Can Iceland and Latvia pay the foreign debts run up by a fairly narrow layer of their population? The European Union and International Monetary Fund have told them to replace private debts with public obligations, and to pay by raising taxes, slashing public spending and obliging citizens to deplete their savings.
Resentment is growing not only towards those who ran up the debts - Iceland's bankrupt Kaupthing and Landsbanki, with its Icesave accounts, and heavily geared property owners in the Baltics and central Europe - but also towards the foreign advisers and creditors who put pressure on these governments to sell off the banks and public companies to insiders. Support in Iceland for joining the EU has fallen to just over a third of the population, while Latvia's Harmony Centre party, the first since independence to include a large segment of the Russian-speaking population, has gained a majority in Riga and is becoming the most popular national party. Popular protests in both countries have triggered rising political pressure to limit the debt burden to a reasonable ability to pay.
This political pressure came to a head over the weekend in Reykjavik's parliament. The Althing agreed a deal, expected to be formalised today, which would severely restrict payments to the UK and Netherlands in compensation for the cost of bailing out their Icesave depositors.
This agreement is, so far as I am aware, the first since the 1920s to subordinate foreign debt to the country's ability to pay. Iceland's payments will be limited to 6 per cent of growth above 2008's gross domestic product. If creditors thrust austerity on the Icelandic economy there will be no growth and they will not get paid.
A similar problem was debated 80 years ago over Germany's first world war reparations. But many policymakers remain confused over the distinction between squeezing out a domestic fiscal surplus and the ability to pay foreign debts. No matter how much a government may tax its economy, there is a problem turning the money into foreign currency. As John Maynard Keynes explained, unless debtor countries can export more, they must pay either by borrowing or by selling off domestic assets. Iceland today has rejected these self-destructive policies.
There is a limit to how much foreign payment an economy can make. Higher domestic taxes do not mean a government can translate this revenue into foreign exchange. This reality is reflected in Iceland's position on its Icesave debt - estimated to amount to half its entire GDP.
In taking this stand, Iceland promises to lead the pendulum swing away from the ideology that debt repayments are sacred.
In the post-Soviet economies the problem is that independence in 1991 did not bring the hoped-for western living standards. Like Iceland, they remain dependent on imports. Their trade deficits have been financed by the global property bubble - borrowing in foreign currency against property that was free of debt at independence. Now the bubble has burst and it is payback time. No more credit is flowing to the Baltics from Swedish banks, to Hungary from Austrian banks or to Iceland from Britain and the Netherlands. Unemployment is rising and governments are slashing healthcare and education budgets. The resulting economic shrinkage is leaving large swathes of property in negative equity.
Austerity programmes were common in developing countries from the 1970s to the 1990s, but European democracies have little tolerance for such an approach. As matters stand, families are losing their homes and emigration is accelerating. This is not what capitalism promised.
Populations are asking not only whether debts should be paid, but - as in Iceland - whether they can be paid. If they cannot be, then trying to pay will only shrink economies further, stopping them becoming viable.
Will Britain and the Netherlands accept Iceland's condition? Trying to squeeze out more debt service than a country could pay requires an oppressive and extractive fiscal and financial regime, Keynes warned, which in turn would inspire a nationalistic political reaction to break free of creditor-nation demands. This is what happened in the 1920s when Germany's economy was wrecked by the rigid ideology of the sanctity of debt.
A pragmatic economic principle is at work: a debt that cannot be paid, will not be. What remains an open question is just how these debts will not be paid. Will many be written off? Or will Iceland, Latvia and other debtors be plunged into austerity in an attempt to squeeze out an economic surplus to avoid default?
The latter option may drive debt-laden countries in a new direction. Eva Joly, the French prosecutor brought in to sort out Iceland's banking crisis, warned this month that Iceland would have little left but its natural resources and strategic position: "Russia, for example, might well find it attractive." The post-Soviet countries are already seeing voters shift away from Europe in reaction to the destructive policies the EU supported.
