By MICHAEL HUDSON
“Coming events cast their shadows forward.”
– Goethe
What is to stop U.S. banks and their customers from creating $1 trillion, $10 trillion or even $50 trillion on their computer keyboards to buy up all the bonds and stocks in the world, along with all the land and other assets for sale in the hope of making capital gains and pocketing the arbitrage spreads by debt leveraging at less than 1 per cent interest cost? This is the game that is being played today.
Finance is the new form of warfare – without the expense of a military overhead and an occupation against unwilling hosts. It is a competition in credit creation to buy foreign resources, real estate, public and privatized infrastructure, bonds and corporate stock ownership. Who needs an army when you can obtain the usual objective (monetary wealth and asset appropriation) simply by financial means? All that is required is for central banks to accept dollar credit of depreciating international value in payment for local assets. Victory promises to go to whatever economy’s banking system can create the most credit, using an army of computer keyboards to appropriate the world’s resources. The key is to persuade foreign central banks to accept this electronic credit.
U.S. officials demonize foreign countries as aggressive “currency manipulators” keeping their currencies weak. But they simply are trying to protect their currencies from being pushed up against the dollar by arbitrageurs and speculators flooding their financial markets with dollars. Foreign central banks find them obliged to choose between passively letting dollar inflows push up their exchange rates – thereby pricing their exports out of global markets – or recycling these dollar inflows into U.S. Treasury bills yielding only 1% and whose exchange value is declining. (Longer-term bonds risk a domestic dollar-price decline if U.S interest rates should rise.)
“Quantitative easing” is a euphemism for flooding economies with credit, that is, debt on the other side of the balance sheet. The Fed is pumping liquidity and reserves into the domestic financial system to reduce interest rates, ostensibly to enable banks to “earn their way” out of negative equity resulting from the bad loans made during the real estate bubble. But why would banks lend more under conditions where a third of U.S. homes already are in negative equity and the economy is shrinking as a result of debt deflation?
The problem is that U.S. quantitative easing is driving the dollar downward and other currencies up, much to the applause of currency speculators enjoying a quick and easy free lunch. Yet it is to defend this system that U.S. diplomats are threatening to plunge the world economy into financial anarchy if other countries do not agree to a replay of the 1985 Plaza Accord “as a possible framework for engineering an orderly decline in the dollar and avoiding potentially destabilizing trade fights.” The run-up to this weekend’s IMF meetings saw the United States threaten to derail the international financial system, bringing monetary chaos if it does not get its way. This threat has succeeded for the past few generations.
The world is seeing a competition in credit creation to buy foreign resources, real estate, public and privatized infrastructure, bonds and corporate stock ownership. This financial grab is occurring without an army to seize the land or take over the government. Finance is the new form of warfare – without the expense of a military overhead and an occupation against unwilling hosts. Indeed, this “currency war” so far has been voluntary among individual buyers and the sellers who receive surplus dollars for their assets. It is foreign economies that lose, as their central banks recycle this tidal wave of dollar “keyboard credit” back into low-yielding U.S. Treasury securities of declining international value.
For thousands of years tribute was extracted by conquering land and looting silver and gold, as in the sacking of Constantinople in 1204, or Incan Peru and Aztec Mexico three centuries later. But who needs a military war when the same objective can be won financially? Today’s preferred mode of warfare is financial. Victory in today’s monetary warfare promises to go to whatever economy’s banking system can create the most credit. Computer keyboards are today’s army appropriating the world’s resources.
The key to victory is to persuade foreign central banks to accept this electronic credit, bringing pressure to bear via the International Monetary Fund, meeting this last weekend. The aim is nothing as blatant as extracting overt tribute by military occupation. Who needs an army when you can obtain the usual objective (monetary wealth and asset appropriation) simply by financial means? All that is required is for central banks to accept dollar credit of depreciating international value in payment for local assets.
But the world has seen the Plaza Accord derail Japan’s economy by obliging its currency to appreciate while lowering interest rates by flooding its economy with enough credit to inflate a real estate bubble. The alternative to a new currency war “getting completely out of control,” the bank lobbyist suggested, is “to try and reach some broad understandings about where currencies should move.” However, IMF managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was more realistic. “I'm not sure the mood is to have a new Plaza or Louvre accord,” he said at a press briefing. “We are in a different time today.” On the eve of the Washington IMF meetings he added: “The idea that there is an absolute need in a globalised world to work together may lose some steam.” (Alan Beattie Chris Giles and Michiyo Nakamoto, “Currency war fears dominate IMF talks,” Financial Times, October 9, 2010, and Alex Frangos, “Easy Money Churns Emerging Markets,” Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2010.)
Quite the contrary, he added: “We can understand that some element of capital controls [need to] be put in place.”
The great question in global finance today is thus how long other nations will continue to succumb as the cumulative costs rise into the financial stratosphere? The world is being forced to choose between financial anarchy and subordination to a new U.S. economic nationalism. This is what is prompting nations to create an alternative financial system altogether.
The global financial system already has seen one long and unsuccessful experiment in quantitative easing in Japan’s carry trade that sprouted in the wake of Japan’s financial bubble bursting after 1990. Bank of Japan liquidity enabled the banks to lend yen credit to arbitrageurs at a low interest rate to buy higher-yielding securities. Iceland, for example, was paying 15 per cent. So Japanese yen were converted into foreign currencies, pushing down its exchange rate.
It was Japan that refined the “carry trade” in its present-day form. After its financial and property bubble burst in 1990, the Bank of Japan sought to enable its banks to “earn their way out of negative equity” by supplying them with low-interest credit for them to lend out. Japan’s recession left little demand at home, so its banks developed the carry trade: lending at a low interest rate to arbitrageurs at home and abroad, to lend to countries offering the highest returns. Yen were borrowed to convert into dollars, euros, Icelandic kroner and Chinese renminbi to buy government bonds, private-sector bonds, stocks, currency options and other financial intermediation. This “carry trade” was capped by foreign arbitrage in bonds of countries such as Iceland, paying 15 per cent. Not much of this funding was used to finance new capital formation. It was purely financial in character – extractive, not productive.
By 2006 the United States and Europe were experiencing a Japan-style financial and real estate bubble. After it burst in 2008, they did what Japan’s banks did after 1990. Seeking to help U.S. banks work their way out of negative equity, the Federal Reserve flooded the economy with credit. The aim was to provide banks with more liquidity, in the hope that they would lend more to domestic borrowers. The economy would “borrow its way out of debt,” re-inflating asset prices real estate, stocks and bonds so as to deter home foreclosures and the ensuing wipeout of the collateral on bank balance sheets.
This is occurring today as U.S. liquidity spills over to foreign economies, increasing their exchange rates. Joseph Stiglitz recently explained that instead of helping the global recovery, the “flood of liquidity” from the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank is causing “chaos” in foreign exchange markets. “The irony is that the Fed is creating all this liquidity with the hope that it will revive the American economy. ... It’s doing nothing for the American economy, but it’s causing chaos over the rest of the world.” (Walter Brandimarte, “Fed, ECB throwing world into chaos: Stiglitz,” Reuters, Oct. 5, 2010, reporting on a talk by Prof. Stiglitz at Colombia University. )
Dirk Bezemer and Geoffrey Gardiner, in their paper “Quantitative Easing is Pushing on a String” , prepared for the Boeckler Conference, Berlin, October 29-30, 2010, make clear that “QE provides bank customers, not banks, with loanable funds. Central Banks can supply commercial banks with liquidity that facilitates interbank payments and payments by customers and banks to the government, but what banks lend is their own debt, not that of the central bank. Whether the funds are lent for useful purposes will depend, not on the adequacy of the supply of fund, but on whether the environment is encouraging to real investment.”
Quantitative easing subsidizes U.S. capital flight, pushing up non-dollar currency exchange rates
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s quantitative easing may not have set out to disrupt the global trade and financial system or start a round of currency speculation that is forcing other countries to defend their economies by rejecting the dollar as a pariah currency. But that is the result of the Fed’s decision in 2008 to keep unpayably high debts from defaulting by re-inflating U.S. real estate and financial markets. The aim is to pull home ownership out of negative equity, rescuing the banking system’s balance sheets and thus saving the government from having to indulge in a Tarp II, which looks politically impossible given the mood of most Americans.
The announced objective is not materializing. The Fed’s new credit creation is not increasing bank loans to real estate, consumers or businesses. Banks are not lending – at home, that is. They are collecting on past loans. This is why the U.S. savings rate is jumping. The “saving” that is reported (up from zero to 3 per cent of GDP) is taking the form of paying down debt, not building up liquid funds on which to draw. Just as hoarding diverts revenue away from being spent on goods and services, so debt repayment shrinks spendable income.
So Bernanke created $2 trillion in new Federal Reserve credit. And now (October 2010) the Fed is proposing to increase the Fed’s money creation by another $1 trillion over the coming year. This is what has led gold prices to surge and investors to move out of weakening “paper currencies” since early September – and prompted other nations to protect their own economies accordingly.
It is hardly surprising that banks are not lending to an economy being shrunk by debt deflation. The entire quantitative easing has been sent abroad, mainly to the BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India and China. “Recent research at the International Monetary Fund has shown conclusively that G4 monetary easing has in the past transferred itself almost completely to the emerging economies … since 1995, the stance of monetary policy in Asia has been almost entirely determined by the monetary stance of the G4 – the US, eurozone, Japan and China – led by the Fed.” According to the IMF, “equity prices in Asia and Latin America generally rise when excess liquidity is transferred from the G4 to the emerging economies.”
Borrowing unprecedented amounts from U.S., Japanese and British banks to buy bonds, stocks and currencies in the BRIC and Third World countries is a self-feeding expansion. Speculative inflows into these countries are pushing up their currencies as well as their asset prices, but. Their central banks settle these transactions in dollars, whose value falls as measured in their own local currencies.
U.S. officials say that this is all part of the free market. “It is not good for the world for the burden of solving this broader problem … to rest on the shoulders of the United States,” insisted Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on Wednesday.
So other countries are solving the problem on their own. Japan is trying to hold down its exchange rate by selling yen and buying U.S. Treasury bonds in the face of its carry trade being unwound as arbitrageurs are paying back the yen that they earlier borrowed to buy higher-yielding but increasingly risky sovereign debt from countries such as Greece. Paying back these arbitrage loans has pushed up the yen’s exchange rate by 12 per cent against the dollar so far during 2010. On Tuesday, October 5, Bank of Japan governor Masaaki Shirakawa announced that Japan had “no choice” but to “spend 5 trillion yen ($60 billion) to buy government bonds, corporate IOUs, real-estate investment trust funds and exchange-traded funds – the latter two a departure from past practice.”
This “sterilization” of unwanted financial speculation is precisely what the United States has criticized China for doing. China has tried more “normal” ways to recycle its trade surplus, by seeking out U.S. companies to buy. But Congress would not let CNOOC buy into U.S. oil refinery capacity a few years ago, and the Canadian government is now being urged to block China’s attempt to purchase its potash resources. This leaves little option for China and other countries but to hold their currencies stable by purchasing U.S. and European government bonds.
This has become the problem for all countries today. As presently structured, the international financial system rewards speculation and makes it difficult for central banks to maintain stability without forced loans to the U.S. Government that has long enjoyed a near monopoly in providing central bank reserves. As noted earlier, arbitrageurs obtain a twofold gain: the arbitrage margin between Brazil’s nearly 12 per cent yield on its long-term government bonds and the cost of U.S. credit (1 per cent), plus the foreign-exchange gain resulting from the fact that the outflow from dollars into reals has pushed up the real’s exchange rate some 30 per cent – from R$2.50 at the start of 2009 to $1.75 last week. Taking into account the ability to leverage $1 million of one’s own equity investment to buy $100 million of foreign securities, the rate of return is 3000 per cent since January 2009.
