying that "it does not mean that without replacing the probes that the A330 was dangerous." Air France issued a further clarification of the situation:
"1) Malfunctions in the pitot probes on the A320 led the manufacturer to issue a recommendation in September 2007 to change the probes. This recommendation also applies to long-haul aircraft using the same probes and on which a very few incidents of a similar nature had occurred."
Since it was not an airworthiness directive (AD), the guidelines allow the operator to apply the recommendations at its discretion. However, Air France implemented the change on its A320 fleet where the incidents of water ingress were observed.
"2) Starting in May 2008 Air France experienced incidents involving a loss of airspeed data in flight (see two incidents above) in cruise phase on A340s and A330s. These incidents were analysed with Airbus as resulting from pitot probe icing for a few minutes, after which the phenomenon disappeared."
After discussing these with the manufacturer, Air France sought a means of reducing these incidents, and Airbus indicated that the new pitot probe designed for the A320 was not designed to prevent cruise level ice-over. However, in 2009 tests suggested that the new probe could improve its reliability, prompting Air France to initiate and accelerate the replacement program, however not before F-GZCP underwent its major overhaul on April 16. On 4 June, Airbus issued an Accident Information Telex to operators of all Airbus models reminding pilots of the recommended Abnormal and Emergency Procedures to be taken in the case of unreliable airspeed indication. By 17 June 2009, Air France has replaced all Pitot tubes on its A330 type aircraft.
French Transport Minister, Dominique Bussreau, said "Obviously the pilots [of Flight 447] did not have the right speed showing, which can lead to two bad consequences for the life of the aircraft: under-speed, which can lead to a stall, and over-speed, which can lead to the aircraft breaking up because it is approaching the speed of sound and the structure of the plane is not made for resisting such speeds". On 11 June 2009, a spokesman from the BEA reminded that there was no conclusive evidence at the moment linking Pitot malfunction to the AF447 crash, and this was reiterated on 17 June 2009 by the BEA chief, Paul-Louis Arslanian.
The incident which befell Flight 447 has some parallels with incidents involving A330 aircraft flown by other carriers. Three similar reports are on file at the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), with two incidents relating to Airbus A330 with the flight computer problems, plus one which involved a Boeing 777.[Note 4] In the October 2008 incident, this fault caused injuries to passengers and damage to the aircraft on Qantas Flight 72, en route from Singapore to Perth, Western Australia, which was forced into a dive by a malfunctioning ADIRU. These incidents often started with the autopilot disengaging and sending ADIRU failure messages. Incorrect speed indications were also observed. The type of airframe and model of ADIRU involved in the Qantas Flight 72 incident were also previously involved in another incident on Qantas Flight 68, 2006. A memo leaked from Airbus suggests that there was no evidence of ADIRU malfunction on Flight 447 similar to the failure in the Qantas incidents. However, the Qantas aircraft were equipped with ADIRUs manufactured by Northrop Grumman, while Flight 447 was equipped with an ADIRU manufactured by Honeywell.
Situation “extreme” in the manual Airbus (English Translation)(Emphasis mine)
20 Juin 2009 By Yann PHILIPPIN and Michel Delean
The JDD procured manual A 330/340 for the training of pilots (Flight Crew Training Manual “). At the reading, the first automatic alert message sent by the device via the ACARS system corresponds to a sensor failure (code 34-11-15). The manual also provides, in this case, the inconsistency of indications of speed, specifying that it “may result” Pitot “blocked or frozen. Another Acars message indicates a failure of two of the three ADIRU these computers which calculate particular, thanks to information provided by sensors, speed and altitude. The manual describes the alarms that are triggered when “the data produced by two ADIRU are wrong but different.” However, many of these alarms correspond to seven Acars messages sent by plane the night of the crash (disconnect the autopilot and pushing the regulator, etc.)..