Something has to give. Will rigid ideology give way to economic reality, or the other way round?
The writer is professor of economics at the University of Missouri
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/610316c4-8ac4-11de-ad08-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1
Showing posts with label ft. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ft. Show all posts
21 August 2009
11 August 2009
The next Japanese Prime Minister's plans a rational retreat from neoliberalism
“Under the principle of fraternity, we will not implement policies that leave economic activities in areas relating to human lives and safety, such as agriculture, the environment and medicine, at the mercy of the tides of globalism,” Mr Hatoyama wrote.
Analysts say that wide policy differences within the often fractious DPJ make it difficult to predict how such statements of principle might be put into practice. Mr Hatoyama highlighted the need for better welfare, more child support and wealth redistribution.
He made clear that while security ties with the US would remain a “diplomatic cornerstone”, Japan must do much more to tighten links with Asian neighbours such as China and South Korea.
“As a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of the US-led globalism is coming to an end and …we are moving away from a unipolar world led by the US towards an era of multipolarity,” the DPJ leader said, adding that fears about China's military rise were a big factor in “accelerating regional integration”.
Japan should "aspire to the move towards regional currency integration" and "spare no effort" in building the security frameworks needed to make union possible, he wrote, adding that the example of European Union showed that integration itself could be the best way of defusing territorial disputes often seen as an impediment to closer ties.
Mr Hatoyama also emphasised the DPJ's campaign pledge to push devolution of power to local governments within Japan as embodying his fraternal values, again approvingly citing European examples.Dismissing the “Ministry of Finance-led theory” of trying to rebuild Japan's state finances through welfare cuts and tax rises, he said he would aim to reform bureaucracy, regain trust in the pension system and give regions fiscal autonomy.
“Resolving our fiscal problems is impossible without comprehensively rebuilding Japan's political systems,” Mr Hatoyama wrote.
http://forums.wallstreetexaminer.com/index.php?showtopic=831802
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e041b3e6-85d8-11de-98de-00144feabdc0.html
28 April 2009
How libertarian dogma led the Fed astray By Henry Kaufman ~FT
Interesting take anyway..
The Federal Reserve has been hobbled by at least two major shortcomings that were primarily responsible for the current and several previous credit crises. Its failure to spot the importance of changing financial markets and its commitment to laisser faire economics were big mistakes and justify a fundamental overhaul of the Fed.
The first of these shortcomings was its failure to recognize the significance for monetary policy of structural changes in the markets, changes that surfaced early in the postwar era. The Fed failed to grasp early on the significance of financial innovations that eased the creation of new credit. Perhaps the most far-reaching of these was the securitisation of hard-to-trade assets. This created the illusion that credit risk could be reduced if instruments became marketable.
Moreover, elaborate new techniques employed in securitisation (such as credit guarantees and insurance) blurred credit risks and raised – from my perspective, many years ago – the vexing question, “Who is the real guardian of credit?” Instead of addressing these issues, the Fed was highly supportive of securitisation.
One of the Fed’s biggest blind spots has been its failure to recognise the problems that huge financial conglomerates would pose for financial stability – including their key role in the current debt overload. The Fed allowed the Glass-Steagall Act to succumb without appreciating the negative consequences of allowing investment and commercial banks to be put together. Within two decades or so, financial conglomerates have come to utterly dominate financial markets and financial behaviour. But monetary policymakers failed to recognise that these behemoths were honeycombed with conflicts of interest that interfered with effective credit allocation.
Nor did the Fed recognise the crucial role that the large financial conglomerates have played in changing the public’s perception of liquidity. Traditionally, liquidity was an asset-based concept. But this shifted to the liability side, as liquidity came to be virtually synonymous with easy borrowing. That would not have happened without the marketing efforts of large institutions.