Brazil has been more a victim than a beneficiary of what is euphemized as a “capital inflow.” The inflow of foreign money has pushed up the real by 4 per cent in just over a month (from September 1 through early October). The past year’s run-up has eroded the competitiveness of Brazilian exports, prompting the government to impose 4 per cent tax on foreign purchases of its bonds on October 4 to deter the currency’s rise. “It’s not only a currency war,” Finance Minister Guido Mantega said on Monday. “It tends to become a trade war and this is our concern.” And Thailand’s central bank director Wongwatoo Potirat warned that his country was considering similar taxes and currency trade restrictions to stem the baht’s rise, and Subir Gokarn, deputy governor of the Reserve Bank of India announced that his country also was reviewing defenses against the “potential threat” of inward capital flows.”
Such inflows do not provide capital for tangible investment. They are predatory, and cause currency fluctuation that disrupts trade patterns while creating enormous trading profits for large financial institutions and their customers. Yet most discussions of exchange rate treat the balance of payments and exchange rates as if they were determined purely by commodity trade and “purchasing power parity,” not by the financial flows and military spending that actually dominate the balance of payments. The reality is that today’s financial interregnum – anarchic “free” markets prior to countries hurriedly putting up their own monetary defenses – provides the arbitrage opportunity of the century. This is what bank lobbyists have been pressing for. It has little to do with the welfare of workers.
The potentially largest speculative prize of all promises to be an upward revaluation of China’s renminbi. The House Ways and Means Committee is backing this gamble, by demanding that China raise its exchange rate by the 20 per cent that the Treasury and Federal Reserve are suggesting. A revaluation of this magnitude would enable speculators to put down 1 per cent equity – say, $1 million to borrow $99 million and buy Chinese renminbi forward. The revaluation being demanded would produce a 2000 per cent profit of $20 million by turning the $100 million bet (and just $1 million “serious money”) into $120 million. Banks can trade on much larger, nearly infinitely leveraged margins, much like drawing up CDO swaps and other derivative plays.
This kind of money already has been made by speculating on Brazilian, Indian and Chinese securities and those of other countries whose exchange rates have been forced up by credit-flight out of the dollar, which has fallen by 7 per cent against a basket of currencies since early September when the Federal Reserve floated the prospect of quantitative easing. During the week leading up to the IMF meetings in Washington, the Thai baht and Indian rupee soared in anticipation that the United States and Britain would block any attempts by foreign countries to change the financial system and curb disruptive currency gambling.
This capital outflow from the United States has indeed helped domestic banks rebuild their balance sheets, as the Fed intended. But in the process the international financial system has been victimized as collateral damage. This prompted Chinese officials to counter U.S. attempts to blame it for running a trade surplus by retorting that U.S. financial aggression “risked bringing mutual destruction upon the great economic powers.
From the gold-exchange standard to the Treasury-bill standard to “free credit” anarchy
Indeed, the standoff between the United States and other countries at the IMF meetings in Washington this weekend threatens to cause the most serious rupture since the breakdown of the London Monetary Conference in 1933. The global financial system threatens once again to break apart, deranging the world’s trade and investment relationships – or to take a new form that will leave the United States isolated in the face of its structural long-term balance-of-payments deficit.
This crisis provides an opportunity – indeed, a need – to step back and review the longue durée of international financial evolution to see where past trends are leading and what paths need to be re-tracked. For many centuries prior to 1971, nations settled their balance of payments in gold or silver. This “money of the world,” as Sir James Steuart called gold in 1767, formed the basis of domestic currency as well. Until 1971 each U.S. Federal Reserve note was backed 25 per cent by gold, valued at $35 an ounce. Countries had to obtain gold by running trade and payments surpluses in order to increase their money supply to facilitate general economic expansion. And when they ran trade deficits or undertook military campaigns, central banks restricted the supply of domestic credit to raise interest rates and attract foreign financial inflows.
As long as this behavioral condition remained in place, the international financial system operated fairly smoothly under checks and balances, albeit under “stop-go” policies when business expansions led to trade and payments deficits. Countries running such deficits raised their interest rates to attract foreign capital, while slashing government spending, raising taxes on consumers and slowing the domestic economy so as to reduce the purchase of imports.
What destabilized this system was war spending. War-related transactions spanning World Wars I and II enabled the United States to accumulate some 80 per cent of the world’s monetary gold by 1950. This made the dollar a virtual proxy for gold. But after the Korean War broke out, U.S. overseas military spending accounted for the entire payments deficit during the 1950s and ‘60s and early ‘70s. Private-sector trade and investment was exactly in balance.
By August 1971, war spending in Vietnam and other foreign countries forced the United States to suspend gold convertibility of the dollar through sales via the London Gold Pool. But largely by inertia, central banks continued to settle their payments balances in U.S. Treasury securities. After all, there was no other asset in sufficient supply to form the basis for central bank monetary reserves. But replacing gold – a pure asset – with dollar-denominated U.S. Treasury debt transformed the global financial system. It became debt-based, not asset-based. And geopolitically, the Treasury-bill standard made the United States immune from the traditional balance-of-payments and financial constraints, enabling its capital markets to become more highly debt-leveraged and “innovative.” It also enabled the U.S. Government to wage foreign policy and military campaigns without much regard for the balance of payments.
The problem is that the supply of dollar credit has become potentially infinite. The “dollar glut” has grown in proportion to the U.S. payments deficit. Growth in central bank reserves and sovereign-country funds has taken the form of recycling of dollar inflows into new purchases of U.S. Treasury securities – thereby making foreign central banks (and taxpayers) responsible for financing most of the U.S. federal budget deficit. The fact that this deficit is largely military in nature – for purposes that many foreign voters oppose – makes this lock-in particularly galling. So it hardly is surprising that foreign countries are seeking an alternative.
Contrary to most public media posturing, the U.S. payments deficit – and hence, other countries’ payments surpluses – is not primarily a trade deficit. Foreign military spending has accelerated despite the Cold War ending with dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Even more important has been rising capital outflows from the United States. Banks lent to foreign governments from Third World countries, to other deficit countries to cover their national payments deficits, to private borrowers to buy the foreign infrastructure being privatized, foreign stocks and bonds, and to arbitrageurs to borrow at a low interest rate to buy higher-yielding securities abroad.
The corollary is that other countries’ balance-of-payments surpluses do not stem primarily from trade relations, but from financial speculation and a spillover of U.S. global military spending. Under these conditions the maneuvering for quick returns by banks and their arbitrage customers is distorting exchange rates for international trade. U.S. “quantitative easing” is coming to be perceived as a euphemism for a predatory financial attack on the rest of the world. Trade and currency stability are part of the “collateral damage” being caused by the Federal Reserve and Treasury flooding the economy with liquidity in their attempt to re-inflate U.S. asset prices. Faced with U.S. quantitative easing flooding the economy with reserves to “save the banks” from negative equity, all countries are obliged to act as “currency manipulators.” So much money is made by purely financial speculation that “real” economies are being destroyed.
The coming capital controls
The global financial system is being broken up as U.S. monetary officials change the rules they laid down nearly half a century ago. Prior to the United States going off gold in 1971, nobody dreamed that an economy – especially the United States – would create unlimited credit on computer keyboards and not see its currency plunge. But that is what happens under the Treasury-bill standard of international finance. Under this condition, foreign countries can prevent their currencies from rising against the dollar (thereby pricing their labor and exports out of foreign markets) only by (1) recycling dollar inflows into U.S. Treasury securities, (2) by imposing capital controls, or (3) by avoiding use of the dollar or other currencies used by financial speculators in economies promoting “quantitative easing.”
Malaysia successfully used capital controls during the 1997 Asian Crisis to prevent short-sellers from covering their bets. This confronted speculators with a short squeeze that George Soros says made him lose money on the attempted raid. Other countries are now reviewing how to impose capital controls to protect themselves from the tsunami of credit from flowing into their currencies and buying up their assets – along with gold and other commodities that are turning into vehicles for speculation rather than actual use in production. Brazil took a modest step along this path by using tax policy rather than outright capital controls when it taxed foreign buyers of its bonds last week.
If other nations take this route, it will reverse the policy of open and unprotected capital markets adopted after World War II. This trend threatens to lead to the kind of international monetary practice found from the 1930s into the ‘50s: dual exchange rates, one for financial movements and another for trade. It probably would mean replacing the IMF, World Bank and WTO with a new set of institutions, isolating U.S., British and Eurozone representation.
To defend itself, the IMF is proposing to act as a “central bank” creating what was called “paper gold” in the late 1960s – artificial credit in the form of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). However, other countries already have complained that voting control remains dominated by the major promoters of arbitrage speculation – the United States, Britain and Eurozone. And the IMF’s Articles of Agreement prevent countries from protecting themselves, characterizing this as “interfering” with “open capital markets.” So the impasse reached this weekend appears to be permanent. As one report summarized matters: “‘There is only one obstacle, which is the agreement of the members,’ said a frustrated Kahn .”
Paul Martin, the former Canadian prime minister who helped create the G20 after the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, said “said the big powers were largely immune to being named andshamed.” And in a Financial Times interview Mohamed El Erian, a former senior IMF official and now chief executive of Pimco said, “You have a burst pipe behind the wall and the water is coming out. You have to fix the pipe, not just patch the wall.”
The BRIC countries are simply creating their own parallel system. In September, China supported a Russian proposal to start direct trading between the yuan and the ruble. It has brokered a similar deal with Brazil. And on the eve of the IMF meetings in Washington on Friday, October 8, Chinese Premier Wen stopped off in Istanbul to reach agreement with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to use their own currencies in tripling Turkish-Chinese trade to $50 billion over the next five years, effectively excluding the U.S. dollar. “We are forming an economic strategic partnership … In all of our relations, we have agreed to use the lira and yuan,” Mr. Erdogan said.
On the deepest economic lane, the present global financial breakdown is part of the price to be paid for the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury refusing to accept a prime axiom of banking: Debts that cannot be paid, won’t be. They tried to “save” the banking system from debt write-downs in 2008 by keeping the debt overhead in place. The resulting repayment burden continues to shrink the U.S. economy, while the Fed’s way to help the banks “earn their way out of negative equity” has been to fuel a flood of international financial speculation. Faced with normalizing world trade or providing opportunities for predatory finance, the U.S. and Britain have thrown their weigh behind the latter. Targeted economies understandably seeking alternative arrangements.
Michael Hudson is a former Wall Street economist. A Distinguished Research Professor at University of Missouri, Kansas City (UMKC), he is the author of many books, including Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (new ed., Pluto Press, 2002) and Trade, Development and Foreign Debt: A History of Theories of Polarization v. Convergence in the World Economy. He can be reached via his website, mh@michael-hudson.com
Showing posts with label monetary policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label monetary policy. Show all posts
18 October 2010
17 May 2010
Dysfunctional Markets
Dysfunctional Markets
by Doug Noland May 14, 2010
For the week, the S&P500 rallied 2.2% (up 1.8% y-t-d), and the Dow gained 2.3% (up 1.8%). The S&P 400 Mid-Caps jumped 4.3% (up 8.6%), and the small cap Russell 2000 recovered 6.3% (up 11.0%). The Morgan Stanley Cyclicals jumped 4.4% (up 7.0%), and the Transports gained 4.4% (up 9.5%). The Morgan Stanley Consumer index rose 1.8% (up 3.4%), and the Utilities gained 2.4% (down 3.9%). The Banks jumped 3.1% (up 24.7%), and the Broker/Dealers increased 1.5% (down 1.8%). The Nasdaq100 increased 3.1% (up 2.5%), and the Morgan Stanley High Tech index gained 2.1% (down 2.1%). The Semiconductors rose 2.1% (down 1.7%). The InteractiveWeek Internet index jumped 4.5% (up 4.1%). The Biotechs rallied 3.7%, increasing 2010 gains to 15.3%. With bullion jumping $22, the HUI gold index surged 7.9% (up 13.4%).