Finally, the manual states that “in extreme situations in which two or three ADR [computers] give false information”, it becomes more difficult “for the computer to identify which ADIRU also provides reliable information and disconnect others. In this case, the system may display on the control screens of information “that appear to be reliable but are in fact false.” A sort of bug in the manual provided … Pilots must “rely on their basic skills in piloting and perform corrective actions required, specifies the same document
According to one informed source, one of the avenues explored by the BEA is a leak in a waste water circuit of the device, reported shortly after take-off by a first automated message warning of the Airbus A 330. The hypothesis examined is whether the leak, undetectable to the crew, causing a prolonged flow of water, then when the device crosses temperatures – 50 ° C, a significant gel composite membrane (half metal , half-composite carbon-type) that is located inside the fuselage in the rear of the unit. This gel, according to the same source, which could cause a sudden rupture of the structure of the device in flight.
As suggested in my post earlier today, the below “LePost” article now explains the interest by several on-line aviation professionals on the Lavatory Error Message beginning at 22:45:
Note: The below posting is translated from a foreign message board and is odd to me. Need ACARS expertise explaining the references to the toilet messages.
Nevertheless, the first message after the toilet at 22:45 this post off autopilot
22 10/06 WRN WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF 09-06-01 AF 447 22 10/06 WRN WN0906010210 221002006AUTO FLT AP OFF 09-06-01 AF 447
38 31/06 FLR FR0905312245 38310006VSC X2,,,,,,,LAV CONF 09-05-31 AF 447 38 31/06 FLR FR0905312245 38310006VSC X2 ,,,,,,, LAV CONF 09-05-31 AF 447
Bottom came first. Do not judge for errors in spelling, copy the text manually. And remember, was a signal of problems with the toilet. Here you are, match the most important. I also think that this should start the investigation.
-The bodies were intact with flail injuries.
-The bodies were unclothed.
-There were no burns present.
-There was no water in the lungs.
-There were two groups of bodies found 50 miles apart.
Tactical Aviators are familiar with flail injuries. They are associated with ejecting (from a doomed aircraft) at high speed into the airstream. The high speed air fractures extremities, and tears away clothing. Had the aircraft burned or exploded there would have been burn marks and smoke in the lungs, there were neither. Had the aircraft ditched and sank water would have been present in the lungs thus far there is none. Most telling is the two groups 50 miles apart and the bodies were intact. Had it impacted at a high rate of speed neither would be the case.
A very sad tragedy; now the investigators must find out why.
Four hours into the flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, the Airbus A330-200s three speed sensors, or pitot tubes started providing "incoherent" readings.
A faulty air speed indicator could mislead pilots into flying faster than the aircraft could withstand, or faster than it should be flown into turbulence two circumstances that could lead to the craft coming apart in flight.
Air France has promised to replace all first-generation Thales sensors on its 34 long-haul A330 and A340 planes "within days", but the airline's director general, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, said today that he was "not convinced" that the sensors caused the crash.
"This (replacement) programme has been accelerated because we know that when the accident happened there were problems with the speed indicators," he said, before adding: "I am not convinced that the sensors were the cause." Air France launched a programme to replace its old probes on April 27, after recording several icing problems on the speed sensors in May 2008. "We did this because we thought it would reduce the number of non-catastrophic accidents," said Mr Gourgoeon.
It now transpires that the first batch of new probes arrived just three days before the crash of flight AF 447 on June 1.
Airbus today denied a French newspaper report that it was considering grounding its fleet of A330 and A340 planes in the wake of the disaster, reiterating a European Aviation Safety Agency statement that they were "safe to fly".
Meanwhile, two terror suspects who died alongside 226 other passengers on the stricken jet have been ruled out as a cause of the disaster.
The two individuals only "shared the same name" as known Islamic radicals, posthumous security checks found.
Vertical stabliser found.
The stablizer broke at the attach points and did not impact the water at the same speed as other recovered weckage. Loss of the rudder in flight looks increasingly certain.
Analysis from the aircraft nerds at Project Seven
From the picture it appears to be substantially intact; appearing to have been sheared near or at the forward attachment points. The rudder is also in place (60-70%). If the tail section was found apart from the rest of the aircraft and is the first piece in the field of wreckage then I believe the cause is verified.
