I spent several months in Afghanistan in 1977 ( A lost boy? You bet!) and the logic of repeating the errors of two centuries of great power intervention; most recently by the Soviet Union, escapes me. This guy walked all over the place, he agrees with me.
watch
LEIGH SALES, PRESENTER: Rory Stewart, who as I explained earlier, has crammed about half a dozen lives into his thirty six years. He's served as a British diplomat and was awarded an OBE for his military service in the British army in Iraq. His best-selling book “The Places In Between” documents his 6000-mile journey by foot through Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Nepal.
In 2004, Mr Stewart started the Turquoise Mountain Foundation in Kabul which creates jobs and skills in Afghanistan's traditional crafts.
And since earlier this year he's been the director of the Carr Centre for Human Rights at Harvard University.
Rory Stewart joins us now live from London.
Professor Stewart I'll ask you a little about your life later but let's start with the recent news out of Afghanistan. The British Government has declared Operation Panther's Claw a success. Could that end up being a bit of a "Mission Accomplished" moment?
RORY STEWART, CARR CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARVARD: I think it's very dangerous to talk about success because we have no clear indications of what we're trying to achieve in that country. Sometimes we talk about stability, sometimes we talk about stat-building, sometimes we talk about trying to defeat the Taliban, sometimes we talk about trying to stabilise Pakistan. All that's really happened in the last few weeks is that they have managed to re-take some ground, quite small ground, about the size of a small island, the Isle of Wight off the coast of Britain - and they're going to try to hold it.
And then they're expecting somehow Afghan government institutions to flourish. Honestly I think a lot of this is a waste of time and sadly a waste of lives.
LEIGH SALES: Why do you think that?
RORY STEWART: Because Afghanistan's problems are much more deep-seated. They're not things that are going to be resolved with foreign troops and short-term operations. It will take 20 or 30 years for a country as poor and as traumatised as Afghanistan to reach the kind of levels of a country even like Pakistan and of course Pakistan itself is not stable.
The most that the West should be trying to do in Pakistan is to provide gentle, light support over 20, 30 years but these military operations I cannot really see the purpose of them.
LEIGH SALES: I will talk to you about some of the strategic issues in a moment. But let's set the context first. You've written that Afghanistan's political and strategic significance has been exaggerated. What do you mean?
RORY STEWART: From almost every point of view many other countries are more important than Afghanistan. If you just take Pakistan on its border. Pakistan has a nuclear bomb. Afghanistan hasn't. Pakistan is where Osama bin Laden is. He is not in Afghanistan. Pakistan has the opportunity to destabilise India. So it's 20 times more important than Afghanistan but we're putting 20-times more resources into Afghanistan than Pakistan.
And you could probably make the same point about Iran, and of course in broader strategic terms about many other countries in the world ranging from North Korea to China.
LEIGH SALES: You've spent considerable time in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The so-called surge was success in Iraq yet you're one of the few voice arguing against the surge in Afghanistan. Tell me a little bit about your thinking on that.
RORY STEWART: In Iraq, the surge was largely a success because Iraqi politicians, particularly the big Shia parties, got behind it. And the Sunni tribal groups who were under a lot of pressure decided to broker a deal. So it was an Iraqi-led process. The troop increases was not the key.
In Afghanistan, we simply don't have those kind of political forces. The Afghan Government doesn't have the weight or the mass political support of the Baghdad Government. And there aren't people coming to us in the way the Sunni tribal groups did in Iraq and saying, "We want to lay down our arms. We want a ceasefire and in return we would like uniforms and salaries."
So without that Afghan push, troop increases on their own are not going to achieve anything.
LEIGH SALES: Is there anything that could make the push come from the Afghan side?
RORY STEWART: I think it's very difficult but, yes, of course. Afghans are generally much more canny, much more competent than the international community acknowledges.
And I see again and again in my work in Kabul that when Afghans want to sort something out, they can. But the challenge for the international community is to understand that you can't force that process and there are many people in southern and eastern Afghanistan who are relatively conservative, who are suspicious of foreign troops, who may not like the Taliban but may prefer them to the foreign troops and there needs to be a political accommodation that recognises that.
LEIGH SALES: You've written that the best Afghan policy would be to reduce the number of foreign troops from the current level of about 90,000 to far fewer, perhaps 20,000. In that situation, what would be the objectives of the reduced military mission?
RORY STEWART: I think the objective of the reduced mission would be much more focused on counter-terrorism. In other words, it wouldn't be trying to fight the Taliban, who predominantly are a domestic Afghan force. The Taliban's agenda is really to take over the Government of Afghanistan. Instead it would focus on al Qaida and their international terrorist agenda. And what you would like look at is the special forces and intelligence presence over a very long period, whose job would be to ensure that Osama bin Laden couldn't again re-establish terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.
LEIGH SALES: If there are only a small number of troop, though, couldn't they easily be overpowered by hostile Afghan forces?
RORY STEWART: Again, it depends what you're trying to do. The key here is to distinguish between international terrorists, people who want to attack Australia, the United States, Europe, and many people in Afghanistan fighting our troops who have no international agenda at all whose problem basically is with the Kabul Government that they perceive as corrupt and with foreign troops in their country. So I think if you were able to focus on the counter-terrorism mission, you should be able to maintain that. And it should certainly be possible to defend our basis against the Taliban, who have no conventional option.
LEIGH SALES: We've heard the senior American military commanders make the exact opposite argument to you, which is that rather than reducing troop numbers they need to increase troop numbers. Why do you think that they hold the exact opposite view to you?
RORY STEWART: Because naturally if you're a general you're going to go for a maximalist solution. You want to have as many resource as possible and troops as possible. The job of politicians or the voting public is to check the military and to say, "We have many other priorities and many other responsibilities around the world. We simply cannot afford to put all our eggs in our basket."