One-month Treasury bill rates ended the week at 14 bps and three-month bills closed at 14 bps. Two-year government yields declined 3 bps to 0.72%. Five-year T-note yields fell 3 bps to 2.10%. Ten-year yields increased 3 bps to 3.46%. Long bond yields rose 6 bps to 4.34%. Benchmark Fannie MBS yields declined 7 bps to 4.20%. The spread between 10-year Treasury and benchmark MBS yields narrowed 10 bps to 74 bps. Agency 10-yr debt spreads declined 3 bps to 44 bps. The implied yield on December 2010 eurodollar futures declined 4 bps to 0.855%. The 10-year dollar swap spread declined 1.25 to 3.5. The 30-year swap spread increased 2.25 to negative 18.5. Corporate bond spreads were mixed. An index of investment grade bond spreads narrowed 15 to 103 bps. An index of junk bond spreads widened 27 to 516 bps.
Debt issuance remained slow. Investment grade issuers included Enterprise Products $2.0bn, Morgan Stanley $1.75bn, Citigroup $1.5bn, CVS Caremark $1.0bn, Kinder Morgan $1.0bn, Burlington Northern $750 million, XCEL Energy $550 million, PNC Funding $500 million, Pearson Funding $350 million, Cigna $300 million, FPL Group $250 million, and San Diego G&E $250 million.
May 14 – Bloomberg (Shiyin Chen): “High-yield bond funds posted the largest outflows in five years and emerging-market equity funds had a second straight week of redemptions as Europe’s sovereign- debt crisis dented demand for riskier assets, EPFR Global said.”
Junk issuers included Mylan $1.25bn, MCE Finance $600 million, Omnicare $400 million, Wireco Worldgroup $275 million and Kratos $225 million.
I saw no converts issued.
International dollar debt sales included Inter-American Development Bank $1.0bn, Metinvest $500 million, Kazatomprom $500 million, and Renhe Commercial $300 million.
U.K. 10-year gilt yields declined 6 bps to 3.75%, while German bund yields rose 6 bps to 2.86%. Greek bond yields collapsed 470 bps to 7.70%, and 10-year Portuguese yields dropped 163 bps to 4.63%. The German DAX equities index rallied 6.0% (up 1.7% y-t-d). Japanese 10-year "JGB" yields rose 3 bps to 1.30%. The Nikkei 225 recovered 0.9% (down 0.8%). Emerging markets recovered some of last week's decline. For the week, Brazil's Bovespa equities index gained 0.9% (down 7.5%), and Mexico's Bolsa rose 1.0% (down 1.0%). Russia’s RTS equities index gained 4.8% (down 0.6%). India’s Sensex equities index gained 1.3% (down 2.7%). China’s Shanghai Exchange added 0.3% (down 17.7%). Brazil’s benchmark dollar bond yields dropped 17 bps to 4.83%, and Mexico's benchmark bond yields sank 43 bps to 4.78%.
Freddie Mac 30-year fixed mortgage rates dropped 7 bps last week to 4.93% (up 7bps y-o-y). Fifteen-year fixed rates fell 6 bps to 4.30% (down 22bps y-o-y). One-year ARMs declined 5 bps to 4.02% (down 69bps y-o-y). Bankrate's survey of jumbo mortgage borrowing costs had 30-yr fixed jumbo rates down 15 bps to 5.63% (down 64bps y-o-y).
Federal Reserve Credit dipped $1.2bn last week to $2.310 TN. Fed Credit was up $90.3bn y-t-d (11.1% annualized) and $193.7bn, or 9.2%, from a year ago. Elsewhere, Fed Foreign Holdings of Treasury, Agency Debt this past week (ended 5/12) declined $11.8bn to $3.064 TN. "Custody holdings" have increased $108bn y-t-d (10.0% annualized), with a one-year rise of $380bn, or 14.2%.
M2 (narrow) "money" supply was up $34.3bn to $8.504 TN (week of 5/3). Narrow "money" has declined $8.1bn y-t-d. Over the past year, M2 grew 1.4%. For the week, Currency added $0.8bn, and Demand & Checkable Deposits surged $40.7bn. Savings Deposits declined $4.0bn, and Small Denominated Deposits fell $5.0bn. Retail Money Fund assets added $1.9bn.
Total Money Market Fund assets (from Invest Co Inst) jumped $24.2bn to $2.878 TN, the first rise since February. In the first 19 weeks of the year, money fund assets have dropped $416bn, with a one-year decline of $912bn, or 24.1%.
Total Commercial Paper outstanding added $0.9bn last week to $1.103 TN. CP has declined 67$bn, or 15.7% annualized, year-to-date, and was down $195bn from a year ago (15%).
International reserve assets (excluding gold) - as tallied by Bloomberg’s Alex Tanzi – were up $1.297 TN y-o-y, or 19.4%, to a record $7.986 TN.
Global Credit Market Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Tim Catts and Pierre Paulden): “Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is punishing corporate borrowers, with bond issuance tumbling as investors doubt a $1 trillion bailout plan will be enough to bolster confidence in government finances for the region. Borrowers worldwide have sold $15 billion of corporate debt this month, a 62% decline from the same period in April and 83% less than the average for the past year… The extra yield investors demand to own corporate debt instead of government bonds soared last week to the highest in more than four months… ‘This is a fix and not a resolution,’ said Jason Brady, a managing director at Thornburg Investment Management… ‘Investors have seen volatility and that makes it harder to get excited about longer-dated assets paying a fixed return.’”
May 11 – International Herald Tribune (Andrew E. Kramer): “As the financial markets try to absorb news of a rescue package for Greece and other teetering euro-zone countries, some bankers and economists see parallels to Russia’s meltdown in 1998. A decade ago Russia was walking in the same shoes as Greece is today, striving to restore confidence in government bonds by seeking a huge loan from the International Monetary Fund and other lenders. Then, as now, the debt crisis was roiling global financial markets. And big hopes were pinned on a bailout — one that in Russia’s case did not work. ‘Greece creates a remarkable sense of déjà vu,’ Roland Nash, the head of research for Renaissance Capital, an investment bank in Moscow, wrote…”
May 11 – Finanacial Times (David Oakley and Ralph Atkins): “Investors on Tuesday warned that the European Central Bank would have to introduce quantitative easing to stave off the worst crisis in the eurozone since it was launched 11 years ago. The ECB has resisted following the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve in expanding the money supply by buying government bonds because it fears that it could stoke inflation. Although eurozone central banks bought eurozone government bonds this week for the first time as part of the international rescue plan, this is not QE as the ECB is funding this by selling German bunds or using commercial bank deposits.”
May 11- New York Times (Landon Thomas Jr. and Jack Ewing): “Like the giant financial bailout announced by the United States in 2008, the sweeping rescue package announced by Europe eased fears of a market collapse but left a big question: will it work long term? Stung by criticism that it was slow and weak, the European Union surpassed expectations in arranging a nearly $1 trillion financial commitment for its ailing members over the weekend and paved the way for the European Central Bank to begin purchases of European debt on Monday... The premium that investors had been demanding to buy Greek bonds plunged… And as details crystallized of the package’s main component — a promise by the European Union’s member states to back 440 billion euros, or $560 billion, in new loans to bail out European economies — the wisdom of solving a debt crisis by taking on more debt was challenged by some analysts. ‘Lending more money to already overborrowed governments does not solve their problems,’ Carl Weinberg, chief economist of High Frequency Economics…said…"
May 12 – Bloomberg (Tim Catts and Pierre Paulden): “Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is punishing corporate borrowers, with bond issuance tumbling as investors doubt a $1 trillion bailout plan will be enough to bolster confidence in government finances for the region. Borrowers worldwide have sold $15 billion of corporate debt this month, a 62% decline from the same period in April and 83% less than the average for the past year…”
May 14 – Wall Street Journal (Ianthe Jeanne Dugan): “Federal regulators and state officials are examining Wall Street's role in trading derivatives that essentially bet the municipal bonds they sold would go bust. The Securities and Exchange Commission has launched a preliminary inquiry into banks' trades of municipal credit-default swaps that allow investors to short-sell, or bet against, municipal bonds… The probe is exploring potential conflicts of interest by banks that sell municipal bonds and then poise themselves to profit if those bonds fail, these people said. A main thrust of their investigation is whether firms use their own money to bet against the bonds they sell and, if so, whether that activity is properly disclosed to bond buyers.”
May 14 – Bloomberg (Christine Harper): “Goldman Sachs… is ceasing proprietary trading in one type of structured debt… A group of traders who were focused on making bets on collateralized loan obligations with the New York-based firm’s own money are now handling trades for clients…”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Takahiko Hyuga and Finbarr Flynn): “Morgan Stanley Chief Executive Officer James Gorman denied allegations the U.S. bank misled investors about mortgage derivatives it sold them. The firm is being probed by U.S. prosecutors over whether the bank misled clients when it sold them collateralized debt obligations as its own traders bet that the value of the securities would drop… Wall Street firms are facing unprecedented scrutiny from lawmakers and prosecutors over whether they missold CDOs linked to the subprime mortgages that caused the credit crisis.”
Global Government Finance Bubble Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Abigail Moses and John Glover): “The cost of saving the world from financial meltdown has been bloated by ‘hyperinflation’ since Long Term Capital Management LP’s rescue in 1998… rising price of bailouts since the $3.5 billion pledged to hedge fund LTCM after it was crushed by Russia’s default, and the almost $1 trillion committed to halt the European Union’s sovereign debt crisis this week. It cost just $29 billion to sooth markets in March 2008 when Bear Stearns Cos. was taken over, and $700 billion for the Federal Reserve to save the banking system with the Troubled Asset Relief Program in October that year. ‘We haven’t had any kind of normal inflation in the last decade, but we’ve had hyperinflation in writedowns and the magnitude of bailouts,’ said Jim Reid, head of fundamental strategy at Deutsche Bank… ‘You have to do more to get a similar effect every time.’”
May 12 – Bloomberg (David Mildenberg and Dawn Kopecki): “Four of the largest U.S. banks, including Citigroup Inc., racked up perfect quarters in their trading businesses between January and March, underscoring how government support and less competition is fueling Wall Street’s revival. Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the first, second and fifth-biggest U.S. banks by assets, all said in regulatory filings that they had zero days of trading losses in the first quarter… ‘The trading profits of the Street is just another way of measuring the subsidy the Fed is giving to the banks,’ said Christopher Whalen, managing director… Institutional Risk Analytics. ‘It’s a transfer from savers to banks.’
Currency Watch:
The dollar index jumped 2.1% this week to 86.249 (up 10.8% y-t-d). For the week on the upside, the South Korean won increased 2.2%, the Mexican peso 2.1%, the Brazilian real 2.0%, the South African rand 1.3%, the Canadian dollar 1.1%, and the Singapore dollar 0.6%. For the week on the downside, the euro declined 3.1%, the Danish krone 3.0%, the Swiss franc 2.2%, the British pound 1.8%, the Swedish krona 1.35, the New Zealand dollar 1.1%, the Japanese yen 0.9%, the Norwegian krone 0.3%, and the Australian dollar 0.2%.
Commodities Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Stuart Wallace): “There has been a ‘significant’ surge in sales of gold coins and bars, particularly in Germany, Ross Norman, one of the founders of TheBullionDesk.com, said… ‘The last time we saw this level of grass-roots activity was in October 2008 when the economy was on the brink and the retail gold buying community effectively drained gold from the market,” the former bullion dealer said in the report.”