Max Beta Q is the maximum dynamic pressure (side load) that the Empennage (Tail) is stressed to. As an aircraft accelerates the dynamic pressure increases on the entire airframe. Beta is yaw, an airliner is stressed to rudder throw and release (to counter yaw produced when an engine fails). With an increase in speed the rudder effectiveness also increases to the point it can damage the structure. To prevent this damage a rudder limiter is used to restrict the amount of rudder that can be deflected.
The A 330 had an electrical limiter that was part of the fly by wire system. A fault code was sent before the aircraft broke up. If large rudder movements were input either by the failing computers or the crew it is likely Max Beta Q was exceeded resulting in the vertical tail failing from the side load. In effect the aircraft flies sideways which causes the relative wind to push on the side area of the tail instead of slicing cleanly threw the air with the leading edge. If it reaches a critical pressure (Max Beta Q) then catastrophic failure occurs. The black boxes may not reveal what caused the fly by wire system to fail.
Australian incident provides leads, evedence for this crash senario..
Next some back ground; the A 330 series aircraft has documented flight control events resulting in erroneous inputs and in flight upsets.
“ATSB (Australian Transportation Safety Board) found that the A330’s primary ADIRU sent erroneous data (spikes) on many parameters to systems in the aircraft, including the primary flight computers, that resulted in the autopilot disconnecting and two violent pitch-down events. Disassembly of the units will not be done until EMI testing is complete in order to prevent disturbance to the hardware. After disassembly, individual modules will be tested separately.”
EMI is electromagnetic interference; the ATSB believes that EMI may have caused the anomaly in the ADIRU which then sent improper commands to the flight control causing “violent pitch-down events”. Take note of the sequence: Auto pilot off, violent maneuvers until the crew could disable the ADIRU.
Wreckage found by Brazilian military...
Nelson Jobim says the debris, located some 435 miles to the northeast of Brazil's Fernando de Noronha archipelago, does indeed belong to the missing flight. A French commercial ship that was the first to arrive on the scene made the confirmation.
Spotted floating on the water, in two spots located approximately 40 miles apart, were an airplane seat, a life preserver, kerosene, and other non-metalic debris. Brazilian naval ships are heading to the site to recover the items and to continue the search. They are expected to arrive Wednesday morning.
Breaking blog info....detailed weather analysis here..
Geohack location of crash site.
Text messages from Norwegian passengers appear to be rumors only but were reported thus.... According to a Norwegian newspaper, several passengers on board Air France flight 447 sent text messages to family members shortly before the plane disappeared from radar screens in Brazil. The flight was scheduled to arrive in Paris at 11:10 CET on June 1, 2009.
The messages included "I love you" and "I'm afraid."
The aircraft involved was an Airbus A330-203, powered by two General Electric CF6-80E1 engines. The manufacturer's serial number was 660, and the French aircraft registration was F-GZCP. The first flight of the aircraft was on 25 February 2005 and at the time of the accident it had flown for 18,870 hours. On 17 August 2006, F-GZCP was involved in a ground collision with Airbus A321-211 F-GTAM at Charles de Gaulle Airport, Paris. F-GTAM was substantially damaged and F-GZCP suffered minor damage. F-GZCP underwent a major overhaul on 16 April 2009. From 5 May 2009 until 31 May 2009 the aircraft carried under 24 different flight names from Paris to and from 13 different destinations on 4 continents outside of Europe.
Rio de Janeiro
22:03, 31 May
Fernando de Noronha
01:33, 1 June
Last transmission at
02:14, 1 June
Expected at 09:10,
Approximate flight path of AF 447. The solid red line shows the actual route. The dashed line indicates the planned route beginning with the position of the last transmission heard.
The aircraft was on a scheduled international passenger flight from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Paris, France. The aircraft departed Rio de Janeiro-Galeão International Airport on 31 May 2009 at 19:03 local time (22:03 UTC), with a scheduled arrival at Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport approximately 11 hours later.