So as you saw in Vietnam took what started as a few thousand troops up to 500,000 eventually. And the military in Iraq, in Afghanistan will push again and again for more resource an troops. We need to push back and say, "Ultimately Afghanistan does not justify this kind of troop presence." We need to look at the world in general, we need to husband our resources for other crises occurring in other countries. We simply cannot put this amount into a country like Afghanistan.
LEIGH SALES: Do your views mean that you think the surge in Afghanistan will fail?
RORY STEWART: I certainly believe that, if they think they can create an enduring stability through the current strategy, it will fail. They will not get an enduring stability. Afghanistan is likely - it's very difficult to predict but it's likely in the future to remain a fragile, poor, traumatised country. And the thing that will turn that around will not be foreign troops, it will be the Afghans themselves.
LEIGH SALES: And what will drive them to eventually do that?
RORY STEWART: This is a question partly of political leadership. It's also a question of will, a question of resources. Essentially Afghans need to have a sense of what kind of country they want to live in. Once that's developed it's perfectly plausible for an Afghan force to emerge which could win the support, the attention of its people and which can stabilise the country. And I think the international community Europe, the United States and the other partners on the ground could certainly play a useful part in training or providing logistical or technical support to Afghans to do those things. But I think foreign troops trying to go on the lead will be seen as an occupying power and that's self-defeating.
LEIGH SALES: Afghanistan will hold elections next month for the presidency and provincial council representatives, how do you see that playing out?
RORY STEWART: I would imagine that what will happen in the elections is that President Karzai, the existing President will be re-elected which will mean that the current political structures in Afghanistan, broadly-speaking, will remain unchanged. The kind of cabinet he will bring in will resemble he had before and the kind of things the international community has been complaining about in Afghanistan will persist.
LEIGH SALES: So more of the same?
RORY STEWART: Yes. Which is why I think, again, the international community needs to be more realistic. This is a country where perhaps 40 per cent of people cannot read or write, where in schools about a quarter of the teachers are illiterate. This is not a country which is going to be able to be transformed overnight into a stable, functioning state in the way that NATO and the other allies on the ground seem to imagine.
LEIGH SALES: If, as you say it's not a particularly or its political and strategic significance is overstated, then why should the West have any stake in improving the lot of Afghanis? Why not just leave the whole thing to them?
RORY STEWART: Because I think we have some responsibilities, not an overwhelming responsibility, not a blank-cheque responsibility. But we have invaded this country. We have disrupted things.
So it seems perfectly reasonable that we should continue over a 20, 30 year period to provide international assistance and aid. But it shouldn't be extravagant but proportional to the sort of assistance we provide to other poor countries around the world. We have aid programs in Nepal. We are trying to work in countries even as difficult as Somalia.
So both from a view of our moral obligations to Afghans we should be doing something but also in terms of self-interest. It's very useful to keep intelligence operatives in a country which has in the past provided some support for international terrorism.
But we need to look at this as a long-term management and containment issue, not as a question of electro-shock therapy pumping in the troops to try to sort everything out.
LEIGH SALES: Tonight, the Japanese Opposition Leader said that he would withdraw from Afghanistan next year and public opinion in other countries has slowly over time turned against the war in Afghanistan. How long do you think governments will be able to resist withdrawal when their populations are increasingly opposed to involvement?
RORY STEWART: I think in cases such as Canada or Germany where, of course, the populations are largely against, the governments are going to respond to that. The interesting case of course is Britain.
In Britain more and more of the population are in favour of the war in Afghanistan. At a time when the Government itself seems to be quite sceptical. So it's almost the opposite problem. In Germany, parliamentarians are going all out to maintain a position in Afghanistan when the public is against them. In Britain, it's the Prime Minister and the Government who are limiting the number of troops and the public and the newspapers are pushing to deploy more.
LEIGH SALES: The British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has said it's time to talk with moderate Taliban leadership, what do you think?
RORY STEWART: This is fine. But it's nothing new. From the very beginning people have understood the importance of trying to talk to the Taliban. We haven't done it very effectively but there were efforts as far back as 2002, 2003. Everybody acknowledges that the only way you can solve this kind of insurgency is to try to negotiate with moderate elements. But the real problem is: Why would they want to negotiate with you? What sort of carrot or stick do you really have to bring them to the table? And how do you draw the distinction between moderate and the extreme elements and what sort of concessions are you prepared to make.
Of course in principle, talking is no problem but what seems unlikely is they're unlikely to come up with any real solution.
LEIGH SALES: So there are no obvious carrots or sticks?
RORY STEWART: No, because the Taliban of course when under pressured can quite easily disperse or cross across the border into Pakistan. What they're really aiming for is to take a stake in the Government and negotiators will be reluctant to give them that because that seems to be exactly what we're fighting against. I can't really see how that kind of negotiation can operate. And, for sure, that kind of negotiation would need to be negotiation led by the Afghan Government. Not by foreigners. It's not something Britain, for example, could do.
LEIGH SALES: I explained some of your background, that very long list of adventures and achievements. Don't you feel guilty just sitting back and letting life pass you by like this?
RORY STEWART: That's what it feels like, for sure.
LEIGH SALES: I only really skimmed over what you've done. Did you set out to live a highly adventurous life?
RORY STEWART: I've been very lucky. But I grew up - I was born in Hong Kong, I grew up in Malaysia and my father was a very active outdoors person. He used to take me into the jungle when I was five or six. I became excited by the idea of being outside in the natural landscape. So I resigned from the foreign service and walked from Turkey to Bangladesh over 21 months, which was probably, I think, the best thing I've done in my life and a lot of the things I've done since then have come from those kinds of experiences.
LEIGH SALES: So what made you decide to take the job at Harvard, which some people might perhaps look at as a little more staid compared to some of the other things in your background?
RORY STEWART: I am not quite sure. I think I probably did it to please my mother.