My second major concern about the conduct of monetary policy is the Fed’s prevailing economic libertarianism. At the heart of this economic dogma is the belief that markets know best and that those who compete well will prosper, while those who do not will fail.
How did this affect the Fed’s actions and behaviour? First, it explains to a large extent why the Fed did not strongly oppose the removal of Glass-Steagall restrictions.
Second, it also helps explain why the Fed failed to recognise that abandoning Glass-Steagall created more institutions that were “too big to fail”.
Third, it diminished the supervisory role of the Fed, especially its direct responsibility to regulate bank holding companies. To be sure, the Fed’s supervisory responsibilities have never been very visible in the monetary policy decision-making process. But its tilt toward an economic libertarian approach pushed supervision a notch down just at a time when financial market complexity was on the rise. Fourth, as hands-on supervision slackened, quantitative risk modelling became increasingly acceptable. This approach, especially quantitative modelling to assess the safety of a financial institution, was far from adequate. But it worked hand in glove with a philosophy that markets knew best.
Fifth, adherence to economic libertarianism inhibited the Fed from using the bully pulpit or moral suasion to constrain market excesses. It is difficult to believe that recourse to moral suasion by a Fed chairman would be ineffective. Such public pronouncements about financial excesses are hard to ignore, reaching the broad public as well as market participants.
Sixth, the Fed’s increasingly libertarian philosophy underpinned its view that it could not know how to recognise a credit bubble but knew what to do once a bubble burst. This is a philosophy plagued with fallacies. Credit bubbles can be detected in a number of ways, such as rapid growth of credit, very high price/earnings ratios and very narrow yield spreads between high- and low-quality debt.
By guiding monetary policy in a libertarian direction, the Fed played a central role in creating a financial environment defined by excessive credit growth and unrestrained profit seeking. Major participants came to fear that if they failed to embrace the new world of securitised debt, proxy debt instruments, and quantitative risk analysis, they stood a very good chance of seeing their market shares shrink, top staff defect, and profits dwindle.
Ironically, the problem was made worse by the fact that the Fed was inconsistently libertarian. The central bank stuck to its hands-off approach during monetary expansion but abandoned it when constraint was necessary. And that, in turn, projected an unpredictable and inconsistent set of rules of the game.
We should, therefore, fundamentally re-examine the role of the Fed and the supervision of our financial institutions. Are the current arrangements within the Fed structure adequate – from its regional representation to its compensation for chairman and governors to its terms of office for governors? How can the Fed’s decision-making process be improved? If we were to create a new central bank from the ground up, how would it differ? At a minimum, the Fed’s sensitivity to financial excesses must be improved.
The writer is president, Henry Kaufman & Company
The Federal Reserve has been hobbled by at least two major shortcomings that were primarily responsible for the current and several previous credit crises. Its failure to spot the importance of changing financial markets and its commitment to laisser faire economics were big mistakes and justify a fundamental overhaul of the Fed.
The first of these shortcomings was its failure to recognize the significance for monetary policy of structural changes in the markets, changes that surfaced early in the postwar era. The Fed failed to grasp early on the significance of financial innovations that eased the creation of new credit. Perhaps the most far-reaching of these was the securitisation of hard-to-trade assets. This created the illusion that credit risk could be reduced if instruments became marketable.
Moreover, elaborate new techniques employed in securitisation (such as credit guarantees and insurance) blurred credit risks and raised – from my perspective, many years ago – the vexing question, “Who is the real guardian of credit?” Instead of addressing these issues, the Fed was highly supportive of securitisation.
One of the Fed’s biggest blind spots has been its failure to recognise the problems that huge financial conglomerates would pose for financial stability – including their key role in the current debt overload. The Fed allowed the Glass-Steagall Act to succumb without appreciating the negative consequences of allowing investment and commercial banks to be put together. Within two decades or so, financial conglomerates have come to utterly dominate financial markets and financial behaviour. But monetary policymakers failed to recognise that these behemoths were honeycombed with conflicts of interest that interfered with effective credit allocation.
