Showing posts with label depression. Show all posts
Showing posts with label depression. Show all posts

7 December 2009

Predictions for 2010...Good News - Bad News

Will 2010 be a 1930 or, comparable to 1937? Is it different this time? When one nation state of a formerly high productive stature destroys itself with inflation, the untouched others can soften the blow and in time bail out the fallen one. This was Germany's fate in the 1920's. In our current instance, most all of the world's economies are on their knees with some hurting worse than others. Who can help with recovery this time? There is no one. It will not be China as some suppose as China shall suffer the same systemic collapse as the U.S, and all of Europe, Russia, and South America. China's neighbors Japan, Taiwan, Korea, India, Indonesia and others will join the fallen.

The interwoven complexities of international trade and finance have caught them in all in a spider's web of systemic collapse. Those who can shall attempt a massive inflationary rescue. While it might appear to work for a few months, eventually all implodes. Please note the following from John Pugsley's "Common Sense Viewpoint" as printed in "Golden Insights" by James U. Blanchard III 1997.

"Inflation will destroy debt. The end answer to all argument (inflation versus deflation) rests in the Federal Reserve and government. Both are absolutely committed to preventing a financial collapse or deflation. As long as they are willing to print dollars to support any failing creditors, the cycle will go on. What most deflationists fail to consider is that inflation destroys debt."

"Creditors win through inflation and lenders lose. The deflationists do not see that if inflation of the money supply continues, which it will, there needs to be a deflation. All the debt in the world can be wiped out just by creating purchasing power…and that's exactly what is happening…the debt problems will be resolved, but they will not be resolved by debt liquidation through bankruptcy and collapse. They will be resolved through debt liquidation via the creation of money. We are in for the greatest wave of inflation in the history of the world. You had better not be on the wrong side of the dollar." -John Pugsley "Common Sense Viewpoint."

We agree with Mr. Pugsley but, this was written years ago. We would suggest that this time with most formerly productive nations becoming victims of both inflation-hyperinflation and systemic collapse; the ending could be much worse than supposed. We forecast inflation first then hyper-inflation some time down the road.

What happens between here and there? While in our view, our forecast episodic adventure takes at least 2-3 years but, no one knows for certain. We forecast 2010 to be one of the very worst years of Greater Depression II; the year 2010being the second cycle of several depressionary phases. The fall of Lehman and a surrounding crash was only Phase One. Before Phase Two terrorizes global markets, we suggest a short recovery arrives first.

Debts both public and private have not been paid down to any great extent. To make matters worse, new debts continue to plague central banks, nation's banks, consumers and commerce. In order to find a basing bottom and enable a recovery, these debts must be paid, repudiated or inflated away. For now all of these solutions are in play but as fast as old problems are resolved even more continue to pile-on aggravating the troubles.

While global governments are busy attempting to inflate away debts through monetization; i.e., printing piles of un-backed dollars, notes and bonds, the load is simply unsustainable on the math. Manipulators have gone past the point of no return. There will be no recovery until after a smashing correction arrives. This smash is the quick and dirty answer to final de-leveraging of all those debts. We think it comes in phases and in fits and spurts.

Japan is in the worst shape with public debt versus GDP now standing at 270%. With an aging population and not nearly enough young workers entering their workplace, deflation arrived again and the Nikkei Stock Market is taking big hits. The U.S. and Europe except for the U.K have 125% of debt versus GDP with the U.K's at 105%. (Source for percentages Societe Generale).

The U. S. Dollar plays a very important role in these problems. With the Dollar being 85% of the entire world's reserve currency; as the dollar goes, so goes the global system. Unfortunately, the dollar has much further to fall and for this month of December, 2009, the dollar can sink to an index low of 70.00-72.50 from today's prices. Look for the dollar's final support as a minimum low sometime during the next three years ranging from 40-46.

Stocks are peaky and will shorter term correct. We think the nearby correction will be mild and new buying can return in January, 2010 continuing through spring, 2010. The Dow could easily find an 8850 base and then return to a new rally. The S&P's might base at 950. Meanwhile, we could experience an 11-12% Dow and S&P haircut.

The blow-off top for primary stock markets could be later May through July, 2010. On this cycle, five extremely negative events hit world economies and markets simultaneously.

These are:

(1) $40-$50 billion in U.S. credit card failures are reported;

(2) Housing sales both new and used for the first half of 2010 fail so badly, this market is literally in free-fall. There will be 7-10 million new mortgage defaults with most of those in the prime paying (not sub-prime) category caused by job losses;

(3) First half auto sales are reported. They will be so poor more car-makers file bankruptcy;

(4) Commercial real estate loans bankrupt many developers and their projects among those existing, under construction, and planned.

(5) Insurance companies are holding so much failing commercial real estate paper, they are in danger of defaulting with some running for government bailouts in TARP II. At one time years ago, the 20 top insurance companies could literally control the United States economy. They are huge asset holders of property and cash investments.

Housing valuations will fall on the average, nationwide in the U.S., another -30%. We figured about one year ago that 1980's prices would be the bottom. Now we potentially see a bottom at 1970's prices. More homes were foreclosed in the last 12 months than in an entire decade in the first Great Depression of the 1930's.

On the Monday morning of 11-23-09, news reported used housing sales were up 10.1%. This is nothing but giveaways prodded by seller financing, government freebie down payment credits, and crash and burn pricing taken by bottom feeders. Housing remains in international collapse. The last great creditor, FHA is hurting badly.

Inflation is now an unreported at 7% and rising. By May, 2010, it begins to bite very hard first on the lower 1/3rd of U.S. wage earners and the jobless. Most of their income is spent on food and energy. They top the inflation pain lists.

Consumers with newer bought and leased autos will do "jingle mail." They will return newer unexpired leased cars and trucks back to dealers' lots, give them the keys and quit paying. We saw this with houses over the past 1-2 years. Auto lots will overflow with new-used cars and trucks. Values will plummet. Many of these "returns" will be from the "Cash for Clunkers" program by those who got stuck with unaffordable car and truck payments.

Auto-maker GM projected total U.S. industry sales for 2010 of 11mm with a new recovery. There will be no recovery and sales could skid for the whole industry group down to 7mm or less in 2010. In 2011 it gets even worse.

Auto layoffs will escalate and unions will scream for help to president Obama. He will financially band-aid a dying industry. Consumers have no buying power, credit or cash to make any difference. Those with cash will save it and hunker down and wait out the troubles. Auto union membership declines rapidly. Most vehicle lending dries-up to a trickle.

The crude oil and energy sector has fundamentals pulling in both directions. Today we see oil price resistance at $80 with a trading range slightly lower in the $70's. Fundamentals show an over-supply on recession-depression lower demands. On the other hand, inflation of prices is rising on a weaker dollar and will escalate. Look for crude oil to visit the $50's and then turn-around on inflation rising to $100. Gasoline will follow as some refineries are closing on operating losses and no new ones are being built. Inflation ultimately wins on price escalation. Eventually, scarcity of product returns.

Depressions normally and historically last ten years. It could take consumers that long to pay down all of their debts before a return to normal conditions. Savings rates are up but with so much debt and few or zero salary raises in the face of new and rabid inflation, consumers will be economically slaughtered.

Credit and banks go through the wringer again. There are few bank ideas left to earn lender income except for trading. While Goldman Sachs makes millions weekly doing this, most banks are not set-up for it and there are only so many good traders available for the work. Since Obama's compensation guy is rankling big traders with income limits this makes things worse as these people leave for unrestricted pay in overseas trading positions.

The bond market is so huge it takes time for it to roll over and slide off a cliff. Asia and the U.S Federal Reserve have been our larger paper buyers. While they still buy some to keep markets glued together they are: (1) exiting the longer term paper for shorter terms and, (2) buying less of it turning to other ideas in the commodity markets.

With the higher Yen, Japan is increasingly engaged in hard asset shopping trips as is South Korea. They are both looking for grain, gold, oil, natural gas and other commodities they lack internally.

Junk bonds could lose 1/3rd of today's value just next year. Treasury bond and note buying continues until "full faith and credit" is repudiated on distrust. Eventually they crash but in slow-motion over years due to the magnitude of these markets. We think no bond is a safe bond. Municipal bonds are viewed as some of the safest. What happens when cities, towns, counties and states are so broke they cannot pay the interest? Their tax revenue is going off a cliff. Some are safer than others for awhile but for how long? Who can finger a top? It can't be done as it's too political.

Various states within the United States have or, will be failing financially. Someone reported 1/3rd of the TARP money spent so far was used to bail-out bankrupt states. This will escalate as federal TARP money cannot help them fast enough and in large enough amounts to keep it all glued together. Watch for fire and police employment to get as thin as too be very dangerous in various communities. Ten states are going financially critical and 47 are on the watch lists.

New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Michigan, Ohio, Florida, Arizona, Nevada and California are among the financially worst, hurting from falling tax revenue on broken businesses and consumers. Watch California as they could go out of control first within this group. They continue to contrive new taxes and not work on spending reduction. When some states face total collapse it will get very ugly very quickly. Michigan is among the worst of the worst. Most all of the states are spending themselves into the ground. They refuse to cut back as its political suicide. They will spend until there is nothing left to spend and then scream for help to the Federal Government.