LEIGH SALES: And is she pleased?
RORY STEWART: She's delighted.
LEIGH SALES: Is it true that Brad Pitt has bought the film rights to your life story thus far?
RORY STEWART: Yes, but I think this is a very uncertain world of film. I am hoping that Danny DeVito is going to play me in the movie.
LEIGH SALES: You might have to do a little bit of eating between now and when they start filming then.
RORY STEWART: Yeah. It's him or Judi Dench. I'm not sure which one.
LEIGH SALES: Judi Dench gets all the good British roles so, I'm sure that's what it will be who it ends up as.
Rory Stewart thank you very much for joining us tonight. A very good pleasure to have you on the program.
RORY STEWART: Thank you very much.
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2008/s2640378.htm
Showing posts with label afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label afghanistan. Show all posts
20 July 2009
Soldier killed in 'unwinnable' war
I havent a clue why Australians are still fighting in Afghanistan. I guess we are there because the US wants us there. Its all about energy and geopolitical plays, I guess; prevent the Stan's morphing into a energy bridge linking Russia and China, stabilise Pakistan, maintain pressure on Iran? who knows? We are in league with warlords and woman hating criminals and will therefore end up like everybody to ever get involved there, well, since Alexander the great, anyway be bled dry in the place...... the graveyard of empires.
THE Government knows it is pursuing a war in Afghanistan that it cannot win and that will make little difference to global terrorism, a leading defence analyst says.
Hugh White of the Lowy Institute and the Australian National University said last night that he did not believe winning or losing in Afghanistan would change the terrorism situation in Indonesia or anywhere else.
With an 11th Australian soldier, Private Benjamin Ranaudo, 22, dead in Afghanistan and more than 400 more troops leaving soon to fight there, the Government has been quick to link the war to global terrorism and the Jakarta bombings on Friday.
"The question is whether what we are doing in Afghanistan is going to succeed," Professor White said. "The Government cannot justify committing troops unless there is a reasonable chance they can succeed. I do not think the Government is persuaded that there is a significant chance of success in Afghanistan."
Professor White said he thought the Government feared that it would look weak if it withdrew from Afghanistan.
"If they are not convinced they have a reasonable chance of succeeding they have really got to ask themselves why they are asking Australian soldiers to die. I don't believe there is reasonable chance of winning in Afghanistan and I don't believe they believe there is a reasonable chance of winning in Afghanistan."
Private Ranaudo was killed on Saturday as his unit surrounded a walled compound in the Baluchi Valley while searching for suspected insurgents.
A second Australian soldier was seriously wounded. He will be flown to a specialist military hospital in Germany.
Three Afghan civilians, one an eight-year-old boy, were also hurt. They are being treated in Afghanistan.
Soldiers detained six Afghans, but later released three. The others were being questioned.
The Chief of the Defence Force, Angus Houston, said Private Ranaudo was a dedicated professional soldier who had completed an extraordinary array of training courses.
"He died ensuring that terrorist groups do not have Afghanistan as a base from which they can plan and mount attacks," he said.
Private Ranaudo had served in East Timor, and this was his first deployment to Afghanistan. His home town has not been revealed.
Air Chief Marshal Houston extended his deepest condolences to Private Ranaudo's family and friends, saying "We will do everything we can to support them as they deal with their terrible loss."
The Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, offered his condolences to Private Ranaudo's family but made it clear the Government remained committed to the war.
"It's important for us all to remember here in Australia that Afghanistan has been a training ground for terrorists worldwide, a training ground also for terrorists in South-East Asia, reminding us of the reasons that we are in that field of combat and reaffirming our resolve to remain committed to that cause," Mr Rudd said.
"It is in our long-term interest that we remain absolutely rock-solid in our commitment there."
The Defence Minister, John Faulkner, warned that the fighting would become more fierce as the northern summer progressed.
He said the troops in Afghanistan were doing a dangerous and difficult job.
"At times like this, the danger and the difficulty is brought home so very starkly to us all. As difficult as this news is, we must not forget the direct impact that terrorists had in our own region and of course have had on the lives of fellow Australians," he said.
"In the past, Afghanistan has been the training ground for terrorists that have killed innocent Australians in attacks such as Bali. That's why we remain committed to stabilising Afghanistan."
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/soldier-killed-in-unwinnable-war/2009/07/19/1247941827786.html?page=2
THE Government knows it is pursuing a war in Afghanistan that it cannot win and that will make little difference to global terrorism, a leading defence analyst says.
Hugh White of the Lowy Institute and the Australian National University said last night that he did not believe winning or losing in Afghanistan would change the terrorism situation in Indonesia or anywhere else.
With an 11th Australian soldier, Private Benjamin Ranaudo, 22, dead in Afghanistan and more than 400 more troops leaving soon to fight there, the Government has been quick to link the war to global terrorism and the Jakarta bombings on Friday.
"The question is whether what we are doing in Afghanistan is going to succeed," Professor White said. "The Government cannot justify committing troops unless there is a reasonable chance they can succeed. I do not think the Government is persuaded that there is a significant chance of success in Afghanistan."
Professor White said he thought the Government feared that it would look weak if it withdrew from Afghanistan.
"If they are not convinced they have a reasonable chance of succeeding they have really got to ask themselves why they are asking Australian soldiers to die. I don't believe there is reasonable chance of winning in Afghanistan and I don't believe they believe there is a reasonable chance of winning in Afghanistan."
Private Ranaudo was killed on Saturday as his unit surrounded a walled compound in the Baluchi Valley while searching for suspected insurgents.
A second Australian soldier was seriously wounded. He will be flown to a specialist military hospital in Germany.
Three Afghan civilians, one an eight-year-old boy, were also hurt. They are being treated in Afghanistan.
Soldiers detained six Afghans, but later released three. The others were being questioned.