Nor did the Fed recognise the crucial role that the large financial conglomerates have played in changing the public’s perception of liquidity. Traditionally, liquidity was an asset-based concept. But this shifted to the liability side, as liquidity came to be virtually synonymous with easy borrowing. That would not have happened without the marketing efforts of large institutions.
My second major concern about the conduct of monetary policy is the Fed’s prevailing economic libertarianism. At the heart of this economic dogma is the belief that markets know best and that those who compete well will prosper, while those who do not will fail.
How did this affect the Fed’s actions and behaviour? First, it explains to a large extent why the Fed did not strongly oppose the removal of Glass-Steagall restrictions.
Second, it also helps explain why the Fed failed to recognise that abandoning Glass-Steagall created more institutions that were “too big to fail”.
Third, it diminished the supervisory role of the Fed, especially its direct responsibility to regulate bank holding companies. To be sure, the Fed’s supervisory responsibilities have never been very visible in the monetary policy decision-making process. But its tilt toward an economic libertarian approach pushed supervision a notch down just at a time when financial market complexity was on the rise. Fourth, as hands-on supervision slackened, quantitative risk modelling became increasingly acceptable. This approach, especially quantitative modelling to assess the safety of a financial institution, was far from adequate. But it worked hand in glove with a philosophy that markets knew best.
Fifth, adherence to economic libertarianism inhibited the Fed from using the bully pulpit or moral suasion to constrain market excesses. It is difficult to believe that recourse to moral suasion by a Fed chairman would be ineffective. Such public pronouncements about financial excesses are hard to ignore, reaching the broad public as well as market participants.
Sixth, the Fed’s increasingly libertarian philosophy underpinned its view that it could not know how to recognise a credit bubble but knew what to do once a bubble burst. This is a philosophy plagued with fallacies. Credit bubbles can be detected in a number of ways, such as rapid growth of credit, very high price/earnings ratios and very narrow yield spreads between high- and low-quality debt.
By guiding monetary policy in a libertarian direction, the Fed played a central role in creating a financial environment defined by excessive credit growth and unrestrained profit seeking. Major participants came to fear that if they failed to embrace the new world of securitised debt, proxy debt instruments, and quantitative risk analysis, they stood a very good chance of seeing their market shares shrink, top staff defect, and profits dwindle.
Ironically, the problem was made worse by the fact that the Fed was inconsistently libertarian. The central bank stuck to its hands-off approach during monetary expansion but abandoned it when constraint was necessary. And that, in turn, projected an unpredictable and inconsistent set of rules of the game.
We should, therefore, fundamentally re-examine the role of the Fed and the supervision of our financial institutions. Are the current arrangements within the Fed structure adequate – from its regional representation to its compensation for chairman and governors to its terms of office for governors? How can the Fed’s decision-making process be improved? If we were to create a new central bank from the ground up, how would it differ? At a minimum, the Fed’s sensitivity to financial excesses must be improved.
The writer is president, Henry Kaufman & Company
17 April 2009
Era of finance as profit center is over~ Wolf FT
"In recent research, Thomas Philippon of New York University’s Stern School of Business and Ariell Reshef of the University of Virginia conclude that the financial sector was a high-skill, high-wage industry between 1909 and 1933. It then went into relative decline until 1980, whereupon it again started to be a high-skill, high-wage sector.* They conclude that the prime cause was deregulation, which “unleashes creativity and innovation and increases demand for skilled workers”.
Deregulation also generates growth of credit, the raw stuff the financial sector creates and on which it feeds. Transmutation of credit into income is why the profitability of the financial system can be illusory. Equally, the expansion of the financial sector will reverse, at least within the US: credit growth and leverage masked low or even non-existent profitability of much activity, which will disappear, and part of the debt must also be liquidated. The golden age of Wall Street is over: the return of regulation is cause and consequence of this shift.