May 10 – Financial Times (Jack Farchy): “Silk ties and handkerchiefs are forecast to rise in price after the cost of silk jumped to its highest level in at least 15 years as rapid industrialisation in China, the world’s largest supplier, robs the sector of valuable farmland. The price of silk cocoons… has doubled since the start of 2009…”
The CRB index declined another 1.1% (down 8.8% y-t-d). The Goldman Sachs Commodities Index (GSCI) slipped 0.4% (down 4.4% y-t-d). Spot Gold jumped 1.8% to $1,230 (up 12.1% y-t-d). Silver surged 4.6% to $19.30 (up 14.6% y-t-d). June Crude sank $3.18 to $71.93 (down 9.4% y-t-d). June Gasoline 0.6% (up 4% y-t-d), and June Natural Gas jumped 7.7% (down 22% y-t-d). July Copper declined 0.8% (down 7% y-t-d). May Wheat sank 7.3% (down 14% y-t-d), and May Corn declined 2.2% (down 14% y-t-d).
China Bubble Watch:
May 11 – Wall Street Journal Asia: “The direction of China’s economy is set. The question troubling investors is whether policy makers have set their course, too. With consumer-price inflation rising to 2.8% in April, real interest rates have moved farther into negative territory… More inflation is in the pipeline. The producer-price index rose 6.8% year-to-year in April, up from 5.9% in March. Higher manufacturing costs should eventually feed through to consumers. The latest housing-market data adds to fears of overheating, with prices up 12.8% year-to-year across 70 of China's larger cities. New bank lending was up, too, with $113.3 billion more loans pumped into the economy in April -- back to around the average monthly level during 2009's credit bonanza. Against this backdrop, Beijing's tightening measures to date are inadequate.”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Peter Woodifield): “China is set to overtake Japan as the largest Asia-Pacific commercial real estate market next year following a surge in values, according to property adviser DTZ Holdings Plc.”
India Watch:
May 13 – Bloomberg (Unni Krishnan): “India’s food inflation rate climbed… An index measuring wholesale prices of agriculture products… rose 16.44% in the week ended May 1 from a year earlier…”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Kartik Goyal): “India’s industrial production grew more than 10% for a sixth straight month, adding to inflation pressures even as Europe’s debt crisis threatens to undermine the global economic recovery.
Asia Bubble Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (David Yong): “Asian interest-rate swaps show traders are betting central banks will be less aggressive in raising borrowing costs because of the European Union’s sovereign-debt crisis. ‘The euro crisis has hurt market confidence and liquidity,’ Matthew Huang, an interest-rate strategist… at Barclays Capital Plc, said… ‘If liquidity freezes up, Asian policy makers will likely choose to leave monetary conditions looser for longer.’”
May 10 – Wall Street Journal Asia (Alex Frangos): “The European bailout plan could be too much medicine for an overheating Asia. Before the Greece crisis intensified last week, policy makers in China and elsewhere in Asia said too much growth and an abundance of capital inflows were pushing real-estate and other asset prices dangerously high. While Asian markets welcomed the 750 billion euro ($955 billion) bailout plan, economists and analysts warned that the rescue package could end up bringing even more capital to Asian markets… Loose monetary policy in Europe and the U.S. has already helped to inflate assets prices in Asia, especially for emerging-market bonds and real estate.”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Eunkyung Seo): “South Korea’s unemployment rate declined in April for a third straight month… The jobless rate fell to 3.7% from 3.8% in March… ‘Jobs market conditions are improving on the economic recovery,’ Lee Sang Jae, an economist at Hyundai Securities... said… ‘But there remains some weakness, supporting policy makers’ views that the economy isn’t strong enough to endure higher borrowing costs.’”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Shamim Adam and Manirajan Ramasamy): “Malaysia’s economy grew at the fastest pace in at least 10 years last quarter… Gross domestic product increased 10.1% in the three months ended March 31 from a year earlier…”
Latin America Bubble Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Jens Erik Gould): “Mexico’s industrial production rose the most in almost four years in March on surging demand for exports to the U.S. Output climbed 7.6% from a year earlier…”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Fabiola Moura and Drew Benson): “Argentine Economy Minister Amado Boudou said last week’s jump in bond yields may prompt the government to shelve plans to sell as much as $1 billion of bonds, its first international offer since defaulting in 2001.”
Unbalanced Global Economy Watch:
May 10 – Bloomberg (Bob Willis and Thomas R. Keene): “The fallout from the European debt crisis raises the risk of a ‘double dip’ recession for the global economy, said Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia Ltd. ‘When you have a vulnerable post-crisis economic recovery and crises reverberating in the aftermath of that, you have some very serious risks to the global business cycle,’ Roach said… ‘This concept of the global double dip which no one wants to talk about… is alive and well.’”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Svenja O’Donnell): “U.K. unemployment climbed to a 16- year high in the first quarter, underlining the fragility of the recovery as Conservative David Cameron begins his premiership.”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Simone Meier): “Europe’s economy expanded at a faster pace than economists forecast in the first quarter as a global recovery boosted exports… Gross domestic product in the 16 euro nations rose 0.2% from the fourth quarter…”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Christian Vits): “Germany’s economy unexpectedly grew in the first three months of the year as rising exports and company investment outweighed the effects of the cold winter. Gross domestic product… rose 0.2%..."
May 12 – Bloomberg (Maria Levitov): “Russia faces a ‘massive’ capital influx as investors look for alternatives to Europe’s crisis- ridden debt markets, said Mikhail Dmitriev, president of the Center for Strategic Development. That’s putting pressure on Russian policy makers to implement capital controls soon to stem the flows and avoid ruble volatility, Dmitriev, whose think tank conducts research for the government, said in an interview… ‘The government is unarmed against the distortions that may result from massive capital inflows,’ said Dmitriev, who is also a former First Deputy Economy Minister. ‘Russia’s balance of payments and internal macroeconomic stability would undoubtedly be at risk.’”
May 14 – Bloomberg (Paul Abelsky): “Russia’s economy expanded for the first time since 2008… Gross domestic product rose an annual 2.9% in the first quarter after contracting 3.8% in the last three months of 2009…”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Jacob Greber): “Australia’s job growth accelerated in April, propelled by full-time employment… The unemployment rate held at 5.4%.”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Tracy Withers): “New Zealand’s manufacturing industry expanded at the fastest pace in more than five years in April amid rising production and orders.”
U.S. Bubble Economy Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Shobhana Chandra): “The trade deficit in the U.S. widened in March to the highest level in more than a year as imports climbed faster than exports, adding to evidence of the global recovery from the worst recession in the post-World War II era. The gap grew 2.5% to $40.4 billion…”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Ryan J. Donmoyer): “White House budget director Peter Orszag predicted Congress would approve higher taxes on managers of private equity firms, real estate funds and other investment partnerships in the coming weeks. Orszag, speaking yesterday…”
May 10 – Bloomberg (Terrence Dopp): “New Jersey’s Democratic lawmakers plan to introduce legislation to resurrect an income-tax surcharge on residents who earn $1 million a year or more…”
Derivatives Watch:
May 11 – Bloomberg (Phil Mattingly): “The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. advanced a proposal aimed at overhauling part of the $4 trillion asset-backed securities market and introduced a rule that would require the biggest U.S. banks to submit ‘funeral plans’ to handle their possible collapse… ‘Now is the time to put some prudent controls in place to make sure we don’t get into some of the problems we saw in the past,’ Bair said…
Real Estate Watch:
May 13 – Bloomberg Dan Levy): “U.S. home repossessions rose to a record level in April while foreclosure filings dropped in a sign mortgage lenders are working off a backlog of seized properties, according to RealtyTrac… ‘Right now it appears that the banks are focusing on processing the loans already in foreclosure, and slowing down the initiation of new foreclosure proceedings as a way of managing inventory levels,’ Rick Sharga, RealtyTrac’s executive vice president, said… A record 92,432 bank repossessions were reported in April, up 45% from a year earlier…”
Central Bank Watch:
May 13 – DPA: “The European Central Bank (ECB) on Thursday defended its decision to intervene in European bond markets, rejecting claims that this threatened the bank’s independence. ‘These measures are designed not to affect the monetary policy stance,’ the ECB wrote in its monthly report of its decision to buy debt from troubled eurozone members. ECB chief economist Juergen Stark said this was a ‘temporary emergency measure,’ to which there was no alternative after the euro currency had come under attack. Stark said the bank was not responding to political pressures… ‘The credibility of the ECB does not just hinge on the question whether or not we buy government securities, but whether we fulfill our central task, which is ensuring price stability,’ Stark said. The economist said there was no doubt that ‘an attack’ on individual eurozone countries was being carried out by "anonymous market sources.’”
May 10 – Bloomberg (Mayumi Otsuma): “Central banks from the U.S., Japan and Europe will participate in temporary U.S. dollar swap agreements amid heightened tension in global financial markets, the Bank of Japan said. ‘In response to the re-emergence of strains in U.S. dollar short-term funding markets in Europe’ the central banks of Canada, England and Switzerland will also participate in the re- establishment of currency swaps that were implemented during the financial crisis, the BOJ said… ‘These facilities are designed to help improve liquidity conditions in U.S. dollar funding markets and to prevent the spread of strains to other markets and financial centers.’ Central banks ‘will continue to work together closely as needed to address pressures in funding markets’ the BOJ said.”
May 10 – Bloomberg (Saburo Funabiki): “The Bank of Japan said it would pump 2 trillion yen ($21.7bn) into the financial system for a second day to help reassure markets after the Greek fiscal crisis set off a slump in stocks worldwide.”
GSE Watch:
May 10 – Bloomberg (Nick Timiraos): “Fannie Mae asked the U.S. government for an additional $8.4 billion in aid after posting an $11.5 billion net loss for the first quarter, the latest sign that the bailout of the mortgage investor and its main rival, Freddie Mac, is likely to be the most expensive legacy of the U.S. housing-market bust… The company has now racked up losses of nearly $145 billion, or nearly double its profits for the previous 35 years.”
Fiscal Watch:
May 13 – Bloomberg (Vincent Del Giudice): “The U.S. posted its largest April budget deficit on record as receipts declined in a month that typically sees an increase in individual income tax payments. The excess of spending over revenue rose to $82.7 billion last month compared with a $20.9 billion gap in April 2009… April marked a record 19th straight monthly shortfall… Deterioration in the government’s balance sheet in coming years raises the risk of higher interest rates even as an improving economy helps lift tax receipts. ‘With the recovery in place, we should be seeing higher revenue and lower outlays, not the other way around,’ said Win Thin, senior currency strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman… The government’s April budget deficit compares with a median forecast of $57.9 billion… The last time the U.S. had back-to-back April deficits was 1963-1964… For the fiscal year that began in October, the budget deficit totaled $799.7 billion compared with $802.3 billion during the same period last year.”
May 12 – Associated Press: “President Obama’s new health-care law could potentially add at least $115 billion more to government health care spending over the next 10 years, if Congress approves all the additional spending called for in the legislation, congressional budget referees said… That would push the 10-year cost of the overhaul above $1 trillion…”
California Watch:
May 11 – Bloomberg (Michael B. Marois and William Selway): “California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger will seek ‘terrible cuts’ to eliminate an $18.6 billion budget deficit facing the most-populous U.S. state through June 2011… California’s revenue in April, when income-tax payments are due, trailed the governor’s estimates by $3.6 billion, or 26%.”