The Chief of the Defence Force, Angus Houston, said Private Ranaudo was a dedicated professional soldier who had completed an extraordinary array of training courses.
"He died ensuring that terrorist groups do not have Afghanistan as a base from which they can plan and mount attacks," he said.
Private Ranaudo had served in East Timor, and this was his first deployment to Afghanistan. His home town has not been revealed.
Air Chief Marshal Houston extended his deepest condolences to Private Ranaudo's family and friends, saying "We will do everything we can to support them as they deal with their terrible loss."
The Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, offered his condolences to Private Ranaudo's family but made it clear the Government remained committed to the war.
"It's important for us all to remember here in Australia that Afghanistan has been a training ground for terrorists worldwide, a training ground also for terrorists in South-East Asia, reminding us of the reasons that we are in that field of combat and reaffirming our resolve to remain committed to that cause," Mr Rudd said.
"It is in our long-term interest that we remain absolutely rock-solid in our commitment there."
The Defence Minister, John Faulkner, warned that the fighting would become more fierce as the northern summer progressed.
He said the troops in Afghanistan were doing a dangerous and difficult job.
"At times like this, the danger and the difficulty is brought home so very starkly to us all. As difficult as this news is, we must not forget the direct impact that terrorists had in our own region and of course have had on the lives of fellow Australians," he said.
"In the past, Afghanistan has been the training ground for terrorists that have killed innocent Australians in attacks such as Bali. That's why we remain committed to stabilising Afghanistan."
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/soldier-killed-in-unwinnable-war/2009/07/19/1247941827786.html?page=2
23 April 2009
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Special Conference on Afghanistan
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Special Conference on Afghanistan, held in Moscow on 27 March, marks a new stage in the international community’s relations with this beleaguered country. It reflected the growing clout of Russia and China, the founders of the SCO, which includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and four observers — India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia.
In attendance for the first time were top US and NATO officials, including US Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Patrick Moon and NATO Deputy Secretary General Martin Howard, as well as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mark Perrin de Brichambaut. Among the 36 countries participating were representatives from the G8, the European Union and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. The unanimously adopted Joint Action Plan underlined the SCO’s importance “for practical interaction between Afghanistan and its neighbouring states in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime.”
The Moscow Declaration upstaged the UN Conference on Afghanistan held four days later, coming down hard on Pakistan with a call for more effective means to combat terrorism, including denying sanctuaries to the resistance. Coming just over a month after Kyrgyzstan announced the closing of the US airbase on its territory, the conference reiterated the SCO’s position that it is opposed to the expansion of US military interests in Central Asia, but is willing to expand cooperation with the US and NATO in Afghanistan, short of sending troops. Interestingly, Obama announced a shift in US policy emphasis on the same day as the SCO summit, promising greater consultation with Afghanistan ’s neighbours.
It also declared support for the efforts of the Karzai government, which is openly criticised as weak and corrupt by US officials. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin warned against creating a power vacuum in Afghanistan in the run-up to the presidential elections later this year. Russia also came out against negotiating with the Taliban.
The Russians believe that Afghan drug trafficking is the most serious threat to the security of Russia and Central Asia. Russia’s anti-drug chief Viktor Ivanov last week called the coalition’s anti-drug policy a fiasco, nothing that opium production in Afghanistan had soared since the deployment of US and NATO troops in the country. Afghan narcotics, he said, kill 30,000 people in Russia every year, twice as many as the Soviet Union lost during its decade-long military intervention in Afghanistan. The Action Plan calls for joint SCO-Afghan operations in combating drug trafficking and organised crime, including training of drug agencies, combating laundering of drug money and improving border controls.
The Plan reads like a roadmap for bringing Afghanistan into the SCO fold, a move which India’s envoy approved of. The idea of Afghanistan joining the SCO would clearly be anathema to the US, however, and Obama’s proposal to create a NATO-dominated Contact Group with Afghanistan is clearly a way to contain the growing influence of the SCO. But with NATO allies reluctant to back Obama’s surge strategy, major concessions will have to be made, affecting virtually all US foreign policy.
Russia has approved rail transit of non-military supplies to Afghanistan, and suggested this could include military cargo as well, though such approval is surely conditional on US actions affecting Russia, primarily its plans for missile bases in Eastern Europe and its campaign against Iran. Russian analyst Alexander Lukin says cooperation with the SCO offers the US and NATO an acceptable format to bring Iran into the dialogue. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi Akhundzadeh sat across the table from the US envoy at the Moscow Conference.
Iran is a dilemma for the SCO. Just as Georgia is being put on hold in NATO, Iran’s application to join the SCO was put off again. “The admission of new members to the SCO should strengthen the organisation, but not cause new problems,” SCO Secretary General Bolat Nurgaliyev said last month. Full membership would provide Tehran with a mutual assistance guarantee similar to that provided NATO members. Just as NATO’s expansion plans brought the world perilously close to war last summer over Georgia, so would a US-Israeli attack on Iran if it were a full member. This will be addressed at the next SCO summit which will be held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June.
In 2003, Iran indicated to the Bush administration that it was no friend of the Taliban and was willing to cooperate in stabilising the situation in Afghanistan, but its overtures were spurned and the invasion of Iraq put paid to any such plans. The hysterical campaign against Iran since has only made the US/NATO occupation of Afghanistan harder — there are reports that Iran may even be burying the hatchet with the Taliban. But its enthusiasm for the SCO and continued support from China and Russia in its stand-off with the West make this possibility unlikely.
Iran is also suffering from the exploding drug trafficking from Afghanistan that the US invasion facilitated, plus a surge of Afghan refugees. Russia in no doubt delighted with the Iranian police chief Esmaeel Ahmadi-Moghadam’s announcement last week that Iran was ready to train Afghan police. The Germans have botched this and the Iranians could hardly do worse. If the US were serious about containing the huge heroin problem it created, it would take their offer seriously.