Yet Prof Johnson makes a stronger point than this. He argues that the refusal of powerful institutions to admit losses – aided and abetted by a government in thrall to the “money-changers” – may make it impossible to escape from the crisis. Moreover, since the US enjoys the privilege of being able to borrow in its own currency it is far easier for it than for mere emerging economies to paper over cracks, turning crisis into long-term economic malaise. So we have witnessed a series of improvisations or “deals” whose underlying aim is to rescue as much of the financial system as possible in as generous a way as policymakers think they can get away with.
I agree with the critique of the policies adopted so far. In the debate on the Financial Times’s economists’ forum on Treasury secretary Tim Geithner’s “public/private investment partnership”, the critics are right: if it works, it is because it is a non-transparent way of transferring taxpayer wealth to banks. But it is unlikely to fill the capital hole that the markets are, at present, ignoring, as Michael Pomerleano argues. Nor am I persuaded that the “stress tests” of bank capital under way will lead to action that fills the capital hole.
Yet do these weaknesses make the US into Russia? No. In many emerging economies corruption is egregious and overt. In the US, influence comes as much from a system of beliefs as from lobbying (although the latter was not absent). What was good for Wall Street was deemed good for the world. The result was a bipartisan programme of ill-designed deregulation for the US and, given its influence, the world.
Moreover, the belief that Wall Street needs to be preserved largely as it is now is mainly a consequence of fear. The view that large and complex financial institutions are too big to fail may be wrong. But it is easy to understand why intelligent policymakers shrink from testing it. At the same time, politicians fear a public backlash against large infusions of public capital. So, like Japan, the US is caught between the elite’s fear of bankruptcy and the public’s loathing of bail-outs. This is a more complex phenomenon than the “quiet coup” Prof Johnson describes.
Yet decisive restructuring is indeed necessary. This is not because returning the economy to the debt-fuelled growth of recent years is either feasible or desirable. But two things must be achieved: first, the core financial institutions must become credibly solvent; and, second, no profit-seeking private institution can remain too big to fail. That is not capitalism, but socialism. That is one of the points on which the right and the left agree. They are right. Bankruptcy – and so losses for unsecured creditors – must be a part of any durable solution. Without that change, the resolution of this crisis can only be the harbinger of the next."
Deregulation also generates growth of credit, the raw stuff the financial sector creates and on which it feeds. Transmutation of credit into income is why the profitability of the financial system can be illusory. Equally, the expansion of the financial sector will reverse, at least within the US: credit growth and leverage masked low or even non-existent profitability of much activity, which will disappear, and part of the debt must also be liquidated. The golden age of Wall Street is over: the return of regulation is cause and consequence of this shift.
Yet Prof Johnson makes a stronger point than this. He argues that the refusal of powerful institutions to admit losses – aided and abetted by a government in thrall to the “money-changers” – may make it impossible to escape from the crisis. Moreover, since the US enjoys the privilege of being able to borrow in its own currency it is far easier for it than for mere emerging economies to paper over cracks, turning crisis into long-term economic malaise. So we have witnessed a series of improvisations or “deals” whose underlying aim is to rescue as much of the financial system as possible in as generous a way as policymakers think they can get away with.
I agree with the critique of the policies adopted so far. In the debate on the Financial Times’s economists’ forum on Treasury secretary Tim Geithner’s “public/private investment partnership”, the critics are right: if it works, it is because it is a non-transparent way of transferring taxpayer wealth to banks. But it is unlikely to fill the capital hole that the markets are, at present, ignoring, as Michael Pomerleano argues. Nor am I persuaded that the “stress tests” of bank capital under way will lead to action that fills the capital hole.
Yet do these weaknesses make the US into Russia? No. In many emerging economies corruption is egregious and overt. In the US, influence comes as much from a system of beliefs as from lobbying (although the latter was not absent). What was good for Wall Street was deemed good for the world. The result was a bipartisan programme of ill-designed deregulation for the US and, given its influence, the world.