China is in very serious trouble as the U.S. consumers have stopped buying their stuff. Their TARP for early this year exceeded that of the United States in both amount and rapidity of spending. It is estimated they spent in four months from January, 2009 to May, roughly $600 Billion with most of it going into projects now at over-capacity. The U.S.' lack of buying cut China's entire year of exports by -25%. Also, note the Chinese economy is 1/4th the size of the United States' economy.

There are hundreds of idle Chinese factories and millions of laid-off workers with no new factory employment and not much work of any kind. Further, millions sold subsistence farms to work in the city. Now that work is gone and so are the farms that would have fed them. Watch for a slow motion or, faster collapse of China with a descent into riots and other social problems in 2010. China need 24mm new jobs each year just to stay even and are remain far behind that job generation power curve; never mind new job growth gains.

If the worry of China not buying our treasury paper suddenly became real, the U.S. government could stop most all Chinese exports into the U.S with crushing tariffs. China would then have skyrocketing joblessness, goods piled-up with no sales and be stuck with a trillion dollars in crappy U. S. bond and currency paper having little or no value and no way to sell it. They would take a $1 U.S. Trillion paper hit and be stuck with mountains of un-saleable merchandise. The social fallout would be catastrophic. China shall continue to buy U.S. Bonds to keep exports moving; albeit at a reduced level.

Should Chinese imports cease, American workers might find some lower paying employment in re-opened U.S. factories with the return of manufacturing to the states from Asia. After all, where would Wal-mart get all their goods to sell in U. S. stores?

We hope for the best and would prefer China keep it all glued together and endure only a mild recession. With global financials and markets so fragile and wrecked we give them a one in five of pulling it off. Rather, in a Chinese communist command economy, forthcoming dislocations could be legendary.

Ambrose-Evan Pritchard, the esteemed writer for The London Telegraph says, "The world economy is still skating on thin ice. The west is sated with debt, the East with (too much) plant. The crisis has been contained (masked) by zero rates and a fiscal (credit) blast, trashing sovereign balance sheets. But the core problem remains. The Anglo-sphere and Club Med are tightening belts, yet Asia is not adding enough (internal) demand to compensate. It is adding supply." (Editor: organic Chinese demand is barely beginning).

"My view is that the markets are still in denial about structural wreckage of the credit bubble. There are two more boils to lance. China's investment bubble; and Europe's banking cover-up. I fear that only then can we clear the rubble and, very slowly, start a fresh cycle."

We agree with Mr. Pritchard but contend China has other bubbles in autos, real estate, their stock market and major water shortages and pollution as well. If these bubbles pop one at a time, it goes easier. But, we might see multiple bubble-popping instead. In that instance, China might take-down the entire global system. Note the effects of the recent scare from Dubai on their $80mm default.

Education, particularly among colleges and universities, has hit the money wall as students now debate if a $40,000 to $80,000 expenditure is worth it in this economy. Newly graduated kids with good degrees but no experience go to the end of the line for jobs.

Experienced people get what few jobs remain as employers have a wider range of choices and can be super picky. Further, employers have no time or money for training. Many kids are schooling on the internet and with on-the-job training while taking menial work for any kind of a pay check.

Public school teachers with longer years of experience, working in grades K-12 are being thinned out for some cheaper new grads. Foreign language teachers along with those in math and science are still preferred over the others. Watch for an increase in home schooling as laid-off teachers with their own children work at home and take in other peoples' kids for instruction-pay. The big public school systems are in trouble. They can no longer be afforded. Since the U.S. Government layered on piles of bureaurat red tape some years ago, fully 1/3rd of public school budgets must be devoted to stupid, expensive politically correct type work. It's all a big waste as students and teachers must suffer for it.

Watch for more traffic accidents due to postponed road work and repairs. Bridges can fall and broken paving causes more wrecks. Higher tax communities will be abandoned especially by seniors with educated kids out of the house. New York City has lost over $6 Billion in income taxes from those fleeing the city and the state.

This trend goes even faster. We see retired folks selling out as local real estate taxes are unaffordable. They are migrating to lower tax states and smaller communities offering fewer services. Much of the big city service stuff is not required and consumers cannot pay for it. Think of Detroit's city wasteland on steroids.

Gold And Silver Trading Is The Place To Be

Fund managers and traders are not married to markets and move to ideas that produce. Gold and silver shares can top and correct in the near term but then take-off in new 2010 rallies. Bigger funds have invested in long-only commodities baskets including gold, silver, grain, copper, platinum and others. They regularly buy the whole cycle from Labor Day to May, endure the dips and trade on 50 and 200 day averages. With a falling dollar these managers forecast stronger gains in these markets. December gold futures were trading near $1,200 this morning of December 1. We see a near-term mild correction followed by more buying.

Administration's Politics Mostly Fail

The Obama left wing liberal agenda designed to transfer wealth is not working. The president's popularity is sinking along with his agenda. The primary problem is the administrations inability to claw out of the employment depression. Instead, they will continue to keep digging while installing the wrong ideas, creating more and deeper messes. This advances the desirability of precious metals, and other hard assets of all kinds. Joblessness is the primary economic problem.

Dollar is the key to several markets. For December, dollar sinks lower.



Never mind the angled line support. Look at the lower box momentum.

Personally, I can see unbelievable opportunities to trade that we would never see again for many years. Turn these problems into opportunities. Those on the right side of the trade might get rich. Those on the other side are just victims. Stay Alert. –Traderrog.

22 November 2009

It isn't over until its over and it isn't over yet

This is an interesting item but it misses so much. Extremely unbalanced economies resolve by way of painful adjustments. We have dodged nothing but the new methods and tools have transferred risk to the dollar system and our ability to sustain capital inflows. We are not out of the woods yet by any means and even our denial at this point is part of the pattern.

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421

What would be surprising is the misplaced confidence and complacency when you consider the US and UK are still in the ICU on full life support but this is just as it was then, hope springs eternal.

Market wrap: Leading stocks made further progress on the rally. Bulls encouraged by optimism from steel industry and Farm Board, by more foreign buying, and by market ability to resist bad news. Major industrials including US Steel, American Can, and GE, staged good gains in first 4 hours. Reactionary tendencies developed in late afternoon on profit taking, but sales were well absorbed on moderate price recessions, with the setback appearing technical. Bond market more active; US govts. and high grade corp. strong; speculative corp. irregular; foreign govts. mixed.

Broad Street Gossip: The head of one prominent Exchange firm has been seeking opinions among his 1,200 customers; finds that experienced traders are now optimistic, having “been through numerous panics” in the past only to see the country recover and become “more prosperous than ever before”. On the other hand, the young trader with less than 10 years experience “can see nothing but black clouds ahead ... and just cannot see how industry can get back on its feet again.”

In past few weeks, fire insurance company funds have been increasingly invested in common stocks of leading companies with safe dividends; viewed as significant since these investments “are directed by shrewd and conservative observers.”

S. Strawn, Montgomery Ward chair., says recovery depends on business men not politicians; warns against “drift toward Bolshevism”; says great problem now is gearing production down so that it will “synchronize with consumption”; implies some wage cuts may be needed.

Market ability to resist bad news is in contrast with a short time ago, when it “ignored any favorable development.” In past week, market has dealt with failure of an Exchange house, wheat irregularity, decline in rail car loadings, bank failures, etc., with little more than a hesitation in the upward trend.


See what I mean? The focus is already on why it was all so easy to fix.

http://newsfrom1930.blogspot.com/2009/11/friday-november-21-1930-dow-18709-048.html

The mild recession we've experienced bears no comparison with the much-mentioned Great Depression. But the difference is more the result of hard lessons learnt than better luck.

This week, Dr David Gruen of Treasury gave a lecture about what economists have learnt from the Depression and how the two events compare.

In Australia, the lead-ups to the two crises were quite different. In the present episode, we'd experienced 17 years of uninterrupted growth, falling unemployment and, in the past five years, booming export prices, leading to hugely improved terms of trade.

By contrast, in the lead-up to the Depression we experienced no real growth for five years, with the unemployment rate rising to 7 per cent. After the Depression began, real GDP fell by almost 10 per cent in 1930-31. The unemployment rate peaked at just under 20 per cent in 1930 (but had fallen to 9 per cent by 1937).

This time, of course, the economy hasn't contracted and is forecast to grow reasonably strongly next year, with the total rise in the unemployment rate expected to be just under 3 percentage points.

And this time we have a standard of living five times what it was then (even for the unemployed) and unemployment benefits which, despite their miserliness, are way better than ''the susso'' of the Depression era.

Gruen says the Depression in Australia had three main causes. First, the extremely unfavourable conditions in the world economy, particularly a large and prolonged deterioration in our terms of trade caused by a fall in the price of wool. This deterioration started in the mid-1920s, well before the Depression began.

By contrast, the deterioration in the terms of trade this time has been much smaller, with the latest level still more than 50 per cent above the average of the 1990s.

The second cause of our Depression was our adherence to the ''gold standard''. (Actually, many Depression scholars have concluded that the decision of most countries to return to the gold standard after World War I was the primary cause of the Depression around the world. So much for Wall Street's crash in October 1929.)

The value of the Australian pound was fixed to a certain amount of gold (the same amount as for the British pound) and anyone could demand that their pound note be exchanged for gold.

Without the gold standard, countries have ''fiat money'', where the value of a $5 note comes simply from the issuing government's command that it be accepted as legal tender in payment of five dollars of debt.