But Obama will be unlikely to capture this moment, given his timidity so far in dealing with the mess he was bequeathed. He needs to build a new coalition and endgame strategy that would avoid the humiliation the US suffered in Vietnam, and fast. There are many adjustments to be made — nixing the Bush-Brzezinski strategy of surrounding Russia with NATO members for starters. And winding down the campaign against Iran, which will include reining in Israel. US policymakers who want to reverse the reckless sabre-rattling of the Bush years can actually take solace in the rise of the SCO, which was founded in 2001 and whose growing prominence is a direct result of the Bush years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and NATO’s self-proclaimed status as world policeman in the past two decades, Russia and China were more or less forced to form their own “NATO”. After all, nature abhors a vacuum.
Ironically, as the attempt to surround Russia sputters, it is Afghanistan that is now surrounded by SCO members and observers, notably Iran, anxious to contain drug trafficking. In this context, US-Israel threats to attack Iran are more and more like the boy who cried “Wolf!” The Bush Afghanistan/Iran policies in shambles and there is little indication so far that much is being done to improve the situation.
Can NATO and the SCO become allies in Afghanistan, or are they fated to be enemies? Council for Foreign Relations analyst Evan Feigenbaum, until recently the State Department’s deputy assistant secretary for South and Central Asia, says the SCO conference “offers an opportunity for the US to try to turn what are ostensibly common interests into complementary polices,” but he’s not optimistic. He pointed to the SCO call in 2005 for a timeline for a US withdrawal from military bases in Central Asia, which “attracted a lot of notoriety,” and asks just what the SCO could actually do in Afghanistan. Good question. How can Chinese and Russian support save the totally discredited Karzai regime? How would their “help” be greeted by Afghans? Clearly some accommodation with, if not total surrender to the Taliban is the deadend the US has reached, and SCO involvement can change this.
Feigenbaum makes another telling observation: “We really don’t understand what the SCO is ... Is it a security group? Is it a trade bloc? Is it a group of non-democratic countries that have created a kind of safe zone where the US and Europeans don’t talk to them about human rights and democracy?” Indeed, there is little uniting the suspicious and uneasy SCO members other than fear and perhaps loathing of the US and Taliban, and a desire to staunch the drug smuggling which the US is failing so spectacularly to deal with. If NATO were to disband or at least retract its claws, the SCO might well collapse. Expanding it to include, say, Iran, let alone Pakistan and India, would paralyse it.
The most likely cooperation would be in containing the drug flow, if the US is indeed serious about this and not part of the problem, as some analysts — in the first place Russian — contend. The prospects of establishing a stable, popular political regime opposed to the Taliban is a fantasy apparently shared by both NATO and the SCO. But Russia and China are hardly going to have more success in destroying the Taliban than the US. Any attempt by either Russia or China to contribute to the slaughter now taking place will only backfire among their own restive Muslim minorities, which all SCO members have.
It appears that Russia genuinely wants the US to succeed in bringing Afghanistan to heel. Russia’s Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin said recently, “We want to prevent the virus of extremism from crossing the borders of Afghanistan and take over other states in the region such as Pakistan. If NATO failed, it would be Russia and her partners that would have to fight against the extremists in Afghanistan.” Rogozin proposes using the NATO-Russia Council to establish a security order stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Perhaps NATO could develop into PATO, a Pacific-Atlantic alliance.”
Whether this is merely Rogozin being flippant is not clear. Surely such an organisation belongs as part of the UN, which is perhaps what he meant. In any case, Rogozin is back on the warpath, or rather the peacepath, calling NATO’s month-long war games in Georgia scheduled for 7 May a “provocation” and calling for them to be cancelled. If they go ahead, Russia will “take appropriate measures”, one of which already has been taken with the cancellation of a meeting of Russian and NATO general staff commanders this week. There are lots more aces up the Russian sleeve, including SCO and Afghan ones. If Obama persists in Bush-era belligerence, it will only make resolving the many problems he faces all the more difficult.
Even if he can keep the SCO onside, it is no lifejacket for NATO in Afghanistan. The best the two “security” organisations can do is to let it go its own way, “containing” it until it recovers from the trauma of all the “help” it has been force-fed over the past three decades.
***
Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly. You can reach him at www.geocities.com/walberg2002/
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13291
In attendance for the first time were top US and NATO officials, including US Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Patrick Moon and NATO Deputy Secretary General Martin Howard, as well as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and Secretary General of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mark Perrin de Brichambaut. Among the 36 countries participating were representatives from the G8, the European Union and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. The unanimously adopted Joint Action Plan underlined the SCO’s importance “for practical interaction between Afghanistan and its neighbouring states in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime.”
The Moscow Declaration upstaged the UN Conference on Afghanistan held four days later, coming down hard on Pakistan with a call for more effective means to combat terrorism, including denying sanctuaries to the resistance. Coming just over a month after Kyrgyzstan announced the closing of the US airbase on its territory, the conference reiterated the SCO’s position that it is opposed to the expansion of US military interests in Central Asia, but is willing to expand cooperation with the US and NATO in Afghanistan, short of sending troops. Interestingly, Obama announced a shift in US policy emphasis on the same day as the SCO summit, promising greater consultation with Afghanistan ’s neighbours.
It also declared support for the efforts of the Karzai government, which is openly criticised as weak and corrupt by US officials. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin warned against creating a power vacuum in Afghanistan in the run-up to the presidential elections later this year. Russia also came out against negotiating with the Taliban.
The Russians believe that Afghan drug trafficking is the most serious threat to the security of Russia and Central Asia. Russia’s anti-drug chief Viktor Ivanov last week called the coalition’s anti-drug policy a fiasco, nothing that opium production in Afghanistan had soared since the deployment of US and NATO troops in the country. Afghan narcotics, he said, kill 30,000 people in Russia every year, twice as many as the Soviet Union lost during its decade-long military intervention in Afghanistan. The Action Plan calls for joint SCO-Afghan operations in combating drug trafficking and organised crime, including training of drug agencies, combating laundering of drug money and improving border controls.