Moreover, the belief that Wall Street needs to be preserved largely as it is now is mainly a consequence of fear. The view that large and complex financial institutions are too big to fail may be wrong. But it is easy to understand why intelligent policymakers shrink from testing it. At the same time, politicians fear a public backlash against large infusions of public capital. So, like Japan, the US is caught between the elite’s fear of bankruptcy and the public’s loathing of bail-outs. This is a more complex phenomenon than the “quiet coup” Prof Johnson describes.
Yet decisive restructuring is indeed necessary. This is not because returning the economy to the debt-fuelled growth of recent years is either feasible or desirable. But two things must be achieved: first, the core financial institutions must become credibly solvent; and, second, no profit-seeking private institution can remain too big to fail. That is not capitalism, but socialism. That is one of the points on which the right and the left agree. They are right. Bankruptcy – and so losses for unsecured creditors – must be a part of any durable solution. Without that change, the resolution of this crisis can only be the harbinger of the next."
26 February 2009
Gold coin shortage as demand soars
The rush by retail investors into bullion coins is creating shortages as mints across the world struggle to meet the surge in demand, dealers and mint officials say.
The scarcity is lifting coin premiums to as much as 5 per cent above the spot gold price, a level reached briefly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers last September, when coin shortages also surfaced.
Spot gold in London on Wednesday traded at $972 an ounce, below last week’s peak of $1,004.5.
“There is demand for double or triple what the US mint is able to produce,” said Michael Kramer, president of MTB in New York, one of the four US gold dealers authorised to purchase bullion coins directly from the government’s mint.
The US Mint has sold 193,500 ounces of its popular American Eagle gold coin in the first seven weeks of this year, the same amount it shipped during the whole of 2007 and about the same as in the first six months of last year.
“The demand is extraordinary. All the coins we got on Monday are gone today [Tuesday] and we will not be able to take any order until the following week,” Mr Kramer said. “It is the same with other mints.”
Bullion coins used to be bought mainly by collectors and gold bugs, but the financial crisis is leading regular retail investors to embrace them, dealers say.
Although the surge in coin demand is a bullish signal for gold prices, the fact that mints cannot match demand means that the potential extra consumption does not push spot prices higher, but just drives premiums above normal levels.
The Rand Refinery in Johannesburg, which mints the world’s most popular gold coin, South Africa’s Krugerrand, said demand was above its maximum capacity, even after doubling last month to 20,000 ounces from 10,000 ounces a week.
Johan Botha, head of precious metals sales at the Rand Refinery, said there was demand for more from international investors, pointing to strong sales to Switzerland, the UK and Germany. “If we were able to produce 30,000 ounces,the market would absorb it,” he said.
Mr Kramer said MTB had Krugerrand orders equal to three months of refinery supplies to the company.
The New Zealand Mint said it was doing as much business in a day as in a month a year ago, mostly servicing global investors.
Michael O’Kane, head of gold sales at the New Zealand Mint, said: “Most mints and bullion manufacturers are struggling to meet current demand levels.”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/666b7ff0-036c-11de-b405-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1
The scarcity is lifting coin premiums to as much as 5 per cent above the spot gold price, a level reached briefly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers last September, when coin shortages also surfaced.
Spot gold in London on Wednesday traded at $972 an ounce, below last week’s peak of $1,004.5.
“There is demand for double or triple what the US mint is able to produce,” said Michael Kramer, president of MTB in New York, one of the four US gold dealers authorised to purchase bullion coins directly from the government’s mint.
The US Mint has sold 193,500 ounces of its popular American Eagle gold coin in the first seven weeks of this year, the same amount it shipped during the whole of 2007 and about the same as in the first six months of last year.
“The demand is extraordinary. All the coins we got on Monday are gone today [Tuesday] and we will not be able to take any order until the following week,” Mr Kramer said. “It is the same with other mints.”