For a long time people disapproved of fiat money, fearing that governments could erode the value of money by permitting inflation or by deciding to ''devalue'' their currency against other countries' currencies.

The hyperinflation in Germany's Weimar Republic in the early 1920s convinced central bankers of the need to return to the gold standard. (In those days, the Commonwealth Bank was a government-owned trading bank and the central bank.)

Trouble is, a country that suffers a major fall in the value of its exports - a deterioration in its terms of trade - needs to respond by devaluing its currency. So sticking with the gold standard ensured the avoidance of inflation, but did so by crunching the economy.

Despite pressure from our deteriorating balance of payments to devalue our currency, we held the line until March 1931, when we left the gold standard and devalued by 25 per cent against the British pound. By then, however, our foreign exchange reserves were run down.

Subsequent research has shown that the sooner a country left the gold standard, the sooner it recovered from the Depression. Big Mistake No.1.

By contrast, in the present crisis our dollar was floating. It acted as a shock absorber for our economy, first by depreciating by 25 per cent in the four months to November last year, then by recovering almost as rapidly.

The third cause of our Depression, according to Gruen, was our inability to borrow abroad from early 1929. Australian governments had borrowed heavily from the London capital market during the 1920s to fund a string of large infrastructure investments, rapidly increasing our foreign debt.

London banks pressed Australian governments for repayments. Our banks restricted their loans to businesses, which put pressure on the economy.

By contrast, although the latest crisis would have shut our banks out of world capital markets, our Government used the strength of its own balance sheet to guarantee the banks' overseas borrowings, for a fee.

Turning to monetary (interest-rate) policy, it was ''tragically tight'' in the run up to the Depression because of the defence of the gold standard, and even after the devaluation the banks delayed cutting interest rates for two years. Big Mistake No.2.

By contrast, this time the official interest rate was slashed late last year and early this year, even while our exchange rate was depreciating rapidly. That we got away with this without adverse reaction from the market or fears of high inflation is a testament to the credibility of the inflation-targeting framework we installed in the early 1990s.

Turning to fiscal (budgetary) policy, the low level of foreign exchange reserves caused by the delay in devaluing the pound prevented fiscal policy from being used to stimulate activity and actually forced governments to curtail their spending.

Then, under the Premiers' Plan of 1931, government spending was cut by 20 per cent and federal and state taxes were increased to finance repayments to the British banks. So fiscal policy was managed in a way that made the economy worse rather than better. Big Mistake No.3.

By contrast, this time the Federal Government's financial position was strong and the Rudd Government quickly lashed out with big stimulus spending.

Now, you can conclude that this time we were lucky to have the economy in good shape when the crisis struck. But we weren't in better shape by accident. Economists have been studying the mistakes of the Depression for decades and have been taking steps for just as long to ensure they aren't repeated.

One lesson was to steer clear of the gold standard and (later) to move to floating exchange rates. Another was that fiscal and monetary policies should be used to stimulate private demand during downturns, but also (and more recently) that they should be ''reloaded'' during the good times to be ready for the next recession.

And don't forget that the better shape of our external environment this time is thanks largely to other countries - including China - having learnt the same lessons.

Ross Gittins is the Herald's economics editor.


http://www.smh.com.au/business/learning-from-the-great-depression-20091113-iens.html

9 September 2009

Back to 1874

Nice short item. Thx to Jesse.

http://pragcap.com/1929-or-1873


The search is on to identify historical precedents for the present global crisis in the hope that they may give useful pointers to the strategies to adopt, and those to avoid, for an effective cure and a solid return to the stability and growth of the 80s and 90s.

So far, most commentaries on historical parallels for the present financial crisis have focused on the Great Depression as the period when the US economy suffered effects most similar to the present turmoil. A contributing factor in this identification is no doubt the
fact that presiding Fed chairman Ben Bernanke did his major academic work describing and analyzing the Great Depression, its aftermath and the efficacy of the various policy moves adopted at the time.

But from a global viewpoint, a more accurate and significant parallel looks to be the depression which started in 1873, which lasted more than five years and was ultimately referred to as the Long Depression. That depression, like the present one, was accompanied by widespread financial turbulence, including bubbles in credit, land prices and mortgage-lending in the major European countries and the collapse of many large banks in the USA and Europe. The end result was the widespread adoption by many countries of protectionist policies and currency floating.

Moreover, it was during the 1870s that the USA entered global markets for the first time as a major exporter of agricultural and manufactured goods. The USA had by then become the low-cost producer of a wide range of products and in the 1870s began to flood Europe with cheap commodities (agricultural goods, minerals, timber) as well as manufactures. The economic effect on Europe was devastating. The existing international flows of production and consumption were rendered instantly obsolete, unemployment soared and there was widespread and lasting hardship.

The origin of this upheaval was the decisive shift in economic competitiveness from the old high-cost producers in Europe to the new low-cost producer, the USA. From then on the international competitive edge of the USA continued to gather strength as its economy developed rapidly with the expansion of the railroad system and the creation of a large-volume internal market enabling economies of scale.

It is this shift that makes the Depression of 1873 rather than the 1929 Great Depression the most relevant parallel for the present crisis. Over the last ten years China has grown to become today the ascendant global economic power, with India and the other developing economies in its train.

This shift will not be reversed. The developing economies have for some years now contributed the lion’s share of global growth.

At the time the adjustment to this massive secular shift in economic ascendancy was immediate and was realized through sharply lower living standards in Europe. There was no possibility of delaying its effects through the accumulation of the enormous imbalances of today. It is likely to take a long period of adjustment, economic and financial certainly, but also probably social and political, for the G3 economies to adapt to their reduced status.

If this analysis is accurate, simply avoiding the mistaken tight-credit policies adopted at the time of the 1929 Depression and flooding the US economy with money will in the end prove irrelevant and ineffective. The problem is not a simple lack of liquidity but more deep-seated, serious and challenging: that, after 130 years in the economic sun, the US, along with Europe and Japan, is no longer economically competitive. The US, at least, has always demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to changing economic conditions; we must hope that it manages to do so again.

6 September 2009

A tale of Two Depressions ~ Update

World industrial production continues to track closely the 1930s fall, with no clear signs of ‘green shoots’.
World stock markets have rebounded a bit since March, and world trade has stabilised, but these are still following paths far below the ones they followed in the Great Depression.
There are new charts for individual nations’ industrial output. The big-4 EU nations divide north-south; today’s German and British industrial output are closely tracking their rate of fall in the 1930s, while Italy and France are doing much worse.
The North Americans (US & Canada) continue to see their industrial output fall approximately in line with what happened in the 1929 crisis, with no clear signs of a turn around.
Japan’s industrial output in February was 25 percentage points lower than at the equivalent stage in the Great Depression. There was however a sharp rebound in March.


See the Charts

7 May 2009

The bearish case in Credit ~ Morgan Stanley: May 2009 report

The slowing economy will create a second wave of defaults that will feed back to credit availability and then back to the real economy.....in the worst case we are perhaps 20% done.

Deleveraging has not played out as acutely as theory suggests; lags and support from monetary policy have helped mute the contraction. But the lags are catching up and the losses, now fueled by the economy itself,continue to mount. And new policy initiatives like the TALF and PPIP may be slow to help.


In the bear case, policy gets traction slowly, the economy languishes, and cumulative losses mount to $4 trillion.
The more intense deleveraging process associated with a further $3 trillion in losses beyond what has been realized so far will promote a much deeper recession: In that scenario the peak-trough GDP decline could be 5.8%, the unemployment rate might peak at 12%, and the risk of deflation would intensify. And in that case, lenders have taken only 21% of the 15% cumulative loss total in that scenario.


MORGAN STANLEY RESEARCH
NORTH AMERICA

6 May 2009

A Tale of Two Depressions

This masterpeice by Barry Eichengreen, Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, formerly a Senior Policy Advisor at the International Monetary Fund and Kevin H. O’Rourke,Professor of Economics at Trinity College Dublin and CEPR Research Fellow is worthy of the widest dissemination, catching as it does the epic nature of the contraction and both the significant differences as well as the apallingly similiar if not, frankly scary economic aggregrates.....

A Tale of Two Depressions

The parallels between the Great Depression of the 1930s and our current Great Recession have been widely remarked upon. Paul Krugman has compared the fall in US industrial production from its mid-1929 and late-2007 peaks, showing that it has been milder this time. On this basis he refers to the current situation, with characteristic black humour, as only “half a Great Depression.” The “Four Bad Bears” graph comparing the Dow in 1929-30 and S&P 500 in 2008-9 has similarly had wide circulation (Short 2009). It shows the US stock market since late 2007 falling just about as fast as in 1929-30.

Comparing the Great Depression to now for the world, not just the US

This and most other commentary contrasting the two episodes compares America then and now. This, however, is a misleading picture. The Great Depression was a global phenomenon. Even if it originated, in some sense, in the US, it was transmitted internationally by trade flows, capital flows and commodity prices. That said, different countries were affected differently. The US is not representative of their experiences.

Our Great Recession is every bit as global, earlier hopes for decoupling in Asia and Europe notwithstanding. Increasingly there is awareness that events have taken an even uglier turn outside the US, with even larger falls in manufacturing production, exports and equity prices.