The Plan reads like a roadmap for bringing Afghanistan into the SCO fold, a move which India’s envoy approved of. The idea of Afghanistan joining the SCO would clearly be anathema to the US, however, and Obama’s proposal to create a NATO-dominated Contact Group with Afghanistan is clearly a way to contain the growing influence of the SCO. But with NATO allies reluctant to back Obama’s surge strategy, major concessions will have to be made, affecting virtually all US foreign policy.
Russia has approved rail transit of non-military supplies to Afghanistan, and suggested this could include military cargo as well, though such approval is surely conditional on US actions affecting Russia, primarily its plans for missile bases in Eastern Europe and its campaign against Iran. Russian analyst Alexander Lukin says cooperation with the SCO offers the US and NATO an acceptable format to bring Iran into the dialogue. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi Akhundzadeh sat across the table from the US envoy at the Moscow Conference.
Iran is a dilemma for the SCO. Just as Georgia is being put on hold in NATO, Iran’s application to join the SCO was put off again. “The admission of new members to the SCO should strengthen the organisation, but not cause new problems,” SCO Secretary General Bolat Nurgaliyev said last month. Full membership would provide Tehran with a mutual assistance guarantee similar to that provided NATO members. Just as NATO’s expansion plans brought the world perilously close to war last summer over Georgia, so would a US-Israeli attack on Iran if it were a full member. This will be addressed at the next SCO summit which will be held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in June.
In 2003, Iran indicated to the Bush administration that it was no friend of the Taliban and was willing to cooperate in stabilising the situation in Afghanistan, but its overtures were spurned and the invasion of Iraq put paid to any such plans. The hysterical campaign against Iran since has only made the US/NATO occupation of Afghanistan harder — there are reports that Iran may even be burying the hatchet with the Taliban. But its enthusiasm for the SCO and continued support from China and Russia in its stand-off with the West make this possibility unlikely.
Iran is also suffering from the exploding drug trafficking from Afghanistan that the US invasion facilitated, plus a surge of Afghan refugees. Russia in no doubt delighted with the Iranian police chief Esmaeel Ahmadi-Moghadam’s announcement last week that Iran was ready to train Afghan police. The Germans have botched this and the Iranians could hardly do worse. If the US were serious about containing the huge heroin problem it created, it would take their offer seriously.
But Obama will be unlikely to capture this moment, given his timidity so far in dealing with the mess he was bequeathed. He needs to build a new coalition and endgame strategy that would avoid the humiliation the US suffered in Vietnam, and fast. There are many adjustments to be made — nixing the Bush-Brzezinski strategy of surrounding Russia with NATO members for starters. And winding down the campaign against Iran, which will include reining in Israel. US policymakers who want to reverse the reckless sabre-rattling of the Bush years can actually take solace in the rise of the SCO, which was founded in 2001 and whose growing prominence is a direct result of the Bush years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and NATO’s self-proclaimed status as world policeman in the past two decades, Russia and China were more or less forced to form their own “NATO”. After all, nature abhors a vacuum.
Ironically, as the attempt to surround Russia sputters, it is Afghanistan that is now surrounded by SCO members and observers, notably Iran, anxious to contain drug trafficking. In this context, US-Israel threats to attack Iran are more and more like the boy who cried “Wolf!” The Bush Afghanistan/Iran policies in shambles and there is little indication so far that much is being done to improve the situation.
Can NATO and the SCO become allies in Afghanistan, or are they fated to be enemies? Council for Foreign Relations analyst Evan Feigenbaum, until recently the State Department’s deputy assistant secretary for South and Central Asia, says the SCO conference “offers an opportunity for the US to try to turn what are ostensibly common interests into complementary polices,” but he’s not optimistic. He pointed to the SCO call in 2005 for a timeline for a US withdrawal from military bases in Central Asia, which “attracted a lot of notoriety,” and asks just what the SCO could actually do in Afghanistan. Good question. How can Chinese and Russian support save the totally discredited Karzai regime? How would their “help” be greeted by Afghans? Clearly some accommodation with, if not total surrender to the Taliban is the deadend the US has reached, and SCO involvement can change this.
Feigenbaum makes another telling observation: “We really don’t understand what the SCO is ... Is it a security group? Is it a trade bloc? Is it a group of non-democratic countries that have created a kind of safe zone where the US and Europeans don’t talk to them about human rights and democracy?” Indeed, there is little uniting the suspicious and uneasy SCO members other than fear and perhaps loathing of the US and Taliban, and a desire to staunch the drug smuggling which the US is failing so spectacularly to deal with. If NATO were to disband or at least retract its claws, the SCO might well collapse. Expanding it to include, say, Iran, let alone Pakistan and India, would paralyse it.
The most likely cooperation would be in containing the drug flow, if the US is indeed serious about this and not part of the problem, as some analysts — in the first place Russian — contend. The prospects of establishing a stable, popular political regime opposed to the Taliban is a fantasy apparently shared by both NATO and the SCO. But Russia and China are hardly going to have more success in destroying the Taliban than the US. Any attempt by either Russia or China to contribute to the slaughter now taking place will only backfire among their own restive Muslim minorities, which all SCO members have.
It appears that Russia genuinely wants the US to succeed in bringing Afghanistan to heel. Russia’s Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin said recently, “We want to prevent the virus of extremism from crossing the borders of Afghanistan and take over other states in the region such as Pakistan. If NATO failed, it would be Russia and her partners that would have to fight against the extremists in Afghanistan.” Rogozin proposes using the NATO-Russia Council to establish a security order stretching “from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Perhaps NATO could develop into PATO, a Pacific-Atlantic alliance.”