Bullion coins used to be bought mainly by collectors and gold bugs, but the financial crisis is leading regular retail investors to embrace them, dealers say.
Although the surge in coin demand is a bullish signal for gold prices, the fact that mints cannot match demand means that the potential extra consumption does not push spot prices higher, but just drives premiums above normal levels.
The Rand Refinery in Johannesburg, which mints the world’s most popular gold coin, South Africa’s Krugerrand, said demand was above its maximum capacity, even after doubling last month to 20,000 ounces from 10,000 ounces a week.
Johan Botha, head of precious metals sales at the Rand Refinery, said there was demand for more from international investors, pointing to strong sales to Switzerland, the UK and Germany. “If we were able to produce 30,000 ounces,the market would absorb it,” he said.
Mr Kramer said MTB had Krugerrand orders equal to three months of refinery supplies to the company.
The New Zealand Mint said it was doing as much business in a day as in a month a year ago, mostly servicing global investors.
Michael O’Kane, head of gold sales at the New Zealand Mint, said: “Most mints and bullion manufacturers are struggling to meet current demand levels.”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/666b7ff0-036c-11de-b405-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1
20 February 2009
Insight: Gold primed to be ‘mania asset’
Gold is exhibiting all the classic signs of being in a structural bull market. On fears of inflation in early 2008, it rallied. Then, on fears of deflation in late 2008, it rallied again.
In our view, that question is the wrong starting point. On the contrary, the rationale for owning gold, as it once again approaches the $1,000 an ounce level, is the prospect of mounting monetary disorder.
The US Federal Reserve, having flooded the market with liquidity by more than doubling its balance sheet in less than six months, may be unable or unwilling to withdraw it in time for fear of precipitating a secondary relapse in economic activity. Other central bankers will also face intense pressures to “support” their domestic economy by weakening the currency, leading to competitive currency devaluations.
The race to the bottom in fiat currencies has begun and hard assets, particularly gold and silver, should be the primary beneficiaries.
Gold is a prime candidate to become a “mania asset” once its demand becomes chiefly financially driven as opposed to jewellery and/or industrial demand driven where its upside could be capped by “sticker shock”.
In fact, gold is currently one of the few remaining major asset classes where a case could be made for it to rise in a parabolic fashion. Once the psychologically significant $1,000 an ounce is breached convincingly, the speed of the move beyond that level could accelerate sharply. One precondition for a mania is there must be uncertainty about how the asset is properly valued which allows “new era” thinking to take hold. This is very true for gold.
Price explosion might not be imminent, however. Gold is experiencing unprecedented buying by exchange-traded funds, offset by substantially reduced jewellery demand. The fall in the Indian rupee has meant Indian gold prices have reached record levels. This is causing a slowdown in jewellery purchases (even though rupee expenditure levels are holding up, the tonnage of gold imports is suffering).
The long-term story for gold, however, is as a remonetisation play as investors lose faith in fiat currencies. Keep an eye on gold lease rates; a spike would be a good lead indicator that gold is about to punch higher as this would reflect a shortage of lendable bullion. Rising lease rates will cause gold to go into backwardation as holders of gold may not want to sell their gold forward under any circumstances a trend currently evidenced by the high physical premium being paid for gold coins.
Rising lease rates prefigured the last big move in gold back in the spring of 2007 just as the two Bear Stearns hedge funds were blowing up. Central Banks feared counterparty risk for the first time in 20 years and substantially curtailed gold lending and sales. This led to a 40 per cent rally in gold from $700 to over $1,000.
How high can gold ultimately go? A Dow Jones Industrial Average/gold ratio of 2:1 would be a good sign the bull market in gold is getting well advanced. We saw this in 1932 and 1980. Only nine years ago in 2000, however, this ratio reached over 40:1.
Arriving at 2:1 again does not necessarily mean the Dow must decline significantly from here; more likely gold prices surge and the Dow stays range-bound but volatile. Investors are looking for good risk/reward investments.