In fact, when we look globally, as in Figure 1, the decline in industrial production in the last nine months has been at least as severe as in the nine months following the 1929 peak. (All graphs in this column track behaviour after the peaks in world industrial production, which occurred in June 1929 and April 2008.) Here, then, is a first illustration of how the global picture provides a very different and, indeed, more disturbing perspective than the US case considered by Krugman, which as noted earlier shows a smaller decline in manufacturing production now than then.

Figure 1. World Industrial Output, Now vs Then



Source: Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009) and IMF.

Similarly, while the fall in US stock market has tracked 1929, global stock markets are falling even faster now than in the Great Depression (Figure 2). Again this is contrary to the impression left by those who, basing their comparison on the US market alone, suggest that the current crash is no more serious than that of 1929-30.

Figure 2. World Stock Markets, Now vs Then



Source: Global Financial Database.

Another area where we are “surpassing” our forbearers is in destroying trade. World trade is falling much faster now than in 1929-30 (Figure 3). This is highly alarming given the prominence attached in the historical literature to trade destruction as a factor compounding the Great Depression.

Figure 3. The Volume of World Trade, Now vs Then



Sources: League of Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, http://www.cpb.nl/eng/research/sector2/data/trademonitor.html
It’s a Depression alright

To sum up, globally we are tracking or doing even worse than the Great Depression, whether the metric is industrial production, exports or equity valuations. Focusing on the US causes one to minimise this alarming fact. The “Great Recession” label may turn out to be too optimistic. This is a Depression-sized event.

That said, we are only one year into the current crisis, whereas after 1929 the world economy continued to shrink for three successive years. What matters now is that policy makers arrest the decline. We therefore turn to the policy response.
Policy responses: Then and now

Figure 4 shows a GDP-weighted average of central bank discount rates for 7 countries. As can be seen, in both crises there was a lag of five or six months before discount rates responded to the passing of the peak, although in the present crisis rates have been cut more rapidly and from a lower level. There is more at work here than simply the difference between George Harrison and Ben Bernanke. The central bank response has differed globally.

Figure 4. Central Bank Discount Rates, Now vs Then (7 country average)



Source: Bernanke and Mihov (2000); Bank of England, ECB, Bank of Japan, St. Louis Fed, National Bank of Poland, Sveriges Riksbank.

Figure 5 shows money supply for a GDP-weighted average of 19 countries accounting for more than half of world GDP in 2004. Clearly, monetary expansion was more rapid in the run-up to the 2008 crisis than during 1925-29, which is a reminder that the stage-setting events were not the same in the two cases. Moreover, the global money supply continued to grow rapidly in 2008, unlike in 1929 when it levelled off and then underwent a catastrophic decline.

Figure 5. Money Supplies, 19 Countries, Now vs Then

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421

Source: Bordo et al. (2001), IMF International Financial Statistics, OECD Monthly Economic Indicators.

Figure 6 is the analogous picture for fiscal policy, in this case for 24 countries. The interwar measure is the fiscal surplus as a percentage of GDP. The current data include the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Update forecasts for 2009 and 2010. As can be seen, fiscal deficits expanded after 1929 but only modestly. Clearly, willingness to run deficits today is considerably greater.

Figure 6. Government Budget Surpluses, Now vs Then

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421

Source: Bordo et al. (2001), IMF World Economic Outlook, January 2009.
Conclusion

To summarise: the world is currently undergoing an economic shock every bit as big as the Great Depression shock of 1929-30. Looking just at the US leads one to overlook how alarming the current situation is even in comparison with 1929-30.

The good news, of course, is that the policy response is very different. The question now is whether that policy response will work. For the answer, stay tuned for our next column.
References

Eichengreen, B. and K.H. O’Rourke. 2009. “A Tale of Two Depressions.” In progress.

Bernanke, B.S. 2000. Bernanke, B.S. and I. Mihov. 2000. “Deflation and Monetary Contraction in the Great Depression: An Analysis by Simple Ratios.” In B.S. Bernanke, Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bordo, M.D., B. Eichengreen, D. Klingebiel and M.S. Martinez-Peria. 2001. “Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?” Economic Policy32: 51-82.

Paul Krugman, “The Great Recession versus the Great Depression,” Conscience of a Liberal (20 March 2009).

Doug Short, “Four Bad Bears,” DShort: Financial Lifecycle Planning” (20 March 2009).

This article may be reproduced with appropriate attribution. See Copyright

5 May 2009

Satyajit Das audio 5th May 2009 Late Night Live

Satyajit Das talks about the other side of the globalisation story - the consequences of financial market cross-infection, swine 'flu pandemic panic, and the rapid international transmission of unemployment.

Download to Listen

2 May 2009

An Even Greater Depression

by Bill Bonner
London, England


Not infrequently, governments 'shoot themselves in the foot.' But in the current event, they have brought out the biggest cannon in history. We look on with amusement as they blow their fool heads off.

Readers are reminded of our Daily Reckoning Law: 'The force of a correction is equal and opposite to the deception that preceded it.' Today, we offer a corollary: 'The greatness of a depression is commensurate to the government's efforts to prevent it.'

Since these iron laws seem to contradict almost everything one hears on the subject, the burden of proof is on us. So, to the witness stand, we call our first expert, Angela Merkel. Alone among the world leaders, she seems to have kept her head:

"The crisis did not come about because we issued too little money but because we created economic growth with too much money, and it was not sustainable," explains Germany's chancellor. She went on to suggest that maybe we shouldn't repeat the errors of the past.

As a proxy for 'deception' in our handy dictum, substitute 'money.' And now consider it in its two misleading forms - credit and deficit spending. "Credit not backed by real savings is a fraud," the great economist, Kurt Richebächer, used to say. It is a fraud when it comes not from willing lenders, but from central banks, artificially reducing lending rates in order to spur the economy. Deficit spending by government is a flimflam too. Governments rarely have extra funds to spare; they have to borrow the money. Eventually, that debt will have to be paid.

During the entire last half a century leading Western economists imagined a world that couldn't exist for one minute - where consuming wealth makes people wealthier...and where simply making more credit available can stimulate consumption. Each time the economy slowed down, the authorities induced people to buy more of what they didn't need with more money they didn't have. This produced 'growth.' But it was an ersatz growth. Every dollar of borrowed money would one day have to be paid back. Every step forward would have to be followed, eventually, by another one to the rear. "Deficit spending by government is a flimflam too. Governments rarely have extra funds to spare; they have to borrow the money. Eventually, that debt will have to be paid."



In the first four U.S. recessions after the Great Depression, from the mid-'30s through the mid-'50s, the total amount of monetary stimulus was actually negative. Instead of lowering rates, the feds - witless, as usual - often increased them or left them alone. But deficit spending went up an average of 2.2% of GDP each time. Later, the feds began to get the hang of it; every recession after 1958 was met with both more credit and more spending.

As the feds put in more money and credit, they found that more money and credit was needed. At the beginning of the period an extra $2 of credit would result in $1 of extra GDP. By the time the lights went out in 2007, it took about $6 of additional credit to produce a single extra dollar of output. Each new dollar of credit had to support not only the new 'growth' the feds were after, but all the accumulated debt and mistakes from previous stimulus programs.

In the recession of 1973, Brookings Institution economist George Perry told Congress that "we should be pulling out all the stops" to fix it. The resulting fiscal and monetary stimulus program cost the U.S. 4% of GDP, according to an estimate by Jim Grant. Future generations of Fed governors and Treasury secretaries found more stops...and of course, pulled them out too. In the micro recession of 2001, for example, the combined fiscal and monetary boost amounted to 7.2% of GDP, according to Grant.

The deceptions of the Bubble Epoque, 2001-2007, were enormous. The correction has been enormous too. And here are the same economists who mismanaged the economy, offering advice to governments who mismanaged their regulatory roles, about how to keep mismanaged companies alive, so that bondholders who mismanaged their investments might not go broke. That this will result in more misery is a foregone conclusion - at least, here at The Daily Reckoning. The measure of that misery, if our iron law holds, is how adamantly governments fight to keep their mismanagement going. Just looking at the numbers, the toll will be monstrous. All over the world, interest rates have been cut and budgets padded. France's deficit is running at 8% of GDP. England is running a deficit of more than 12% of GDP. And the U.S. is mobilizing as if it had been attacked by Martians. On the credit side, the feds have cut rates more than ever before, for a monetary boost equivalent to 18% of GDP, according to Grant. As to spending, $13 trillion has been pledged...an amount equivalent to a full year's annual output of the United States of America. This response is 3 times more (adjusted to today's dollars) than the U.S. spent to fight WWII. It is 12 times more (relative to GDP) than the total committed to fight the Great Depression.

It is, we will guess, what makes a great depression even greater.

Enjoy your weekend,

Bill Bonner
The Daily Reckoning

1 May 2009

German gloom ~ Uncanny Parallels to Great Depression

It is a part of an excellent series by De Spiegel..

Politicians, in their desperation, are clinging to even the tiniest glimmer of hope. At the opening ceremony of the Hanover Trade Fair early last week, where the number of exhibitors had just about remained stable, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that the worst appeared to be over.

At an economic summit at the Chancellery a few days later, none of the 31 invited representatives of industry was willing to share this optimism. Instead, the meeting was marked by pessimism and a deep sense of helplessness. The mood reminded one of the attendees of a "funeral wake."

It appears that the German federal government, labor unions and employers have exhausted their options. As a result, the course of the meeting was predictable. The assembled representatives of industry groups used the opportunity to present the government with their familiar demands. The invited economists argued over terminology and forecasts, and the members of the government snubbed those officials who had expressed their opinions somewhat too loudly of late.