May 14 – Bloomberg (Michael B. Marois and William Selway): “California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed a new round of budget cuts, including eliminating the state’s main welfare program for families, to close a $19.1 billion budget deficit for the year starting July 1. The $83.4 billion plan calls for $12.4 billion in spending reductions, $3.4 billion in additional federal aid and $3.4 billion in fund shifts, fees and assessments…”
Speculator Watch:
May 14 – Bloomberg (Jody Shenn and Michael J. Moore): “In June 2006, a year before the subprime mortgage market collapsed, Morgan Stanley created a cluster of investments doomed to fail even if default rates stayed low -- then bet against its concoction. Known as the Baldwin deals, the $167 million of synthetic collateralized debt obligations had an unusual feature… Rather than curtailing their bets on mortgage bonds as the underlying home loans paid down, the CDOs kept wagering as if the risk hadn’t changed. That left Baldwin investors facing losses on a modest rise in U.S. housing foreclosures, while Morgan Stanley was positioned to gain. ‘I can’t imagine anybody would take that bet knowingly,’ said Thomas Adams, a former executive at bond insurers Ambac Financial Group Inc. and FGIC Corp… ‘You’re overriding the natural process of risk-mitigation.’”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Tomoko Yamazaki and Komaki Ito): “Japanese hedge funds, the world’s worst performers last year, returned 6.7% in the first four months of 2010, the best year-to-April return in six years, according to Eurekahedge Pte.”
Dysfunctional Markets:
It scrolled by quickly Wednesday afternoon on my Bloomberg screen: a one-line headline quoting ECB Executive Board member Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo: “Central Banks Can’t Work if Markets Dysfunctional.” My efforts to located Mr. Gonzalez-Paramo’s full comments on the issue were unsuccessful; we’ll have to assume the context. I do believe strongly that many things these days can’t work because global markets are hopelessly dysfunctional.
I was never a big fan of the simplistic analytical fixation on the so-called “shadow banking system.” Key components of this “system” – i.e. the Wall Street securities firms, ABS, CDOs, SIVs, private-label MBS, etc. – have been reined in. This would imply a more stable financial backdrop, which is nowhere to been seen. I am similarly not a subscriber to a “new normal” thesis. Again, the focus seems to detract from today’s key issues. I have posited a “Newest Abnormal” thesis – that the long process of market distortions and economic imbalances has actually accelerated. Things go from bad to only worse. Things may look somewhat different, but there’s nothing new.
From my analytical perspective, the heart of the problem lies with this dysfunctional dynamic between global marketable debt and derivatives, policy-induced distortions, and unfettered speculative finance. Unique in history, we continue to operate with a global financial “system” functioning without limits to either the quantity or quality of new Credit created. There’s way too much Credit backed by little more than government assurances or perceptions of government insurance. And never before has an enormous global “leveraged speculating community” so dominated the markets for debt instruments and, in the process, so relied on faith in the efficacy of government market interventions. It’s global wildcat banking in its purest ever form.
These days, entities all over the world issue enormous quantities of tradable debt instruments. This debt, in large part, is purchased by sophisticated market operators earning unimaginable compensation for achieving “above market” returns. When market psychology is bullish, there is essentially unlimited demand for marketable debt – a significant portion acquired through the use of leverage. And as long as demand for new marketable securities remains robust, underlying positive fundamentals appear to support a high market valuation for this debt (irrespective of the quantity issued) - and the party lives on. But Katy bar the door whenever the crowd moves to cut exposure – either through liquidating positions or acquiring market “insurance.”
Eurozone policymakers look foolish these days for not having reined in profligate Greek borrowing and spending. To many, the ECB looks foolish for Sunday’s decision to purchase in the open market debt issued by Greece, Portugal, Spain and other troubled European countries. Others believe the ECB was foolish for not having had initiated a Federal Reserve-style monetization plan long before the debt crisis spiraled out of control. I sympathize with the ECB. Dysfunctional global markets placed them in a winless situation. Greek 10-year bond yields were below 5% for much of 2009. The market was happy to accommodate profligacy - until it wasn’t. If only well-functioning global markets disciplined borrowers rather than emboldening them.
The sea change in global finance gained unstoppable momentum in the early nineties. The Greenspan Federal Reserve nurtured marketable debt as a mechanism to help overcome severe banking system impairment. There was no stopping the historic boom in market-based Credit once unleashed. The problem was clear by the time of the 1994 bond and mortgage securities dislocation. But it was politically and monetarily expedient to allow GSE Credit (with its implicit government guarantee) to evolve into a mechanism for stabilizing the Credit system and spurring economic expansion.
The rapidly escalating scope of the problem was illuminated with the collapse of LTCM. Yet, the Greenspan Fed supported this new financial infrastructure with only more powerful words and deeds. Pegging short term interest rates and aggressively intervening to rectify market tumult incited unprecedented leveraged speculation throughout the Credit system. Dr. Bernanke’s 2002 “helicopter money” and “government printing press” speeches sealed the fate of runaway Bubbles in both marketable debt and leveraged speculation.
Especially during the Bubble years 2004 through 2007, massive U.S. current account deficits worked to unleash U.S. Credit Bubble dynamics upon the entire world. The more Bubbles became ingrained in the financial architecture the deeper market perceptions became that policymakers wouldn’t tolerate a bust. Worse yet, policymakers resorted to using the debt markets and the market’s propensity for leveraged speculation as mechanisms for increasingly aggressive monetary reflation.
Global policymakers and Credit markets have been fueling Bubbles and accommodating profligacy for years now. It would have taken a concerted effort by global central bankers to rein things in. The Greenspan/Bernanke Federal Reserve would have had no part of it. Quite the contrary. It was fundamental to Greenspan/Bernanke doctrine to deal with market and economic fragility through the aggressive reflation of system Credit. This doctrine of inflationism was instrumental in nurturing Credit and speculation excesses that worked over time to increasingly distort the pricing of finance, the quantity of Credit created, and the allocation of real and financial resources. The ECB’s big mistake was not to have forcefully fought the Fed.
We’re now two years into the greatest expansion of global government debt in the history of mankind. Manic-depressive debt markets have now pulled the rug out from under Greece and periphery Europe, but in the process have further accommodated profligate government borrowings here at home. It is frightening to think of how distorted the Treasury market has become - and how things might play out down the road.
My bearish thesis on our markets and economy is based upon the view that the financial fuel for our recovery has been unsound, unstable and unsustainable. This “Monetary Process” is now in jeopardy. The Global Government Finance Bubble, which lunged into its terminal phase of excess with the collapse of the Wall Street/mortgage finance Bubble, has been pierced. Greece’s debt crisis marks a momentous inflection point. And, yes, some government markets – certainly including Treasuries – are benefiting from Greek and periphery European debt woes. Yet key Bubble dynamics percolate under the surface.
I have argued that the Global Government Finance Bubble has been the biggest and most precarious Bubble yet. The incredible scope of global sovereign debt expansion over the past couple years has been rather obvious. Less apparent are related distortions - to the pricing and allocation of finance throughout international markets - based specifically upon the market's perception that politicians and central bankers would act aggressively and successfully to forestall future crises. This policy-induced market distortion fostered an incredible bout of risk-taking – especially considering the fundamental backdrop – and a resulting massive flood of finance out to the risk markets. This perception has been blown to smithereens in Europe and has quickly become vulnerable everywhere.
Global markets in sovereign Credit default swap (CDS) protection have flourished on the assumption that policymakers would thwart any debt crisis. In the post-Greek debacle era, writing insurance against a government default is no longer free money. New realities have profoundly changed the risk and reward profiles of operating in this key market - and I’ll assume some profoundly less attractive marketplace liquidity dynamics going forward. And a faltering market for sovereign debt insurance significantly changes the risk profile of owning the underlying sovereign debt. To be sure, changing perceptions in the market for government debt work to corrode market confidence in the capacity of policymakers to stem financial and economic crises generally. This implies a major adjustment in the markets’ perception of risk in various markets, including corporate, municipal and mortgage instruments.
But I’m getting somewhat ahead of myself. Thus far, dislocation in Greek debt has fed powerful contagion effects throughout European debt and CDS. This has forced a major market reassessment of the relative stability of the euro currency, which has unleashed bloody havoc throughout the currency and “carry trade” arena. Currency and “carry trade” tumult has forced market reassessment as to near-term prospects for both the dollar (upward) and global growth (downward). This has caused trading liquidation and de-leveraging havoc in the enormous global “reflation trade” and in risk markets more generally. And there’s nothing like liquidation and forced de-leveraging to really bring out the animal spirits for those seeking to make nice speculative profits from others’ misfortune.
The dollar and Treasuries have benefited. This has supported the bullish view that the unfolding crisis is largely a European issue. It has also helped dampen the impact to our markets from changing global perceptions with respect to the capacity of policymakers to stem crises. Here in the U.S., Credit spreads and risk premiums (corporates, MBS, municipals, etc.) have widened some. Yet faith still runs deep that Washington won’t allow a crisis. This confidence must hold for sufficiently loose U.S. finance to continue to support our fragile recovery.
The confluence of global financial crisis and intense financial sector scrutiny here at home will at some point prove confidence in Washington overly optimistic. For now, when it comes to pricing risk and disciplining profligate borrowers, our debt markets remain dysfunctional.
This has caused liquidation and de-leveraging havoc in the enormous global “reflation trade” and in risk markets more generally. And there’s nothing like liquidation and forced de-leveraging to really bring out the animal spirits for those seeking to make nice speculative profits from others’ misfortune.
The dollar and Treasuries have benefited. This has supported the bullish view that the unfolding crisis is largely a European issue. It has also helped dampen the impact to our markets from changing global perceptions with respect to the capacity of policymakers to stem crises. Here in the U.S., Credit spreads and risk premiums (corporates, MBS, municipals, etc.) have widened some. Yet faith still runs deep that Washington won’t allow a crisis. This confidence must hold for sufficiently loose U.S. finance to continue to support our fragile recovery.
The confluence of global financial crisis and intense financial sector scrutiny here at home will at some point prove confidence in Washington overly optimistic. For now, when it comes to pricing risk and disciplining profligate borrowers, our debt markets remain dysfunctional.
http://prudentbear.com/index.php/creditbubblebulletinview?art_id=10376
by Doug Noland May 14, 2010
For the week, the S&P500 rallied 2.2% (up 1.8% y-t-d), and the Dow gained 2.3% (up 1.8%). The S&P 400 Mid-Caps jumped 4.3% (up 8.6%), and the small cap Russell 2000 recovered 6.3% (up 11.0%). The Morgan Stanley Cyclicals jumped 4.4% (up 7.0%), and the Transports gained 4.4% (up 9.5%). The Morgan Stanley Consumer index rose 1.8% (up 3.4%), and the Utilities gained 2.4% (down 3.9%). The Banks jumped 3.1% (up 24.7%), and the Broker/Dealers increased 1.5% (down 1.8%). The Nasdaq100 increased 3.1% (up 2.5%), and the Morgan Stanley High Tech index gained 2.1% (down 2.1%). The Semiconductors rose 2.1% (down 1.7%). The InteractiveWeek Internet index jumped 4.5% (up 4.1%). The Biotechs rallied 3.7%, increasing 2010 gains to 15.3%. With bullion jumping $22, the HUI gold index surged 7.9% (up 13.4%).
One-month Treasury bill rates ended the week at 14 bps and three-month bills closed at 14 bps. Two-year government yields declined 3 bps to 0.72%. Five-year T-note yields fell 3 bps to 2.10%. Ten-year yields increased 3 bps to 3.46%. Long bond yields rose 6 bps to 4.34%. Benchmark Fannie MBS yields declined 7 bps to 4.20%. The spread between 10-year Treasury and benchmark MBS yields narrowed 10 bps to 74 bps. Agency 10-yr debt spreads declined 3 bps to 44 bps. The implied yield on December 2010 eurodollar futures declined 4 bps to 0.855%. The 10-year dollar swap spread declined 1.25 to 3.5. The 30-year swap spread increased 2.25 to negative 18.5. Corporate bond spreads were mixed. An index of investment grade bond spreads narrowed 15 to 103 bps. An index of junk bond spreads widened 27 to 516 bps.
Debt issuance remained slow. Investment grade issuers included Enterprise Products $2.0bn, Morgan Stanley $1.75bn, Citigroup $1.5bn, CVS Caremark $1.0bn, Kinder Morgan $1.0bn, Burlington Northern $750 million, XCEL Energy $550 million, PNC Funding $500 million, Pearson Funding $350 million, Cigna $300 million, FPL Group $250 million, and San Diego G&E $250 million.