I cannot say with any confidence that gold will not be without risk and volatility but at least it offers early participants plenty of upside reward to compensate them for the wild ride.
Speaking to central bankers, this is the first time I can recall them actually favouring a high gold price. Normally they see high gold prices as a lack of trust in the financial system (not to mention their ability as central bankers). Alan Greenspan, the former Fed chairman, for example used to target a gold price of around $400 to $500 an ounce.
Recently, the central bankers have become more enamoured of higher gold prices as it would suggest that their attempts to stave off deflation were starting to work.
Central bankers in favour of higher gold prices? Things really have changed.
The writer is manager of the RAB Gold Strategy
link
In our view, that question is the wrong starting point. On the contrary, the rationale for owning gold, as it once again approaches the $1,000 an ounce level, is the prospect of mounting monetary disorder.
The US Federal Reserve, having flooded the market with liquidity by more than doubling its balance sheet in less than six months, may be unable or unwilling to withdraw it in time for fear of precipitating a secondary relapse in economic activity. Other central bankers will also face intense pressures to “support” their domestic economy by weakening the currency, leading to competitive currency devaluations.
The race to the bottom in fiat currencies has begun and hard assets, particularly gold and silver, should be the primary beneficiaries.
Gold is a prime candidate to become a “mania asset” once its demand becomes chiefly financially driven as opposed to jewellery and/or industrial demand driven where its upside could be capped by “sticker shock”.
In fact, gold is currently one of the few remaining major asset classes where a case could be made for it to rise in a parabolic fashion. Once the psychologically significant $1,000 an ounce is breached convincingly, the speed of the move beyond that level could accelerate sharply. One precondition for a mania is there must be uncertainty about how the asset is properly valued which allows “new era” thinking to take hold. This is very true for gold.
Price explosion might not be imminent, however. Gold is experiencing unprecedented buying by exchange-traded funds, offset by substantially reduced jewellery demand. The fall in the Indian rupee has meant Indian gold prices have reached record levels. This is causing a slowdown in jewellery purchases (even though rupee expenditure levels are holding up, the tonnage of gold imports is suffering).
The long-term story for gold, however, is as a remonetisation play as investors lose faith in fiat currencies. Keep an eye on gold lease rates; a spike would be a good lead indicator that gold is about to punch higher as this would reflect a shortage of lendable bullion. Rising lease rates will cause gold to go into backwardation as holders of gold may not want to sell their gold forward under any circumstances a trend currently evidenced by the high physical premium being paid for gold coins.
Rising lease rates prefigured the last big move in gold back in the spring of 2007 just as the two Bear Stearns hedge funds were blowing up. Central Banks feared counterparty risk for the first time in 20 years and substantially curtailed gold lending and sales. This led to a 40 per cent rally in gold from $700 to over $1,000.
How high can gold ultimately go? A Dow Jones Industrial Average/gold ratio of 2:1 would be a good sign the bull market in gold is getting well advanced. We saw this in 1932 and 1980. Only nine years ago in 2000, however, this ratio reached over 40:1.
Arriving at 2:1 again does not necessarily mean the Dow must decline significantly from here; more likely gold prices surge and the Dow stays range-bound but volatile. Investors are looking for good risk/reward investments.
I cannot say with any confidence that gold will not be without risk and volatility but at least it offers early participants plenty of upside reward to compensate them for the wild ride.
Speaking to central bankers, this is the first time I can recall them actually favouring a high gold price. Normally they see high gold prices as a lack of trust in the financial system (not to mention their ability as central bankers). Alan Greenspan, the former Fed chairman, for example used to target a gold price of around $400 to $500 an ounce.
Recently, the central bankers have become more enamoured of higher gold prices as it would suggest that their attempts to stave off deflation were starting to work.
Central bankers in favour of higher gold prices? Things really have changed.
The writer is manager of the RAB Gold Strategy
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