The mood at the Chancellery only worsened in response to the grim forecast for growth presented by Hans-Werner Sinn, the president of the Munich-based Ifo Institute for Economic Research, who predicted that the worst is yet to come. According to Sinn, German banks will have to make write-downs equivalent to up to 90 percent of their capital, while most businesses hold a pessimistic view of the future. Sinn even believes that deflation is possible, a situation in which demand would continue to decline despite falling prices.

But not all of the economics professors in attendance agreed with the Munich economist's theories. Wolfgang Franz, an economist from the southwestern German city of Mannheim, said that he believed that the economy could fall back into step more quickly than others predicted. Axel Weber, the head of Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank, made it clear that he sees possible inflation as a much greater threat. By the end of the economists' presentations, the attendees were no longer sure which danger they were supposed to combat.

Deflation, inflation, mass unemployment -- these are words reminiscent of the darkest chapter in economic history. Thus, it comes as no surprise that experts are mentioning with growing frequency a term that was believed to have been relegated to the history books: Great Depression.


http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,621979,00.html

On buying dips in this environment

The idea that this bear market will end and life will return to "normal" is, in the opinion of this writer, completely mistaken. The public domain, as far as opinion goes, in this writers view is still contaminated by the paid optimism of vested interests. The sponsors of our media are the winners of the great boom and their opinions regarding a return to a "dollar hegemony based debt fueled once in a lifetime blowoff" normality must be discounted.

No doubt a golden age based on digitisation and measurment efficiency, smart grids, biology based extraction technologies and a revitalised if somewhat localised agriculture lies ahead but I expect that to some extent the whole globalisation paradigm will have to be rebuilt from the ground up on more economically sustainable grounds. The winners in that recovery, when it comes, are probably small companies unknown to the public.

A true new bull market, if it is not driven by the mere inflation of nominal values must arise out of a backdrop of near total and universal despair and capitulation, not the denial we see all around.

People who rushed to by bargains last time we had a bear market like this one, and those who came after, and those who came after them, were all destroyed..

The singular feature of the great crash of 1929 was that the worst continued to worsen. What looked one day like the end proved on the next day to have been only the beginning. Nothing could have been more ingeniously designed to maximize the suffering, and also to ensure that as few as possible escaped the common misfortune. The fortunate speculator who had funds to answer the first margin call presently got another and equally urgent one, and if he met that there would still be another. In the end all the money he had was extracted from him and lost.

The man with the smart money, who was safely out of the market when the first crash came, naturally went back in to pick up bargains. (Not only were a recoreded 12,894,650 shares sold on 24 October; precisely the same number were bought.)

The bargains then suffered a ruiness fall. Even the man who waited out all of October and all of November, who saw the volumne of trading return to normal and saw Wall Street become as placid as a produce market, and who then bought common stocks would see their value drop to a third or a fourth of the purchase price in the next twenty-four months.

The Coolidge bull market was a remarkable phenonmemon. The ruthlessness of its liquidation was, in its own way, equally remarkable."

18 April 2009

Commodity outlook bullish on Inflation /1935-1945 record

Puru Saxena makes the case......


Today, there are many deflationists who are claiming that the prices will remain depressed for many years due to the weak economic activity. However, these folks should note that even during the Great Depression of the 1930's, prices of commodities stabilised and began rising in 1933. Figure 1 confirms that due to monetary inflation in the early 1930's, the CRB Index embarked on a secular bull-market which had a violent correction in 1937 (marked by purple arrow). Following that crash, commodities bottomed out in 1938 and thanks to the super-inflationary efforts of President Roosevelt, the CRB Index surged for more than a decade.

Figure 1: CRB Spot Index - (1930-2007)



Source: Commodities Research Bureau

Contrary to popular opinion, that huge commodities boom took place despite an economic depression. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that commodities rose relentlessly despite the fact that private-sector debt and bank lending remained essentially flat until 1945. Back then, similar to the current situation, banks accumulated large reserves but didn't loan these reserves into the broad economy. However, from 1932 onwards, the US government borrowed so much new money into existence that prices began to rise way before private-sector credit started to expand.

A similar drama unfolded in the 1970's when commodities went through the roof. During that time, economic activity was dismal but governments decided to tackle the recession with money creation. The net result was surging hard asset prices and mind-numbing inflation!

Turning to the present situation, US private-sector debt is shrinking as banks remain fearful of lending. However, the US government (along with other nations) is borrowing and creating gigantic sums of money and this should cause prices to rise for the next 3-4 years. Accordingly, we are maintaining our positions in top-quality businesses in the resources sector.

http://www.safehaven.com/article-13104.htm

15 April 2009

Economic Meltdown 2009 is Worse than the Great Depression

It's been 21 months since two Bear Stearns hedge funds defaulted setting off a series of events which have led to the gravest economic crisis since the Great Depression. No one expected the financial meltdown to hit this hard or spread this fast. The failure at Bear triggered a freeze in the secondary market where mortgage loans are repackaged into securities and sold to investors. That market is now completely paralyzed cutting off 40 percent of funding for consumer and business loans and thrusting the broader economy into a deep recession

Banks and financial institutions have been forced to curtail their off-balance sheet operations and build their reserves which have ballooned from $45 billion to nearly $700 billion in the last 6 months alone. Like millions of homeowners who have seen their home equity vanish and their retirement savings slashed in half, the banks are hunkering down hoping they can outlast the deflationary hurricane ahead.

The deteriorating economic conditions have taken their toll on consumer confidence and forced businesses to lay off employees that won't be needed during the slowdown. The system is bursting with overcapacity. Demand is falling faster than any time since the 1930s. Inventories will have to be trimmed and budgets cut to muddle through the down-times. Foreign trade has slowed to a crawl, auto sales are down by 40 percent or more, and unemployment is rising at 650,000 per month. Policymakers have pushed through a $800 billion stimulus plan, but it won't be nearly enough to stop the steady rise in unemployment or take up the slack in an economy where industrial output has been cut in half, new home construction has dropped to record lows, and manufacturing has fallen off a cliff. Economists warn that when governments don't step in and provide stimulus to increase aggregate demand, consumers cut back sharply on spending and push the economy deeper into depression.

Treasury Secretary Geithner and Fed chief Bernanke have lent or committed $13 trillion trying to keep the financial system functioning, but they've only managed to plug a few holes and avoid a system-wide collapse. The financial system is hobbled and unable to provide sufficient credit to generate growth. Every sector has suffered cutbacks, layoffs and slimmer profits. The problems go beyond toxic assets or complex derivatives. The system is plagued with stagnation, overcapacity and redundancy. Economics professor Robert Brenner sums it up like this in an interview in the Asia Pacific Journal:

Robert Brenner: "The current crisis is more serious than the worst previous recession of the postwar period, between 1979 and 1982, and could conceivably come to rival the Great Depression, though there is no way of really knowing. Economic forecasters have underestimated how bad it is because they have over-estimated the strength of the real economy and failed to take into account the extent of its dependence upon a buildup of debt that relied on asset price bubbles. In the U.S., during the recent business cycle of the years 2001-2007, GDP growth was by far the slowest of the postwar epoch. There was no increase in private sector employment.

The increase in plants and equipment was about a third of the previous, a postwar low. Real wages were basically flat. There was no increase in median family income for the first time since World War II. Economic growth was driven entirely by personal consumption and residential investment, made possible by easy credit and rising house prices. Economic performance was weak, even despite the enormous stimulus from the housing bubble and the Bush administration's huge federal deficits. Housing by itself accounted for almost one-third of the growth of GDP and close to half of the increase in employment in the years 2001-2005. It was, therefore, to be expected that when the housing bubble burst, consumption and residential investment would fall, and the economy would plunge. " ("Overproduction not Financial Collapse is the Heart of the Crisis", Robert P. Brenner speaks with Jeong Seong-jin, Asia Pacific Journal)

The economy is now in a downward spiral. Tightening in the credit markets has made it harder for consumers to borrow or businesses to expand. Overextended financial institutions are forced to shed assets at firesale prices to meet margin calls from the banks. Asset deflation is ongoing with no end in sight. Price declines in housing have reached 30 percent already and are now accelerating on the downside. This is the nightmare scenario that Bernanke hoped to avoid; a capitulation in real estate that drags the rest of economy into a black hole. Economist Nouriel Roubini and market analyst Meredith Whitney predict that housing prices will drop another 20 percent before they hit bottom. Nearly half of all homeowners will be underwater and owe more on their mortgages than the current value of their homes. That will increase the foreclosures and push scores of banks into default. According to Merrill Lynch's economist David Rosenberg:

"It would take over three years to achieve price stability (in housing) The problem is that prices do not begin to stabilize until we break below eight months' supply – and they tend to deflate 3% per quarter until that happens. So as impressive as it is that the builders have taken single-family starts below underlying sales, their efforts are just not sufficient to prevent real estate prices from falling further. In fact, even if the builders were to declare a moratorium immediately, that is, taking starts to zero, demand is so weak and the unsold inventory so intractable that it would now take over three years to achieve the holy grail of price stability in the residential real estate market."