Whether this is merely Rogozin being flippant is not clear. Surely such an organisation belongs as part of the UN, which is perhaps what he meant. In any case, Rogozin is back on the warpath, or rather the peacepath, calling NATO’s month-long war games in Georgia scheduled for 7 May a “provocation” and calling for them to be cancelled. If they go ahead, Russia will “take appropriate measures”, one of which already has been taken with the cancellation of a meeting of Russian and NATO general staff commanders this week. There are lots more aces up the Russian sleeve, including SCO and Afghan ones. If Obama persists in Bush-era belligerence, it will only make resolving the many problems he faces all the more difficult.
Even if he can keep the SCO onside, it is no lifejacket for NATO in Afghanistan. The best the two “security” organisations can do is to let it go its own way, “containing” it until it recovers from the trauma of all the “help” it has been force-fed over the past three decades.
***
Eric Walberg writes for Al-Ahram Weekly. You can reach him at www.geocities.com/walberg2002/
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13291
26 February 2009
China comes out on "The tomb of Empires"
Your blogger was in Afghanistan just before the Russians in his wandering days, what an adventure that was. It was different then;when I got sick (Amoebic dysentery) the professionals at Kabul Hospital were marvelous, efficent and free andthe city was lovely. A planned day trip to Bamian was delayed when a addicted european stole everything I had, which, remarkably, I recovered in two hours by a energised determination that can only be described as remarkable.....but thats a story for another day.
Our interest in the "Tomb of empires" dates from then.
"Compare the two leadership styles and learn, because this relationship will guide the world:
"Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership." -- China's former Communist Party Leader, Deng Xiaoping.
"But I can say that the president of the United States said during his campaign and in the debates that if there is an actionable target, of a high-level Al Qaeda personnel, that he would not hesitate to use action to deal with that" -- Vice President Joseph Biden.
nulwee :: The Middle Kingdom Ends Its Silence On Obama & Afghanistan.
There is a fascinating article about China's Afghanistan policy in the Asia Times, written by Indian fmr. Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar. After long avoidance, China's given voice to its interests in the Himalayan foothills. Despite the years of "Red Menace" hype, China prefers to act out of a path of least resistance, being an anti-US located between (US-Russia) extremes and neighboring conflicts. For this reason, the old moniker "The Middle Kingdom" retains relevance. Bhadrakumar begins with the Xiaoping quote, and ends with this paragraph:
It seems China has no problem with such an agenda [of occupation]. China will "hide its capacities" - to quote Deng - even as the US and Russia collide and negate each other and eventually drop down in exhaustion. As The People's Daily concludes, Afghanistan is known as the "tomb of empires". Therefore, China must focus on securing its position and simply bide its time - a strategy Deng could surely appreciate."
more
Our interest in the "Tomb of empires" dates from then.
"Compare the two leadership styles and learn, because this relationship will guide the world:
"Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership." -- China's former Communist Party Leader, Deng Xiaoping.
"But I can say that the president of the United States said during his campaign and in the debates that if there is an actionable target, of a high-level Al Qaeda personnel, that he would not hesitate to use action to deal with that" -- Vice President Joseph Biden.
nulwee :: The Middle Kingdom Ends Its Silence On Obama & Afghanistan.
There is a fascinating article about China's Afghanistan policy in the Asia Times, written by Indian fmr. Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar. After long avoidance, China's given voice to its interests in the Himalayan foothills. Despite the years of "Red Menace" hype, China prefers to act out of a path of least resistance, being an anti-US located between (US-Russia) extremes and neighboring conflicts. For this reason, the old moniker "The Middle Kingdom" retains relevance. Bhadrakumar begins with the Xiaoping quote, and ends with this paragraph:
It seems China has no problem with such an agenda [of occupation]. China will "hide its capacities" - to quote Deng - even as the US and Russia collide and negate each other and eventually drop down in exhaustion. As The People's Daily concludes, Afghanistan is known as the "tomb of empires". Therefore, China must focus on securing its position and simply bide its time - a strategy Deng could surely appreciate."
more
5 February 2009
U.S. supply routes to Afghanistan suffer two huge blows
Tom Lasseter and Jonathan S. Landay | McClatchy Newspapers
last updated: February 03, 2009 07:59:35 PM
MOSCOW — The U.S.-led campaign against the Taliban suffered two logistical blows Tuesday as the president of Kyrgyzstan announced that he'd shut a U.S. airbase in his country and insurgents in Pakistan blew up a bridge, disrupting the main U.S. supply route into Afghanistan.
The developments were the latest reminders of the vulnerability of the long and complex transportation system on which the 60,000 U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan depend for fuel, ammunition, construction materials and a great deal more.
The announcement by Kyrgyzstan President Kurmanbek Bakiyev that he will close the Manas Air Base also gave President Barack Obama a first taste of the challenge he faces from Russia, which is trying to restore its clout in countries that were part of the former Soviet Union.
Bakiyev made his announcement in Moscow, not in his own capital, shortly after the Russian government reportedly agreed to lend Kyrgyzstan $2 billion, write off $180 million in debt and add another $150 million in aid. The timing and place of the announcement indicated the Kremlin's involvement.
"It's a direct challenge to the new American administration. Russia is going out of its way to close an American base," said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based military analyst.
Manas is the main transit point through which U.S. troops fly into and out of Afghanistan. As such, it is vital to plans to send 30,000 more American troops to stabilize Afghanistan. A U.S. Air Force Web site calls it "the premier air-mobility hub" for U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan, with about 1,000 military personnel from America, Spain and France stationed there.
A senior U.S. military official said the U.S. military hopes Bakiyev's decision is not final but is the latest gambit in what has been a lengthy effort to squeeze more money out of Washington.
"There is a long list of things that he wants, some of which we can't do, like debt relief, relieving the debt he owes other governments," said the U.S. military official. "The bottom line, we hope, is that this is simply a card being played as part of the negotiating process. Obviously, we don't want to lose Manas."