The last verbal contact with the aircraft was at 01:33 UTC, when it was near waypoint INTOL (1°21′39″S 32°49′53″W) located 565 km (351 mi) off Brazil's north-eastern coast. The crew reported that they expected to use UN873 airway and enter Senegalese-controlled airspace at waypoint TASIL (4°0′18″N 29°59′24″W) within 50 minutes, and that the aircraft was flying normally at an altitude of 10,670 m (35,000 ft) and a speed of 840 km/h (520 mph). The aircraft left Brazil Atlantic radar surveillance at 01:48 UTC.
Automated message and equipment malfunction
The last contact with the aircraft was at 02:14 UTC, four hours after take-off, when its avionics automatically transmitted several messages via ACARS indicating multiple systems failures. The first of these messages, at 2:10 UTC, reportedly indicated that the autopilot had disengaged and the fly-by-wire went into 'alternate law' flight control mode. This happens when multiple failures of redundant systems occur. Next, the aircraft transmitted several messages indicating failures of the Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU), the Integrated Standby Instrument System (a backup system providing basic flight instruments), and the master units of the primary and secondary flight control computers. The final message received, at 02:14 UTC, indicated a possible cabin depressurization ("cabin vertical speed warning") at location 3°34′40″N 30°22′28″W.
French accident investigators have claimed that ACARS messages indicated that the aircraft's electronics were giving different airspeeds prior to its final message. A spokesperson for Airbus claimed that "the air speed of the aircraft was unclear" to the pilots. The interpreted airspeed presented to pilots on the Primary Flight Display is derived from the pitot tube, Air Data Reference unit and synthesized from the ADIRU units and finally processed by the flight computers on the aircraft with Normal Law and most Alternative Law circumstances.
A satellite image of the area, at the approximate time of the incident, showed severe weather conditions occurring 49,000 ft (15 kilometres (9.3 mi)) above the Atlantic Ocean and over the intended path of Flight 447. According to commercial transport pilots familiar with the route, it is likely that the flight crew of the Air France aircraft was aware of the intensity of the storm in the flight path at that altitude long before actually encountering the thunderstorms. From satellite images taken near the time of the incident, it appears that the aircraft encountered a severe thunderstorm approximately 650 miles (1,050 km) in length, likely containing hail and extreme turbulence.
Commercial air transport crews routinely encounter this type of storm in this area. Generally, according to pilots familiar with this route, when storms of this type are encountered, a course either circumnavigating the storm or diverting to weaker portions of the storm is normally taken.
In this instance, shortly after that last verbal contact with Air Traffic Control about 350 miles (563 km) northeast of Natal, Brazil (station identifier SBNT), the aircraft likely traversed an area of intense deep convection which had formed within a broad band of thunderstorms along the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ). Turbulence in the vicinity of these rapidly-developing storms may have contributed to the accident.
Search and rescue
Cockpit of a Brazilian C-130 Hercules involved in search operations. The aircraft flies at low altitude over the ocean, 650 km north of the Fernando de Noronha islands, while the crew surveys the surface.
Brazilian air traffic controllers contacted air traffic control in Dakar at 02:20 UTC, when they noticed that the plane had not made the required radio call signaling its crossing into Senegalese airspace. The Brazilian Air Force then began a search and rescue operation from the Brazilian archipelago of Fernando de Noronha, and at 19:00 UTC on 1 June, Spain sent a CASA 235 maritime patrol plane in search and rescue operations near Cape Verde. French reconnaissance planes were also dispatched, including one Breguet Atlantic from Dakar, and the French requested satellite equipment from the United States to help find the plane. Brazilian Air Force spokesperson Colonel Henry Munhoz told Brazilian TV that radar on Cape Verde failed to pick up the aircraft over the Atlantic Ocean.
Early on, officials with Air France and the French government presumed that the plane had been lost with no survivors. An Air France spokesperson told L'Express that there was "no hope for survivors," and French President Nicolas Sarkozy told relatives of the passengers that there was only a "minimal" chance that anyone survived.