The main economic indicators all point to a long period of retrenchment ahead. The slowdown in global trade has hit Germany, Japan, and most of Asia particularly hard. The export-driven model of growth has suffered a major setback and won't rebound for some time to come. With the US consumer unable to continue his debt-fueled spending spree, surplus countries will have to develop domestic markets for growth, but it won't be easy. Chinese workers save 50 percent of what they earn and German workers already have a comfortable life without increasing personal consumption. Higher wages and lower interest rates can help stimulate demand, but cultural influences make it difficult to change spending habits. Meanwhile, the economy will continue to languish operating well below its optimum capacity.

Capital flows have also suddenly reversed causing turmoil in the currency markets. January's TIC data indicates that net capital outflows for the US were negative $148 billion in January. Capital is now fleeing the country. Financial protectionism has triggered the repatriation of foreign investment causing a sharp drop in the purchase of US sovereign debt. This is from Brad Setser, economist for the CFR:

"The obvious implication of the recent downturn in total reserve holdings — and the $180 billion fall in q4 wasn't driven by currency moves — is that the pace of growth in the world's dollar reserves has slowed dramatically...

The obvious implication: most of the 2009 US fiscal deficit WILL NEED TO BE FINANCED DOMESTICALLY. The Fed's custodial data indicates central banks are still buying Treasuries, though at a somewhat slower pace than in late 2008. But their demand hasn't kept up with issuance. (Foreign Central banks aren't going to finance much of the 2009 US fiscal deficit; Their reserves aren't growing anymore", Brad Setser, Council on Foreign Relations)

The United States does not have the reserves to finance it own massive deficits which will soar to $1.9 trillion by the end of 2009. The Fed will have to increase its purchases of US Treasuries and monetize the debt. Foreign holders of Treasuries and dollar-backed assets ($5 trillion overseas) will be watching carefully as Bernanke revs up the printing presses to fight the recession and meet government obligations. China, Russia, Venezuela and Iran have already called for a change in the world's reserve currency. It won't happen overnight, but the momentum is steadily growing.

The S&P 500 has soared 23 percent in the last four weeks, but the current bear market rally is misleading. The prospects for a quick recovery are remote at best. The fundamentals are all weak. Corporate profits are down, GDP is negative 6 percent, housing is in a shambles, and the banking system broken. The Fed has increased the money supply by 22 percent, but economic activity is at a standstill. The velocity at which money is spent is the slowest since 1987. Nothing is moving. The banks are hoarding, credit has dried up, and consumers are saving for the first time in 2 decades. The banks' credit-conduit cannot function properly until bad assets are removed from their balance sheets. But the magnitude of the losses make it impossible for the government to purchase them outright without bankrupting the country. According to the Times Online, the IMF has increased its estimates of how much toxic mortgage-backed paper the banks are holding:

"Toxic debts racked up by banks and insurers could spiral to $4 trillion, new forecasts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are set to suggest.

The IMF said in January that it expected the deterioration in US-originated assets to reach $2.2 trillion by the end of next year, but it is understood to be looking at raising that to $3.1 trillion in its next assessment of the global economy, due to be published on April 21. In addition, it is likely to boost that total by $900 billion for toxic assets originated in Europe and Asia.

Banks and insurers, which so far have owned up to $1.29 trillion in toxic assets, are facing increasing losses as the deepening recession takes a toll, adding to the debts racked up from sub-prime mortgages. The IMF's new forecast, which could be revised again before the end of the month, will come as a blow to governments that have already pumped billions into the banking system."

Since banks lend at a ratio of 10 to 1; the amount of credit cut off to the broader economy will ensure that sluggish growth well into the future. If there is a recovery, it will be weak. The Obama administration will have to increase its capital injections even though they will add to mushrooming deficits. So far, financial institutions have only written down $1 trillion or 25 percent of their losses. This means the banking system is insolvent. Eventually, Obama will have to resolve the bad banks and auction off troubled assets, even though political support is rapidly eroding. According to political analyst F. William Engdahl, most of the garbage assets are concentrated in the nation's five biggest banks:

"Today five US banks according to data in the just-released Federal Office of Comptroller of the Currency's Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activity, hold 96% of all US bank derivatives positions in terms of nominal values, and an eye-popping 81% of the total net credit risk exposure in event of default.

The five are, in declining order of importance: JPMorgan Chase which holds a staggering $88 trillion in derivatives (€66 trillion!). Morgan Chase is followed by Bank of America with $38 trillion in derivatives, and Citibank with $32 trillion. Number four in the derivatives sweepstakes is Goldman Sachs with a ‘mere' $30 trillion in derivatives. Number five, the merged Wells Fargo-Wachovia Bank, drops dramatically in size to $5 trillion. Number six, Britain's HSBC Bank USA has $3.7 trillion. ("Geithner's ‘Dirty Little Secret': The Entire Global Financial System is at Risk", F. William Engdahl, Global Research)

These five banking Goliaths are at the center of political power in America today. Their White House emissary, Timothy Geithner, has concocted a rescue plan--the Public-Private Investment Program--which will provide 94 percent funding from the FDIC for the purchase bad assets. The program is designed to keep asset prices artificially high while transferring the bulk of the losses to the taxpayer. The plan has been widely criticized and has even raised a few eyebrows even among usually-supportive members of the establishment like the Financial Times:

"US banks that have received government aid, including Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan Chase, are considering buying toxic assets to be sold by rivals under the Treasury's $1,000bn (£680bn) plan to revive the financial system.

The plans proved controversial, with critics charging that the government's public-private partnership - which provide generous loans to investors - are intended to help banks sell, rather than acquire, troubled securities and loans.

Banks have three options if they want to buy toxic assets: apply to become one of four or five fund managers that will purchase troubled securities; bid for packages of bad loans; or buy into funds set up by others. The government plan does not allow banks to buy their own assets, but there is no ban on the purchase of securities and loans sold by others." (The Financial Times)

It's a multi-billion dollar shell game with myriad opportunities for fraud. In theory, the banks could create their own off-balance sheet operations (SIVs or SPEs) and use them to purchase their own bad assets taking advantage of the government's 94 percent low interest non recourse loans. It's a blatant swindle and another windfall for Wall Street.

Geithner's plan does not fix the problems with the banks, it only delays the final outcome. The next leg-down in the recession will push many of the undercapitalized banks into receivership. Geithner's PPIP won't change that. As housing prices fall and foreclosures rise, the capital position of many of the banks will become untenable leading to a rash of bank failures. An article in Monday's Wall Street Journal puts adds some historical perspective to today's financial crisis:

"The events of the past 10 years have an eerie similarity to the period leading up to the Great Depression. Total mortgage debt outstanding increased from $9.35 billion in 1920 to $29.44 billion in 1929. In 1920, residential mortgage debt was 10.2% of household wealth; by 1929, it was 27.2% of household wealth....

The causes of the Great Depression need more study, but the claims that losses on stock-market speculation and a monetary contraction caused the decline of the banking system both seem inadequate. It appears that both the Great Depression and the current crisis had their origins in excessive consumer debt -- especially mortgage debt -- that was transmitted into the financial sector during a sharp downturn.

Why does one crash cause minimal damage to the financial system, so that the economy can pick itself up quickly, while another crash leaves a devastated financial sector in the wreckage? The hypothesis we propose is that a financial crisis that originates in consumer debt, especially consumer debt concentrated at the low end of the wealth and income distribution, can be transmitted quickly and forcefully into the financial system. It appears that we're witnessing the second great consumer debt crash, the end of a massive consumption binge." (From Bubble to Depression? Steven Gjerstad and Vernon L. Smith, Wall Street Journal)

PARTY LIKE ITS 1929

Two leading economic historians, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H. Rourke, have written an article "A Tale of Two Depressions" which has been widely circulated on the Internet. It illustrates (with graphs) how the global economy is plummeting faster now than during the 1930s.
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421

By nearly every objective standard, the present downturn is worse than the Great Depression. Manufacturing, industrial production, foreign trade, capital flows, consumer confidence, housing, and even stocks are falling faster today than after the crash of 1929. So far, Bernanke's monetary bandaids have prevented the wholesale collapse of the financial system, but that could change. The economy continues its downhill slide and it looks like there's nothing to stop it from falling further still.

By Mike Whitney

Email: fergiewhitney@msn.com

http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article9962.html

2 April 2009

The World Depression: A Class Analysis

The aggregate economic indicators of the rise and fall of the world capitalist system are of limited value in understanding the causes, trajectory and impact of the world depression. At best, they describe the economic carnage; at worst, they obfuscate the leading (ruling) social classes, with their complex networks and transformations, which directed the expansion and economic collapse and the wage and salaried (working) classes, which produced the wealth to fuel the expansive phase and now pay the cost of the economic collapse.

It is a well-known truism that those who caused the crisis are also the greatest beneficiaries of government largesse. The crude and simple everyday observations that the ruling class ‘made’ the crisis and the working class ‘pays’ the cost, at a minimum, is a recognition of the utility of class analyses in deciphering the social reality behind the aggregate economic data. Following the recession of the early 1970s, the Western industrial capitalist class secured financing to launch a period of extensive and deep growth covering the entire globe. German, Japanese and Southeast Asian capitalists flourished, competed and collaborated with their US counterpart. Throughout this period the social power, organization and political influence of the working class witnessed a relative and absolute decline in their share of material income. Technological innovations, including the re-organization of work, compensated for wage increases by reducing the ‘mass of workers’ and in, particular, their capacity to pressure the prerogatives of management. The capitalist strategic position in production was strengthened: they were able to exercise near absolute control over the location and movements of capital.