Another U.S. official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, said Bakiyev had been trying to play the U.S. off against Russia for months in order to secure more funds. The official could not be identified by name because he was unauthorized to speak to reporters.
The U.S. has been paying Kyrgyzstan about $63 million a year to use Manas. The money is part of some $150 million in annual direct and indirect U.S. aid.
Gen. David Petraeus, the head of the U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East and South Asia, said senior Kyrgyz officials had assured him that there were no discussions between the country and Russia about closing the base in exchange for aid.
The senior U.S. military official said the base is also used to "bed down" U.S. tanker aircraft used for mid-aid refueling operations over Afghanistan.
Bakiyev explained in Moscow that the decision had been made because "we have repeatedly raised with the U.S. the matter of economic compensation for the existence of the base in Kyrgyzstan, but we have not been understood," Russian media reported.
Bakiyev said that after the base opened in 2001 the understanding was that "it was one or two years that were being talked about. Eight years have passed."
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 touched off 30 years of war, and Moscow is again turning into a player in Afghan politics. Two days before Obama's inauguration, the Afghan government said that Russia had accepted a request from President Hamid Karzai for military aid.
And last month, the Kremlin said it would open transportation lines through Russia to Afghanistan to help U.S. forces circumvent the violence-plagued route across the Pakistani border.
Although he didn't cite the base closing, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a point of saying in Moscow that Kyrgyzstan and Russia "are open to coordinated action" with the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.
Analyst Felgenhauer said the message from the two actions was clear: The Kremlin is willing to help the American military in Afghanistan, but only on the condition that the U.S. recognizes its authority in central Asia.
Or, more simply put, "we will not allow their bases in our sphere of influence," said Felgenhauer, a critic of Kremlin policy.
In Pakistan, meanwhile, Islamic insurgents allied with the Taliban blew up a bridge in the Khyber Pass, disrupting one of two truck routes from the port of Karachi by which U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan receive about 80 percent of their supplies.
(Landay reported from Washington.)
last updated: February 03, 2009 07:59:35 PM
MOSCOW — The U.S.-led campaign against the Taliban suffered two logistical blows Tuesday as the president of Kyrgyzstan announced that he'd shut a U.S. airbase in his country and insurgents in Pakistan blew up a bridge, disrupting the main U.S. supply route into Afghanistan.
The developments were the latest reminders of the vulnerability of the long and complex transportation system on which the 60,000 U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan depend for fuel, ammunition, construction materials and a great deal more.
The announcement by Kyrgyzstan President Kurmanbek Bakiyev that he will close the Manas Air Base also gave President Barack Obama a first taste of the challenge he faces from Russia, which is trying to restore its clout in countries that were part of the former Soviet Union.
Bakiyev made his announcement in Moscow, not in his own capital, shortly after the Russian government reportedly agreed to lend Kyrgyzstan $2 billion, write off $180 million in debt and add another $150 million in aid. The timing and place of the announcement indicated the Kremlin's involvement.
"It's a direct challenge to the new American administration. Russia is going out of its way to close an American base," said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based military analyst.
Manas is the main transit point through which U.S. troops fly into and out of Afghanistan. As such, it is vital to plans to send 30,000 more American troops to stabilize Afghanistan. A U.S. Air Force Web site calls it "the premier air-mobility hub" for U.S. and allied operations in Afghanistan, with about 1,000 military personnel from America, Spain and France stationed there.
A senior U.S. military official said the U.S. military hopes Bakiyev's decision is not final but is the latest gambit in what has been a lengthy effort to squeeze more money out of Washington.
"There is a long list of things that he wants, some of which we can't do, like debt relief, relieving the debt he owes other governments," said the U.S. military official. "The bottom line, we hope, is that this is simply a card being played as part of the negotiating process. Obviously, we don't want to lose Manas."
Another U.S. official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, said Bakiyev had been trying to play the U.S. off against Russia for months in order to secure more funds. The official could not be identified by name because he was unauthorized to speak to reporters.
The U.S. has been paying Kyrgyzstan about $63 million a year to use Manas. The money is part of some $150 million in annual direct and indirect U.S. aid.
Gen. David Petraeus, the head of the U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East and South Asia, said senior Kyrgyz officials had assured him that there were no discussions between the country and Russia about closing the base in exchange for aid.
The senior U.S. military official said the base is also used to "bed down" U.S. tanker aircraft used for mid-aid refueling operations over Afghanistan.
Bakiyev explained in Moscow that the decision had been made because "we have repeatedly raised with the U.S. the matter of economic compensation for the existence of the base in Kyrgyzstan, but we have not been understood," Russian media reported.
Bakiyev said that after the base opened in 2001 the understanding was that "it was one or two years that were being talked about. Eight years have passed."
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 touched off 30 years of war, and Moscow is again turning into a player in Afghan politics. Two days before Obama's inauguration, the Afghan government said that Russia had accepted a request from President Hamid Karzai for military aid.
And last month, the Kremlin said it would open transportation lines through Russia to Afghanistan to help U.S. forces circumvent the violence-plagued route across the Pakistani border.
Although he didn't cite the base closing, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a point of saying in Moscow that Kyrgyzstan and Russia "are open to coordinated action" with the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.
Analyst Felgenhauer said the message from the two actions was clear: The Kremlin is willing to help the American military in Afghanistan, but only on the condition that the U.S. recognizes its authority in central Asia.
Or, more simply put, "we will not allow their bases in our sphere of influence," said Felgenhauer, a critic of Kremlin policy.
In Pakistan, meanwhile, Islamic insurgents allied with the Taliban blew up a bridge in the Khyber Pass, disrupting one of two truck routes from the port of Karachi by which U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan receive about 80 percent of their supplies.
(Landay reported from Washington.)
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