Late on 1 June, the deputy chief of the Brazilian Aeronautical Communications Center, Jorge Amaral, confirmed that 30 minutes after the Air France Airbus had emitted the automatic report, a commercial pilot had reported the sighting of "orange dots" in the middle of the Atlantic, which could indicate the glow of wreckage on fire. This sighting was reported by a TAM Airlines crew flying from Europe to Brazil, at approximately 1,300 km (800 mi) from Fernando de Noronha. The Brazilian newspaper O Globo reported that wreckage debris was discovered off the Senegalese coast, but that its origin was still uncertain. EarthTimes and news.com.au reported that the crew of the French freighter Douce France spotted debris floating on the ocean in the area earlier indicated by the TAM crew.
At 15:20 UTC on 2 June, the Brazilian Air Force found wreckage ("white pieces and electrical conductors") and oil spots strewn along a 5 km (3 mi) band. After meeting with relatives of the Brazilians on the plane, the Brazilian Defence Minister Nelson Jobim first believed that the debris found off the coast was from Flight 447, but on June 5 at around 9:00 AM EDT, Brazilian officials announced that they had not, in fact, recovered anything from Flight 447, as the oil slick and debris field found on June 2 could not have come from the plane. Brazilian vice-president José Alencar, acting in the stead of president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was out of the country, declared three days of official mourning after the finding was confirmed. However, the confirmation proved to be premature as it was later discovered that none of the items in question was debris from the missing aircraft. The search for the plane's black boxes continued.
On 2 June, two French Navy vessels, Foudre and Ventôse, were en route to the suspected crash site. Also among the ships sent to the site was the French research vessel Pourquoi Pas?, equipped with two mini-submarines that can descend to 6,000 m (20,000 ft) – the area of the Atlantic in which the plane went down may be as deep as 4,700 m (15,000 ft). A United States Navy Lockheed Martin P3 Orion MR submarine-hunting aircraft was also deployed in the search due to its low altitude endurance and patrol capability, sonar and magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) sensor suite.
On 3 June, the first Brazilian Navy ship, the patrol boat NPa Grajaú, reached the area in which the first debris was spotted. The Brazilian Navy has sent a total of five ships to the debris site; the frigate F Constituição and the corvette Cv Caboclo are scheduled to reach the area on 4 June, the frigate F Bosísio on 6 June and the tankship NT Almirante Gastão Motta on 7 June.
On 4 June, the Brazilian Air Force claimed they had recovered the first debris from the Air France crash site, 340 miles (550 km) northeast of the Fernando de Noronha archipelago. However, the Brazilian Air Force later said that the debris did not come from the flight in question.
On 5 June, the French defence minister Hervé Morin announced that a French nuclear submarine is also en route to the crash site to assist in finding the wreckage.
An oil slick thought to have been caused by the crashed Air France flight, but later determined to be from a cargo ship.
At 15:20 UTC on 2 June, an Embraer R-99 operated by the Brazilian Air Force found wreckage strewn along a 5 km (3 mi) band 650 km (400 mi) northeast of Fernando de Noronha Island, near Saint Peter and Paul Rocks. It included a plane seat, an orange buoy, a barrel, "white pieces and electrical conductors" and signs of oil and jet fuel.
Later that day, after meeting with relatives of the Brazilians on the aircraft, Brazilian Defence Minister Nelson Jobim announced that the Air Force believed the wreckage was from Flight 447. Brazilian vice-president José Alencar (acting as president since Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was out of the country) declared three days of official mourning.
Early the next morning, French military spokesperson Christophe Prazuck said that the French military believed "there was no longer any room for doubt" that the debris was from the aircraft. However, on 5 June, Brazilian officials announced that none of the debris they had recovered was from the airplane. It is not yet known whether debris spotted earlier, including what appeared to be a large section of fuselage, was from the plane or not. Brazilian air force General Ramon Cardoso said on 5 June that officials now knew the discovery of a cargo pallet was inconsequential because Flight 447 was not carrying wooden pallets.
On 5 June, around 9:00 AM EDT, Brazilian officials announced that they had not, in fact, recovered anything from Flight 447, as the oil slick and debris field found on 2 June could not have come from the plane.
Aircraft serviced 6 weeks ago. New Item via al Jazerra...