May 14 – Bloomberg (Shiyin Chen): “High-yield bond funds posted the largest outflows in five years and emerging-market equity funds had a second straight week of redemptions as Europe’s sovereign- debt crisis dented demand for riskier assets, EPFR Global said.”
Junk issuers included Mylan $1.25bn, MCE Finance $600 million, Omnicare $400 million, Wireco Worldgroup $275 million and Kratos $225 million.
I saw no converts issued.
International dollar debt sales included Inter-American Development Bank $1.0bn, Metinvest $500 million, Kazatomprom $500 million, and Renhe Commercial $300 million.
U.K. 10-year gilt yields declined 6 bps to 3.75%, while German bund yields rose 6 bps to 2.86%. Greek bond yields collapsed 470 bps to 7.70%, and 10-year Portuguese yields dropped 163 bps to 4.63%. The German DAX equities index rallied 6.0% (up 1.7% y-t-d). Japanese 10-year "JGB" yields rose 3 bps to 1.30%. The Nikkei 225 recovered 0.9% (down 0.8%). Emerging markets recovered some of last week's decline. For the week, Brazil's Bovespa equities index gained 0.9% (down 7.5%), and Mexico's Bolsa rose 1.0% (down 1.0%). Russia’s RTS equities index gained 4.8% (down 0.6%). India’s Sensex equities index gained 1.3% (down 2.7%). China’s Shanghai Exchange added 0.3% (down 17.7%). Brazil’s benchmark dollar bond yields dropped 17 bps to 4.83%, and Mexico's benchmark bond yields sank 43 bps to 4.78%.
Freddie Mac 30-year fixed mortgage rates dropped 7 bps last week to 4.93% (up 7bps y-o-y). Fifteen-year fixed rates fell 6 bps to 4.30% (down 22bps y-o-y). One-year ARMs declined 5 bps to 4.02% (down 69bps y-o-y). Bankrate's survey of jumbo mortgage borrowing costs had 30-yr fixed jumbo rates down 15 bps to 5.63% (down 64bps y-o-y).
Federal Reserve Credit dipped $1.2bn last week to $2.310 TN. Fed Credit was up $90.3bn y-t-d (11.1% annualized) and $193.7bn, or 9.2%, from a year ago. Elsewhere, Fed Foreign Holdings of Treasury, Agency Debt this past week (ended 5/12) declined $11.8bn to $3.064 TN. "Custody holdings" have increased $108bn y-t-d (10.0% annualized), with a one-year rise of $380bn, or 14.2%.
M2 (narrow) "money" supply was up $34.3bn to $8.504 TN (week of 5/3). Narrow "money" has declined $8.1bn y-t-d. Over the past year, M2 grew 1.4%. For the week, Currency added $0.8bn, and Demand & Checkable Deposits surged $40.7bn. Savings Deposits declined $4.0bn, and Small Denominated Deposits fell $5.0bn. Retail Money Fund assets added $1.9bn.
Total Money Market Fund assets (from Invest Co Inst) jumped $24.2bn to $2.878 TN, the first rise since February. In the first 19 weeks of the year, money fund assets have dropped $416bn, with a one-year decline of $912bn, or 24.1%.
Total Commercial Paper outstanding added $0.9bn last week to $1.103 TN. CP has declined 67$bn, or 15.7% annualized, year-to-date, and was down $195bn from a year ago (15%).
International reserve assets (excluding gold) - as tallied by Bloomberg’s Alex Tanzi – were up $1.297 TN y-o-y, or 19.4%, to a record $7.986 TN.
Global Credit Market Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Tim Catts and Pierre Paulden): “Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is punishing corporate borrowers, with bond issuance tumbling as investors doubt a $1 trillion bailout plan will be enough to bolster confidence in government finances for the region. Borrowers worldwide have sold $15 billion of corporate debt this month, a 62% decline from the same period in April and 83% less than the average for the past year… The extra yield investors demand to own corporate debt instead of government bonds soared last week to the highest in more than four months… ‘This is a fix and not a resolution,’ said Jason Brady, a managing director at Thornburg Investment Management… ‘Investors have seen volatility and that makes it harder to get excited about longer-dated assets paying a fixed return.’”
May 11 – International Herald Tribune (Andrew E. Kramer): “As the financial markets try to absorb news of a rescue package for Greece and other teetering euro-zone countries, some bankers and economists see parallels to Russia’s meltdown in 1998. A decade ago Russia was walking in the same shoes as Greece is today, striving to restore confidence in government bonds by seeking a huge loan from the International Monetary Fund and other lenders. Then, as now, the debt crisis was roiling global financial markets. And big hopes were pinned on a bailout — one that in Russia’s case did not work. ‘Greece creates a remarkable sense of déjà vu,’ Roland Nash, the head of research for Renaissance Capital, an investment bank in Moscow, wrote…”
May 11 – Finanacial Times (David Oakley and Ralph Atkins): “Investors on Tuesday warned that the European Central Bank would have to introduce quantitative easing to stave off the worst crisis in the eurozone since it was launched 11 years ago. The ECB has resisted following the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve in expanding the money supply by buying government bonds because it fears that it could stoke inflation. Although eurozone central banks bought eurozone government bonds this week for the first time as part of the international rescue plan, this is not QE as the ECB is funding this by selling German bunds or using commercial bank deposits.”
May 11- New York Times (Landon Thomas Jr. and Jack Ewing): “Like the giant financial bailout announced by the United States in 2008, the sweeping rescue package announced by Europe eased fears of a market collapse but left a big question: will it work long term? Stung by criticism that it was slow and weak, the European Union surpassed expectations in arranging a nearly $1 trillion financial commitment for its ailing members over the weekend and paved the way for the European Central Bank to begin purchases of European debt on Monday... The premium that investors had been demanding to buy Greek bonds plunged… And as details crystallized of the package’s main component — a promise by the European Union’s member states to back 440 billion euros, or $560 billion, in new loans to bail out European economies — the wisdom of solving a debt crisis by taking on more debt was challenged by some analysts. ‘Lending more money to already overborrowed governments does not solve their problems,’ Carl Weinberg, chief economist of High Frequency Economics…said…"
May 12 – Bloomberg (Tim Catts and Pierre Paulden): “Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is punishing corporate borrowers, with bond issuance tumbling as investors doubt a $1 trillion bailout plan will be enough to bolster confidence in government finances for the region. Borrowers worldwide have sold $15 billion of corporate debt this month, a 62% decline from the same period in April and 83% less than the average for the past year…”
May 14 – Wall Street Journal (Ianthe Jeanne Dugan): “Federal regulators and state officials are examining Wall Street's role in trading derivatives that essentially bet the municipal bonds they sold would go bust. The Securities and Exchange Commission has launched a preliminary inquiry into banks' trades of municipal credit-default swaps that allow investors to short-sell, or bet against, municipal bonds… The probe is exploring potential conflicts of interest by banks that sell municipal bonds and then poise themselves to profit if those bonds fail, these people said. A main thrust of their investigation is whether firms use their own money to bet against the bonds they sell and, if so, whether that activity is properly disclosed to bond buyers.”
May 14 – Bloomberg (Christine Harper): “Goldman Sachs… is ceasing proprietary trading in one type of structured debt… A group of traders who were focused on making bets on collateralized loan obligations with the New York-based firm’s own money are now handling trades for clients…”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Takahiko Hyuga and Finbarr Flynn): “Morgan Stanley Chief Executive Officer James Gorman denied allegations the U.S. bank misled investors about mortgage derivatives it sold them. The firm is being probed by U.S. prosecutors over whether the bank misled clients when it sold them collateralized debt obligations as its own traders bet that the value of the securities would drop… Wall Street firms are facing unprecedented scrutiny from lawmakers and prosecutors over whether they missold CDOs linked to the subprime mortgages that caused the credit crisis.”
Global Government Finance Bubble Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Abigail Moses and John Glover): “The cost of saving the world from financial meltdown has been bloated by ‘hyperinflation’ since Long Term Capital Management LP’s rescue in 1998… rising price of bailouts since the $3.5 billion pledged to hedge fund LTCM after it was crushed by Russia’s default, and the almost $1 trillion committed to halt the European Union’s sovereign debt crisis this week. It cost just $29 billion to sooth markets in March 2008 when Bear Stearns Cos. was taken over, and $700 billion for the Federal Reserve to save the banking system with the Troubled Asset Relief Program in October that year. ‘We haven’t had any kind of normal inflation in the last decade, but we’ve had hyperinflation in writedowns and the magnitude of bailouts,’ said Jim Reid, head of fundamental strategy at Deutsche Bank… ‘You have to do more to get a similar effect every time.’”
May 12 – Bloomberg (David Mildenberg and Dawn Kopecki): “Four of the largest U.S. banks, including Citigroup Inc., racked up perfect quarters in their trading businesses between January and March, underscoring how government support and less competition is fueling Wall Street’s revival. Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the first, second and fifth-biggest U.S. banks by assets, all said in regulatory filings that they had zero days of trading losses in the first quarter… ‘The trading profits of the Street is just another way of measuring the subsidy the Fed is giving to the banks,’ said Christopher Whalen, managing director… Institutional Risk Analytics. ‘It’s a transfer from savers to banks.’
Currency Watch:
The dollar index jumped 2.1% this week to 86.249 (up 10.8% y-t-d). For the week on the upside, the South Korean won increased 2.2%, the Mexican peso 2.1%, the Brazilian real 2.0%, the South African rand 1.3%, the Canadian dollar 1.1%, and the Singapore dollar 0.6%. For the week on the downside, the euro declined 3.1%, the Danish krone 3.0%, the Swiss franc 2.2%, the British pound 1.8%, the Swedish krona 1.35, the New Zealand dollar 1.1%, the Japanese yen 0.9%, the Norwegian krone 0.3%, and the Australian dollar 0.2%.
Commodities Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Stuart Wallace): “There has been a ‘significant’ surge in sales of gold coins and bars, particularly in Germany, Ross Norman, one of the founders of TheBullionDesk.com, said… ‘The last time we saw this level of grass-roots activity was in October 2008 when the economy was on the brink and the retail gold buying community effectively drained gold from the market,” the former bullion dealer said in the report.”
May 10 – Financial Times (Jack Farchy): “Silk ties and handkerchiefs are forecast to rise in price after the cost of silk jumped to its highest level in at least 15 years as rapid industrialisation in China, the world’s largest supplier, robs the sector of valuable farmland. The price of silk cocoons… has doubled since the start of 2009…”
The CRB index declined another 1.1% (down 8.8% y-t-d). The Goldman Sachs Commodities Index (GSCI) slipped 0.4% (down 4.4% y-t-d). Spot Gold jumped 1.8% to $1,230 (up 12.1% y-t-d). Silver surged 4.6% to $19.30 (up 14.6% y-t-d). June Crude sank $3.18 to $71.93 (down 9.4% y-t-d). June Gasoline 0.6% (up 4% y-t-d), and June Natural Gas jumped 7.7% (down 22% y-t-d). July Copper declined 0.8% (down 7% y-t-d). May Wheat sank 7.3% (down 14% y-t-d), and May Corn declined 2.2% (down 14% y-t-d).
China Bubble Watch:
May 11 – Wall Street Journal Asia: “The direction of China’s economy is set. The question troubling investors is whether policy makers have set their course, too. With consumer-price inflation rising to 2.8% in April, real interest rates have moved farther into negative territory… More inflation is in the pipeline. The producer-price index rose 6.8% year-to-year in April, up from 5.9% in March. Higher manufacturing costs should eventually feed through to consumers. The latest housing-market data adds to fears of overheating, with prices up 12.8% year-to-year across 70 of China's larger cities. New bank lending was up, too, with $113.3 billion more loans pumped into the economy in April -- back to around the average monthly level during 2009's credit bonanza. Against this backdrop, Beijing's tightening measures to date are inadequate.”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Peter Woodifield): “China is set to overtake Japan as the largest Asia-Pacific commercial real estate market next year following a surge in values, according to property adviser DTZ Holdings Plc.”