The established capitalist powers – especially in England and the US -- with large accumulations of capital and facing increasing competition from the fully recovered German and Japanese capitalists, sought to expand their rates of return by moving capital investments into finance and services. At first, this move was linked and directed towards promoting the sale of their manufactured products by providing credit and financing toward the purchases of automobiles or ‘white goods’. Less dynamic industrial capitalists relocated their assembly plants to low-wage regions and countries. The results were that industrial capitalists took on more the appearance of ‘financiers’ in the US even as they retained their industrial character in the operation of their overseas manufacturing subsidiaries and satellite suppliers. Both overseas manufacturing and local financial returns swelled the aggregate profits of the capitalist class. While capital accumulation expanded in the ‘home country’, domestic wages and social costs were under pressure as capitalists imposed the costs of competition on the backs of wage earners via the collaboration of the trade unions in the US and social democratic political parties in Europe. Wage constraints, tying wages to productivity in an asymmetrical way and labor-capital pacts increased profits. US workers were ‘compensated’ by the cheap consumer imports produced by the low-wage labor force in the newly industrializing countries and access to easy credit at home.

The Western pillage of the former-USSR, with the collaboration of gangster-oligarchs, led to the massive flow of looted capital into Western banks throughout the 1990s. The Chinese transition to capitalism in the 1980s, which accelerated in the 1990s, expanded the accumulation of industrial profits via the intensive exploitation of tens of millions of wageworkers employed at subsistence levels. While the trillion-dollar pillage of Russia and the entire former Soviet Union bloated the West European and US financial sector, the massive growth of billions of dollars in illegal transfers and money laundering toward US and UK banks added to the overdevelopment of the financial sector. The rise in oil prices and ‘rents’ among ‘rentier’ capitalists added a vast new source of financial profits and liquidity. Pillage, rents, and contraband capital provided a vast accumulation of financial wealth disconnected from industrial production. On the other hand, the rapid industrialization of China and other Asian countries provided a vast market for German and Japanese high-end manufacturers: they supplied the high quality machines and technology to the Chinese and Vietnamese factories.

US capitalists did not ‘de-industrialize’ – the country did. By relocating production overseas and importing finished products and focusing on credit and financing, the US capitalist class and its members became diversified and multi-sectoral. They multiplied their profits and intensified the accumulation of capital.

On the other hand, workers were subject to multiple forms of exploitation: wages stagnated, creditors squeezed interest, and the conversion from high wage/high skill manufacturing jobs to lower-paid service jobs steadily reduced living standards.

The basic process leading up to the breakdown was clearly present: the dynamic growth of western capitalist wealth was based, in part, on the brutal pillage of the USSR and Latin America, which profoundly lowered living standards throughout the 1990s. The intensified and savage exploitation of hundreds of millions of low-paid Chinese, Mexican, Indonesian and Indochinese workers, and the forced exodus of former peasants as migrant laborers to manufacturing centers led to high rates of accumulation. The relative decline of wages in the US and Western Europe also added to the accumulation of capital. The German, Chinese, Japanese, Latin American and Eastern European emphasis on export-driven growth added to the mounting ‘imbalance’ or contradiction between concentrated capitalist wealth and ownership and the growing mass of low-paid workers. Inequalities on a world scale grew geometrically. The dynamic accumulation process exceeded the capacity of the highly polarized capitalist system to absorb capital in productive activity at existing high rates of profit. This led to the large scale and multiform growth of speculator capital inflating prices and investing in real estate, commodities, hedge funds, securities, debt-financing, mergers and acquisitions -- all divorced from real value-producing activity. The industrial boom and the class constraints imposed on workers wages undermined domestic demand and intensified competition in world markets. Speculator-financial activity with massive liquidity offered a ‘short-term solution’: profits based on debt financing. Competition among lenders fueled the availability of cheap credit. Real estate speculation was extended into the working class, as wage and salaried workers, without personal savings or assets, took advantage of their access to easy loans to join the speculator-induced frenzy - based on an ideology of irreversible rising home values. The inevitable collapse reverberated throughout the system – detonated at the bottom of the speculative chain. From the latest entrants to the real estate sub-prime mortgage holders, the crisis moved up the ladder affecting the biggest banks and corporations, who engaged in leveraged buyouts and acquisitions. All ‘sectors’, which had ‘diversified’ from manufacturing to finance, trade and commodities speculation, were downgraded. The entire panoply of capitalists faced bankruptcy. German, Japanese and Chinese industrial exporters who exploited labor witnessed the collapse of their export markets.

The ‘bursting’ financial bubble was the product of the ‘over-accumulation’ of industrial capital and the pillage of wealth on a world scale. Over-accumulation is rooted in the most fundamental capitalist relation: the contradictions between private ownership and social production, the simultaneous concentration of capital and sharp decline of living standards.

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27 March 2009

Friedman on Lateline (ABC TV)

LEIGH SALES, PRESENTER: A recent letter writer to the New York Times described America's current economic crisis as President Obama's "Hurricane Katrina moment," meaning the point in the presidency when public sentiment turns.

Several opinion polls in America show Barack Obama's approval rating has slipped by around 20 points since his election, although Gallup still gives him a solid 65 per cent rating.

The President's facing a public that's furious about the erosion of retirement savings.

And cases like AIG, where executives took big bonuses from a taxpayer bailout, which they've now paid back.

Somebody who's been writing in great detail about the American recession and its political implications is Tom Friedman, one of the New York Times' most prominent columnists.

He's also the author of numerous books. His latest is 'Hot, Flat and Crowded'.

He joined me earlier today from Washington.

Mr Friedman, many thanks for being with us.

TOM FRIEDMAN: Wonderful to be with you, Leigh. It's great to be in touch with all my friends in Australia.

LEIGH SALES: In a column this week you wrote that President Obama needs to have an overdue, fire-side chat with the nation. What did you mean by that?

TOM FRIEDMAN: Well, I guess what I meant by that, Leigh, is this: that in a funny way President Obama is both overexposed and underexposed. He's been great about meeting with the press, going on late night TV, really interacting with the public in a lot of different ways than a President has in the past.

But to me, one thing's been missing, and it's been that FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt fireside chat where the President simply sits down and explains to people just how much financial trouble we're in, and that all these brush fires out there - who makes how much money et cetera, what bonus - you know, they're all important issues, but ultimately we've got to heel our banking system, Leigh.

The banking system is like your heart. It pumps blood to your industrial muscles and right now we have, in banking terms, congestive heart failure. Our heart is not pumping credit into the system. And without that, you know, the system doesn't work. And I think one thing that has been missing from the beginning, is a sense of, for the average American, how big this problem is, and, you know, the image I've really been using from the beginning of this crisis is that incredible scene in the movie 'Jaws' where Roy Scheider first beholds the great white shark. And after he sees the shark he walks, you know, wide-eyed up to the captain and says, "We're going to need a bigger boat". And we are going to need a bigger boat. And right now, that sense, that this is so big, you know, Leigh, we built up a credit bubble that was THIS big. And you know what that means? The hole we're in is THIS deep. And I think the President still hasn't quite conveyed that to the American people.

LEIGH SALES: Well, your paper, The New York times has created a bit of a buzz during the past week because three very influential columnists - you, Paul Krugman and Frank Rich - each wrote columns critical of President Obama, and The Times also ran a critical editorial. Is Barack Obama beginning to lose some of his political capital, as Mr Krugman argues?

TOM FRIEDMAN: You know, I think it's premature to say that. You know, a lot of this is simply the natural to and fro over what is a really big, complicated issue. And all of us have slightly different takes on it. I think that's really healthy right now. Because, you know what, Leigh, nobody knows for sure. There's nobody standing out there saying, "It's my way or the highway, I know exactly how to get out of this problem."

I mean, you know, we've never faced a problem like this in any our lifetime - anything this big, and not since the Great Depression, and it's a very different world since then. And so I think what you are seeing is the natural to and fro. I think it's really healthy, because the public is trying to sort this out as well.

One of the problems, Leigh, is this: we basically just have three choices. One is to nationalise the sick banks, including some of the biggest brand names in the world. Maybe Citibank, hard to believe, but one is nationalise the big banks.

The second option is to create a bank of Junk, the B of J. Some call it not Fanny May but Crappy May, where this bank of junk would basically buy up all the toxic assets. And the third option is the Geitner plan, that was announced this week, where the Government would basically partner with hedge funds and private equity firms to leverage their assets to have the private market buy up these toxic assets.

Now the reason we actually ended up with option three is not only because the Government didn't want to nationalise the banks, it's but because the Congress, remember, wasn't going to give another dime, basically, for any of this. And so the option of leveraging the private market and the hedge funds was really, you know, came out of the fact that the administration really didn't have the money to do either nationalisation right now or create a bank of junk.

LEIGH SALES: Given the enormous anger we've seen in the US over the AIG bonuses, though, do you think that the American public is in the mood for the third option?

TOM FRIEDMAN: Well, it's a real problem. Honestly, Leigh, we've two choices. You can have revenge or recovery, but you can't have both. It's either revenge or recovery. And one of the points I've making since the very beginning: unfortunately, to get out of a problem this deep, to get out of a problem this deep, we're going to have to reward people who you really wouldn't want to reward. We're going to have to allow people to make money who really don't deserve to make money, but the issue of fairness, unfortunately - unfortunately fairness it isn't on the menu anymore.