India Watch:
May 13 – Bloomberg (Unni Krishnan): “India’s food inflation rate climbed… An index measuring wholesale prices of agriculture products… rose 16.44% in the week ended May 1 from a year earlier…”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Kartik Goyal): “India’s industrial production grew more than 10% for a sixth straight month, adding to inflation pressures even as Europe’s debt crisis threatens to undermine the global economic recovery.
Asia Bubble Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (David Yong): “Asian interest-rate swaps show traders are betting central banks will be less aggressive in raising borrowing costs because of the European Union’s sovereign-debt crisis. ‘The euro crisis has hurt market confidence and liquidity,’ Matthew Huang, an interest-rate strategist… at Barclays Capital Plc, said… ‘If liquidity freezes up, Asian policy makers will likely choose to leave monetary conditions looser for longer.’”
May 10 – Wall Street Journal Asia (Alex Frangos): “The European bailout plan could be too much medicine for an overheating Asia. Before the Greece crisis intensified last week, policy makers in China and elsewhere in Asia said too much growth and an abundance of capital inflows were pushing real-estate and other asset prices dangerously high. While Asian markets welcomed the 750 billion euro ($955 billion) bailout plan, economists and analysts warned that the rescue package could end up bringing even more capital to Asian markets… Loose monetary policy in Europe and the U.S. has already helped to inflate assets prices in Asia, especially for emerging-market bonds and real estate.”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Eunkyung Seo): “South Korea’s unemployment rate declined in April for a third straight month… The jobless rate fell to 3.7% from 3.8% in March… ‘Jobs market conditions are improving on the economic recovery,’ Lee Sang Jae, an economist at Hyundai Securities... said… ‘But there remains some weakness, supporting policy makers’ views that the economy isn’t strong enough to endure higher borrowing costs.’”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Shamim Adam and Manirajan Ramasamy): “Malaysia’s economy grew at the fastest pace in at least 10 years last quarter… Gross domestic product increased 10.1% in the three months ended March 31 from a year earlier…”
Latin America Bubble Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Jens Erik Gould): “Mexico’s industrial production rose the most in almost four years in March on surging demand for exports to the U.S. Output climbed 7.6% from a year earlier…”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Fabiola Moura and Drew Benson): “Argentine Economy Minister Amado Boudou said last week’s jump in bond yields may prompt the government to shelve plans to sell as much as $1 billion of bonds, its first international offer since defaulting in 2001.”
Unbalanced Global Economy Watch:
May 10 – Bloomberg (Bob Willis and Thomas R. Keene): “The fallout from the European debt crisis raises the risk of a ‘double dip’ recession for the global economy, said Stephen Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia Ltd. ‘When you have a vulnerable post-crisis economic recovery and crises reverberating in the aftermath of that, you have some very serious risks to the global business cycle,’ Roach said… ‘This concept of the global double dip which no one wants to talk about… is alive and well.’”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Svenja O’Donnell): “U.K. unemployment climbed to a 16- year high in the first quarter, underlining the fragility of the recovery as Conservative David Cameron begins his premiership.”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Simone Meier): “Europe’s economy expanded at a faster pace than economists forecast in the first quarter as a global recovery boosted exports… Gross domestic product in the 16 euro nations rose 0.2% from the fourth quarter…”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Christian Vits): “Germany’s economy unexpectedly grew in the first three months of the year as rising exports and company investment outweighed the effects of the cold winter. Gross domestic product… rose 0.2%..."
May 12 – Bloomberg (Maria Levitov): “Russia faces a ‘massive’ capital influx as investors look for alternatives to Europe’s crisis- ridden debt markets, said Mikhail Dmitriev, president of the Center for Strategic Development. That’s putting pressure on Russian policy makers to implement capital controls soon to stem the flows and avoid ruble volatility, Dmitriev, whose think tank conducts research for the government, said in an interview… ‘The government is unarmed against the distortions that may result from massive capital inflows,’ said Dmitriev, who is also a former First Deputy Economy Minister. ‘Russia’s balance of payments and internal macroeconomic stability would undoubtedly be at risk.’”
May 14 – Bloomberg (Paul Abelsky): “Russia’s economy expanded for the first time since 2008… Gross domestic product rose an annual 2.9% in the first quarter after contracting 3.8% in the last three months of 2009…”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Jacob Greber): “Australia’s job growth accelerated in April, propelled by full-time employment… The unemployment rate held at 5.4%.”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Tracy Withers): “New Zealand’s manufacturing industry expanded at the fastest pace in more than five years in April amid rising production and orders.”
U.S. Bubble Economy Watch:
May 12 – Bloomberg (Shobhana Chandra): “The trade deficit in the U.S. widened in March to the highest level in more than a year as imports climbed faster than exports, adding to evidence of the global recovery from the worst recession in the post-World War II era. The gap grew 2.5% to $40.4 billion…”
May 13 – Bloomberg (Ryan J. Donmoyer): “White House budget director Peter Orszag predicted Congress would approve higher taxes on managers of private equity firms, real estate funds and other investment partnerships in the coming weeks. Orszag, speaking yesterday…”
May 10 – Bloomberg (Terrence Dopp): “New Jersey’s Democratic lawmakers plan to introduce legislation to resurrect an income-tax surcharge on residents who earn $1 million a year or more…”
Derivatives Watch:
May 11 – Bloomberg (Phil Mattingly): “The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. advanced a proposal aimed at overhauling part of the $4 trillion asset-backed securities market and introduced a rule that would require the biggest U.S. banks to submit ‘funeral plans’ to handle their possible collapse… ‘Now is the time to put some prudent controls in place to make sure we don’t get into some of the problems we saw in the past,’ Bair said…
Real Estate Watch:
May 13 – Bloomberg Dan Levy): “U.S. home repossessions rose to a record level in April while foreclosure filings dropped in a sign mortgage lenders are working off a backlog of seized properties, according to RealtyTrac… ‘Right now it appears that the banks are focusing on processing the loans already in foreclosure, and slowing down the initiation of new foreclosure proceedings as a way of managing inventory levels,’ Rick Sharga, RealtyTrac’s executive vice president, said… A record 92,432 bank repossessions were reported in April, up 45% from a year earlier…”
Central Bank Watch:
May 13 – DPA: “The European Central Bank (ECB) on Thursday defended its decision to intervene in European bond markets, rejecting claims that this threatened the bank’s independence. ‘These measures are designed not to affect the monetary policy stance,’ the ECB wrote in its monthly report of its decision to buy debt from troubled eurozone members. ECB chief economist Juergen Stark said this was a ‘temporary emergency measure,’ to which there was no alternative after the euro currency had come under attack. Stark said the bank was not responding to political pressures… ‘The credibility of the ECB does not just hinge on the question whether or not we buy government securities, but whether we fulfill our central task, which is ensuring price stability,’ Stark said. The economist said there was no doubt that ‘an attack’ on individual eurozone countries was being carried out by "anonymous market sources.’”
May 10 – Bloomberg (Mayumi Otsuma): “Central banks from the U.S., Japan and Europe will participate in temporary U.S. dollar swap agreements amid heightened tension in global financial markets, the Bank of Japan said. ‘In response to the re-emergence of strains in U.S. dollar short-term funding markets in Europe’ the central banks of Canada, England and Switzerland will also participate in the re- establishment of currency swaps that were implemented during the financial crisis, the BOJ said… ‘These facilities are designed to help improve liquidity conditions in U.S. dollar funding markets and to prevent the spread of strains to other markets and financial centers.’ Central banks ‘will continue to work together closely as needed to address pressures in funding markets’ the BOJ said.”
May 10 – Bloomberg (Saburo Funabiki): “The Bank of Japan said it would pump 2 trillion yen ($21.7bn) into the financial system for a second day to help reassure markets after the Greek fiscal crisis set off a slump in stocks worldwide.”
GSE Watch:
May 10 – Bloomberg (Nick Timiraos): “Fannie Mae asked the U.S. government for an additional $8.4 billion in aid after posting an $11.5 billion net loss for the first quarter, the latest sign that the bailout of the mortgage investor and its main rival, Freddie Mac, is likely to be the most expensive legacy of the U.S. housing-market bust… The company has now racked up losses of nearly $145 billion, or nearly double its profits for the previous 35 years.”
Fiscal Watch:
May 13 – Bloomberg (Vincent Del Giudice): “The U.S. posted its largest April budget deficit on record as receipts declined in a month that typically sees an increase in individual income tax payments. The excess of spending over revenue rose to $82.7 billion last month compared with a $20.9 billion gap in April 2009… April marked a record 19th straight monthly shortfall… Deterioration in the government’s balance sheet in coming years raises the risk of higher interest rates even as an improving economy helps lift tax receipts. ‘With the recovery in place, we should be seeing higher revenue and lower outlays, not the other way around,’ said Win Thin, senior currency strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman… The government’s April budget deficit compares with a median forecast of $57.9 billion… The last time the U.S. had back-to-back April deficits was 1963-1964… For the fiscal year that began in October, the budget deficit totaled $799.7 billion compared with $802.3 billion during the same period last year.”
May 12 – Associated Press: “President Obama’s new health-care law could potentially add at least $115 billion more to government health care spending over the next 10 years, if Congress approves all the additional spending called for in the legislation, congressional budget referees said… That would push the 10-year cost of the overhaul above $1 trillion…”
California Watch:
May 11 – Bloomberg (Michael B. Marois and William Selway): “California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger will seek ‘terrible cuts’ to eliminate an $18.6 billion budget deficit facing the most-populous U.S. state through June 2011… California’s revenue in April, when income-tax payments are due, trailed the governor’s estimates by $3.6 billion, or 26%.”
May 14 – Bloomberg (Michael B. Marois and William Selway): “California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed a new round of budget cuts, including eliminating the state’s main welfare program for families, to close a $19.1 billion budget deficit for the year starting July 1. The $83.4 billion plan calls for $12.4 billion in spending reductions, $3.4 billion in additional federal aid and $3.4 billion in fund shifts, fees and assessments…”
Speculator Watch:
May 14 – Bloomberg (Jody Shenn and Michael J. Moore): “In June 2006, a year before the subprime mortgage market collapsed, Morgan Stanley created a cluster of investments doomed to fail even if default rates stayed low -- then bet against its concoction. Known as the Baldwin deals, the $167 million of synthetic collateralized debt obligations had an unusual feature… Rather than curtailing their bets on mortgage bonds as the underlying home loans paid down, the CDOs kept wagering as if the risk hadn’t changed. That left Baldwin investors facing losses on a modest rise in U.S. housing foreclosures, while Morgan Stanley was positioned to gain. ‘I can’t imagine anybody would take that bet knowingly,’ said Thomas Adams, a former executive at bond insurers Ambac Financial Group Inc. and FGIC Corp… ‘You’re overriding the natural process of risk-mitigation.’”
May 12 – Bloomberg (Tomoko Yamazaki and Komaki Ito): “Japanese hedge funds, the world’s worst performers last year, returned 6.7% in the first four months of 2010, the best year-to-April return in six years, according to Eurekahedge Pte.”
Dysfunctional Markets:
It scrolled by quickly Wednesday afternoon on my Bloomberg screen: a one-line headline quoting ECB Executive Board member Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo: “Central Banks Can’t Work if Markets Dysfunctional.” My efforts to located Mr. Gonzalez-Paramo’s full comments on the issue were unsuccessful; we’ll have to assume the context. I do believe strongly that many things these days can’t work because global markets are hopelessly dysfunctional.