There's just systematic risk, or, you know, systematic failure, or systematic survival. And I think we have to come to terms with that. Again, that gets back to my fireside chat. I don't think the President has explained that to the American people, that fairness isn't on the menu anymore. God, I wish it were. But unfortunately what I'm worried about now is the system.

LEIGH SALES: You wrote in a recent column that perhaps this crisis is telling the US that the growth model it's created over the last 50 years is unsustainable, economically and ecologically. And indeed in your new book 'Hot, Flat and Crowded' you write what's needed in the US is a revolution, a green revolution.

What did you mean by that? And is what we're seeing in the US now a precursor to it?

TOM FRIEDMAN: I think it is. I think it's a precursor to what my Australian friend and environmental teacher Paul Gielding calls "the great disruption". And what he means by that, and sort of what I mean by that is I think two things happened in 2008/2009, Leigh. I think both the market and Mother Nature hit a wall. And they both hit a wall. And what they basically - the wall they hit was that we cannot keep raising standards of living for us, for our kids, the way we've been doing for the last 50 years.

What was that system? Well, in short it worked like this: we built an America - more and more stores - to sell more and more stuff, to more and more Americans, which triggered more and more factories in China, powered by more and more coal, that earn more and more dollars, that went to buy more and more T bills, that were recirculated back to America to build more and more stores, to sell more and more stuff.

And that cycle basically had become unsustainable for a number of reasons. One is the incredible imbalance of our consumption and China's savings, that we built all this huge horde of global dollars that basically triggered more and more people inventing more and more crazy ways to get higher yield out of those dollars, and that finally exploded in the mortgage and credit default swaps. that was one problem.

But the other problem is that this system really required living off and stripping off more and more stocks, stocks of natural resources, and not living off more and more renewable flows. And in that sense Mother Nature was telling us what the market was telling us: we can't do this anymore. That if we try to pass on this way of growing standards of living to our children, we're going to blow up.

What was missing in the system? What was missing in the system, Leigh, is that both the market and Mother Nature were not honestly pricing things. The market was not pricing the real risk of some of these derivatives and credit default swaps, and when you don't price the real risks of things, OK, and the real potential cost, then these kinds of explosions happen, because people go to excess. And at the same time we were not allowing Mother Nature to price the real cost of what we were doing climatically. The cost of putting all this CO2 in the atmosphere.

So we had a kind of unreal system. We were living, as a world community, as if there were no laws of gravity, either in the financial markets or in Mother Nature's universe. We could do whatever we want and there would be no cost. And I think what happened in 2008/2009, is that the real cost became so big, and they just smacked us right across the head. And therefore coming out of this, it seems to me we need to find a different way of raising standards of living, but it's got to begin with putting the real cost on things, the real cost of these derivatives, so people won't think they're free and therefore do crazy, reckless things, and the real cost of carbon in the atmosphere, so people don't think polluting the atmosphere is free, and therefore do crazy things.

LEIGH SALES: How did this mentality that you describe come to the fore in the United States? I think in your book you write that a certain connection between hard work, achievement and accountability has been broken?

TOM FRIEDMAN: That's really what I feel. I can only speak for my own country, but we've become a - we became a subprime nation. We became a subprime nation. We thought and we told people and we acted as if you could have the American dream - a house, a yard, a car and a dog and a job - with no money down, and nothing to pay, you know, for two years. That's basically what we did. We told people, "You could have the dream that our parents had," but we could have it with nothing down and nothing to pay. So our parents, Leigh, they were the greatest generation, we we're the greediest generation, and what our kids need to be is the regeneration, where they basically regenerate America, but not on the way we did it, by stripping all the stocks, but rather by creating renewable flows. And I think that's really the challenge.

LEIGH SALES: I'm just wondering how that might change, though. Let me quote from the White House spokesman Ari Fleischer in 2001. He was asked if Americans need to take difficult decisions about their consumption levels to address the nation's energy problems, and his response was, "That's a big 'No.' the President believes it's an American way of life and that it should be the goal of policymakers to protect the American way of life. The American way of life is a blessed one". If that's a prevalent attitude in the US, how difficult is it going to be to take the sort of steps, the hard steps that you advocate?

TOM FRIEDMAN: Well, that quote really stands out as kind of the, you know, absolutely epitome of this view that really got us into this problem, which is that we can do what we want. "We can do whatever the heck we want. It's our world, it's our way of life and everyone else be damned."

I do believe that's starting to change. I can't tell you that it's going to happen overnight. And I tell you it is critical that we have a President who leads this change. You have to remember, Leigh, for eight years we had a President and a Vice President who could not get the words c-c-c-c-c-c-conservation out of their mouth, OK. I mean, as far as Dick Cheney was concerned, conservation was a four-letter word.

So we're going from that to a President, you know, who has made green jobs, green growth and a low carbon economy a real priority. And he's using his bully pulpit of the presidency everyday to make that. My great fear is that he's going to get swallowed by the great white shark of this economic crisis and won't be able to pursue this agenda. But at least we have a President who's talking in a very different way. And that really does matter.

LEIGH SALES: You're famously an advocate for globalisation, and in a recent interview you said that "... the flattening of the world is a metaphor for the rise of middle class citizens from China to India, Brazil to Russia, to Eastern Europe, who are beginning to consume like Americans. That's a blessing in so many ways, it's a blessing for global stability and global growth." But how is it a blessing if other nations start to consume like American, given that the American pattern of consumption has contributed to its recession and the global crisis?

TOM FRIEDMAN: Sure. Well, the point I was making, actually, that's sort of half of my thought. The full thought is that there are too many Americans in the world today. Then I say, of course I'm being facetious, it's a blessing there's so many more people, whether in Australia, in Russia, Brazil, Argentina, China and India, can live in American size house, drive American size cars on American size highways. I want people to enjoy rising standards of living just as my generation did and my country did.

The problem is: unless we the original Americans redefine, and this is the point I make in the book, redefine in more sustainable terms what it means to be an American and lead the world in inventing the clean, green technologies that will allow so many people to live like us. Unless we do that, there are too many Americans in the world, there are carbon copies, and this world - the good Lord did not design this planet for this many Americans, this many people consuming like us. So I believe it's our obligation both to set a different example and to invent the technologies so other people can enjoy this, otherwise, Leigh, we're going to burn up, choke up, heat up, smoke up and eat up this planet with this many Americans so much faster than even Al Gore predicts.

In the book I use a - an image that a British environmentalist came up with. He calls it the Americom, and he says an Americom is any 300 million people living like Americans. So when I was born in 1953 there were two-and-a-half Americoms in the world. There was America, Western Europe and sort of Japan and parts of east Asia, including Australia. Today, Leigh, there are nine Americoms. There's one in America, one in Western Europe, now there's one in Eastern Europe and Russia, one in Japan, East Asia, one in India - giving birth to another - one in China, giving birth to another, and one in Latin America. So just in the last 30 years we've gone from a world of two-and-a-half Americoms, units of 300 million people living like Americans, to a world of nine Americoms. And the energy and natural resource implications of will be staggering unless we, the original Americoms, at least take the lead in redefining what it means to be an Americom.

LEIGH SALES: With all the study that you've done on these issues, with all the people that you meet, with all the governments that you cover - are you an optimist or pessimist about the future?

TOM FRIEDMAN: Well, you know, I tell you, Leigh, I was in Israel. And I always end my talks this way. A couple of years ago when I was having dinner with the editor of the Arutz newspaper, which is Israel's leading newspaper, and they blessedly run my column twice a week in Hebrew. And I said to the editor, "Why do you run my column?" He said, "Well, Tom, you're the only optimist we have left. And I laughed and we were going to sit down at the table and here was an Israeli general who pulled me aside and said, "Tom, I know why you're an optimist." "Why?" He says, "It's because you're short." "Short?"He said, "Yeah, you can only see that part of the glass that's half full."

So, the truth is I am an eternal optimist. I believe in that old adage that pessimists are usually right, optimists are usually wrong, but all the great change in history was done by optimists.

One of the things that really excites me is I travel around my country, right now, to big schools and small schools, big towns and small towns. And I've been doing my book talks and after I do a book signing. I go back to the hotel and you know what I do? I empty my pocket of business cards. Business cards from energy innovators around this country. It's great, rock stars get room keys; I get business cards. But I tell you, they're very exciting because they're from people that come up to me, they say, "I've got a solar project, I've got a wind project, I've got a cellulosic project, I've got a duck, it paddles a wheel, blows up a balloon, issues methane, turns a turbine." I hear the craziest stuff. But it tells me this country is really alive. It is really alive still with innovation and entrepreneurs, and if we can just have a government in Washington that captures and enhances that energy at the speed, scope and scale we need - then I'm an optimist.

LEIGH SALES: Mr Friedman, thanks so much for sharing your thoughts with us, we really do appreciate your time.

TOM FRIEDMAN: My pleasure, thanks for having me.

Video...scroll to the right...

http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/

Earlier audio......


US author and columnist Thomas Freidman has won three Pulitzer prizes, his last book, The World Is Flat, was an international bestseller. In his new book he argues green politics has to be re-branded in the US, so that it is no longer the sole domain of liberals, but is something every red, white, and blue NASCAR Dad and Soccer Mom sees as patriotic and essential.

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