I was never a big fan of the simplistic analytical fixation on the so-called “shadow banking system.” Key components of this “system” – i.e. the Wall Street securities firms, ABS, CDOs, SIVs, private-label MBS, etc. – have been reined in. This would imply a more stable financial backdrop, which is nowhere to been seen. I am similarly not a subscriber to a “new normal” thesis. Again, the focus seems to detract from today’s key issues. I have posited a “Newest Abnormal” thesis – that the long process of market distortions and economic imbalances has actually accelerated. Things go from bad to only worse. Things may look somewhat different, but there’s nothing new.
From my analytical perspective, the heart of the problem lies with this dysfunctional dynamic between global marketable debt and derivatives, policy-induced distortions, and unfettered speculative finance. Unique in history, we continue to operate with a global financial “system” functioning without limits to either the quantity or quality of new Credit created. There’s way too much Credit backed by little more than government assurances or perceptions of government insurance. And never before has an enormous global “leveraged speculating community” so dominated the markets for debt instruments and, in the process, so relied on faith in the efficacy of government market interventions. It’s global wildcat banking in its purest ever form.
These days, entities all over the world issue enormous quantities of tradable debt instruments. This debt, in large part, is purchased by sophisticated market operators earning unimaginable compensation for achieving “above market” returns. When market psychology is bullish, there is essentially unlimited demand for marketable debt – a significant portion acquired through the use of leverage. And as long as demand for new marketable securities remains robust, underlying positive fundamentals appear to support a high market valuation for this debt (irrespective of the quantity issued) - and the party lives on. But Katy bar the door whenever the crowd moves to cut exposure – either through liquidating positions or acquiring market “insurance.”
Eurozone policymakers look foolish these days for not having reined in profligate Greek borrowing and spending. To many, the ECB looks foolish for Sunday’s decision to purchase in the open market debt issued by Greece, Portugal, Spain and other troubled European countries. Others believe the ECB was foolish for not having had initiated a Federal Reserve-style monetization plan long before the debt crisis spiraled out of control. I sympathize with the ECB. Dysfunctional global markets placed them in a winless situation. Greek 10-year bond yields were below 5% for much of 2009. The market was happy to accommodate profligacy - until it wasn’t. If only well-functioning global markets disciplined borrowers rather than emboldening them.
The sea change in global finance gained unstoppable momentum in the early nineties. The Greenspan Federal Reserve nurtured marketable debt as a mechanism to help overcome severe banking system impairment. There was no stopping the historic boom in market-based Credit once unleashed. The problem was clear by the time of the 1994 bond and mortgage securities dislocation. But it was politically and monetarily expedient to allow GSE Credit (with its implicit government guarantee) to evolve into a mechanism for stabilizing the Credit system and spurring economic expansion.
The rapidly escalating scope of the problem was illuminated with the collapse of LTCM. Yet, the Greenspan Fed supported this new financial infrastructure with only more powerful words and deeds. Pegging short term interest rates and aggressively intervening to rectify market tumult incited unprecedented leveraged speculation throughout the Credit system. Dr. Bernanke’s 2002 “helicopter money” and “government printing press” speeches sealed the fate of runaway Bubbles in both marketable debt and leveraged speculation.
Especially during the Bubble years 2004 through 2007, massive U.S. current account deficits worked to unleash U.S. Credit Bubble dynamics upon the entire world. The more Bubbles became ingrained in the financial architecture the deeper market perceptions became that policymakers wouldn’t tolerate a bust. Worse yet, policymakers resorted to using the debt markets and the market’s propensity for leveraged speculation as mechanisms for increasingly aggressive monetary reflation.
Global policymakers and Credit markets have been fueling Bubbles and accommodating profligacy for years now. It would have taken a concerted effort by global central bankers to rein things in. The Greenspan/Bernanke Federal Reserve would have had no part of it. Quite the contrary. It was fundamental to Greenspan/Bernanke doctrine to deal with market and economic fragility through the aggressive reflation of system Credit. This doctrine of inflationism was instrumental in nurturing Credit and speculation excesses that worked over time to increasingly distort the pricing of finance, the quantity of Credit created, and the allocation of real and financial resources. The ECB’s big mistake was not to have forcefully fought the Fed.
We’re now two years into the greatest expansion of global government debt in the history of mankind. Manic-depressive debt markets have now pulled the rug out from under Greece and periphery Europe, but in the process have further accommodated profligate government borrowings here at home. It is frightening to think of how distorted the Treasury market has become - and how things might play out down the road.
My bearish thesis on our markets and economy is based upon the view that the financial fuel for our recovery has been unsound, unstable and unsustainable. This “Monetary Process” is now in jeopardy. The Global Government Finance Bubble, which lunged into its terminal phase of excess with the collapse of the Wall Street/mortgage finance Bubble, has been pierced. Greece’s debt crisis marks a momentous inflection point. And, yes, some government markets – certainly including Treasuries – are benefiting from Greek and periphery European debt woes. Yet key Bubble dynamics percolate under the surface.
I have argued that the Global Government Finance Bubble has been the biggest and most precarious Bubble yet. The incredible scope of global sovereign debt expansion over the past couple years has been rather obvious. Less apparent are related distortions - to the pricing and allocation of finance throughout international markets - based specifically upon the market's perception that politicians and central bankers would act aggressively and successfully to forestall future crises. This policy-induced market distortion fostered an incredible bout of risk-taking – especially considering the fundamental backdrop – and a resulting massive flood of finance out to the risk markets. This perception has been blown to smithereens in Europe and has quickly become vulnerable everywhere.
Global markets in sovereign Credit default swap (CDS) protection have flourished on the assumption that policymakers would thwart any debt crisis. In the post-Greek debacle era, writing insurance against a government default is no longer free money. New realities have profoundly changed the risk and reward profiles of operating in this key market - and I’ll assume some profoundly less attractive marketplace liquidity dynamics going forward. And a faltering market for sovereign debt insurance significantly changes the risk profile of owning the underlying sovereign debt. To be sure, changing perceptions in the market for government debt work to corrode market confidence in the capacity of policymakers to stem financial and economic crises generally. This implies a major adjustment in the markets’ perception of risk in various markets, including corporate, municipal and mortgage instruments.
But I’m getting somewhat ahead of myself. Thus far, dislocation in Greek debt has fed powerful contagion effects throughout European debt and CDS. This has forced a major market reassessment of the relative stability of the euro currency, which has unleashed bloody havoc throughout the currency and “carry trade” arena. Currency and “carry trade” tumult has forced market reassessment as to near-term prospects for both the dollar (upward) and global growth (downward). This has caused trading liquidation and de-leveraging havoc in the enormous global “reflation trade” and in risk markets more generally. And there’s nothing like liquidation and forced de-leveraging to really bring out the animal spirits for those seeking to make nice speculative profits from others’ misfortune.
The dollar and Treasuries have benefited. This has supported the bullish view that the unfolding crisis is largely a European issue. It has also helped dampen the impact to our markets from changing global perceptions with respect to the capacity of policymakers to stem crises. Here in the U.S., Credit spreads and risk premiums (corporates, MBS, municipals, etc.) have widened some. Yet faith still runs deep that Washington won’t allow a crisis. This confidence must hold for sufficiently loose U.S. finance to continue to support our fragile recovery.
The confluence of global financial crisis and intense financial sector scrutiny here at home will at some point prove confidence in Washington overly optimistic. For now, when it comes to pricing risk and disciplining profligate borrowers, our debt markets remain dysfunctional.
This has caused liquidation and de-leveraging havoc in the enormous global “reflation trade” and in risk markets more generally. And there’s nothing like liquidation and forced de-leveraging to really bring out the animal spirits for those seeking to make nice speculative profits from others’ misfortune.
The dollar and Treasuries have benefited. This has supported the bullish view that the unfolding crisis is largely a European issue. It has also helped dampen the impact to our markets from changing global perceptions with respect to the capacity of policymakers to stem crises. Here in the U.S., Credit spreads and risk premiums (corporates, MBS, municipals, etc.) have widened some. Yet faith still runs deep that Washington won’t allow a crisis. This confidence must hold for sufficiently loose U.S. finance to continue to support our fragile recovery.
The confluence of global financial crisis and intense financial sector scrutiny here at home will at some point prove confidence in Washington overly optimistic. For now, when it comes to pricing risk and disciplining profligate borrowers, our debt markets remain dysfunctional.
http://prudentbear.com/index.php/creditbubblebulletinview?art_id=10376
19 September 2009
A 300-year-old example of quantitative easing ~ Law of easy money
“IF FIVE hundred millions of paper had been of such advantage, five hundred millions additional would be of still greater advantage.” So Charles Mackay, author of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, described the “quantitative easing” tactics of the French regent and his economic adviser, John Law, at the time of the Mississippi bubble in the early 18th century. The Mississippi scheme was a precursor of modern attempts to reflate the economy with unorthodox monetary policies. It is hard not to be struck by parallels with recent events.
Law was a brilliant mathematician who used his understanding of probability to help his gambling habit. Escaping from his native Scotland after killing a rival in a duel, he made friends with the Duke of Orleans, the regent of the young king Louis XV.
The finances of the French government were in a terrible mess. Louis XIV had spent much of his long reign fighting expensive wars. Tax collection was in the hands of various agents, who were more concerned with enriching themselves than the state. Not only was the monarchy struggling to pay the interest on its debt, there was also a credit crunch in the form of a shortage of the gold and silver coins needed to fund economic activity.
Law’s insight was that economic activity could be boosted by the use of paper money that was not backed by gold and silver. He was well ahead of his time.
Establishing confidence in a new monetary system was the trickiest part. Law had the benefit of working for an absolute monarchy which could decree that taxes should be paid in the form of notes issued by his new bank, Banque Générale. He also believed, having observed the success of the Dutch in exploiting the spice trade in the East Indies, that France could use paper money to develop its colonial possessions. Hence the Mississippi scheme, under which Law created the Compagnie d’Occident to exploit trade opportunities in what is now the United States. The money raised from these share issues was used to repay the government’s debts; on occasion, Law’s bank lent investors the money to buy shares.
Turn this into modern economic jargon and Law could be described as creating a stimulus package for French economic activity. But rather than rescuing sunset industries such as carmaking, Law was an early venture capitalist, financing the dynamic potential of the Mississippi delta.
The problem was that the delta was a mosquito-infested swamp. According to Niall Ferguson, a historian, 80% of the early colonists died from starvation or disease. Even though the company had monopolies over things like tobacco, it had little chance of generating enough income to fund the dividends Law had promised.
So a vicious circle was created, in which a growing money supply was needed to bolster the share price of the Mississippi company and a rising share price was needed to maintain confidence in the system of paper money. You can see parallels with recent times, in which money was lent on the back of rising asset prices, and higher prices gave banks the confidence to lend more money.
When the scheme faltered Law resorted to a number of rescue packages, many of which have their echoes 300 years later. One was for the bank to guarantee to buy shares in the Mississippi company at a set price (think of the various government asset-purchase schemes today). Then the company took over the bank (a rescue along the lines of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Finally there were restrictions on the amount of gold and silver that could be owned (something America tried in the 1930s).
All these rules failed and the scheme collapsed. Law was exiled and died in poverty. The French state’s finances stayed weak, helping trigger the 1789 revolution. The idea of a “fiat” currency was perceived to be the essence of recklessness for another two centuries and the link between money and gold was not fully abandoned until the 1970s, when the Bretton Woods system expired.
Of course, the parallels with today are not exact. Law’s system took just four years to collapse; today’s fiat money regime has been running for nearly 40 years. The growth in money supply has been less excessive this time. Technological change and the entry of China into the world economy have generated growth rates beyond the dreams of 18th-century man. But one lesson from Law’s sorry tale endures: attempts to maintain asset prices above their fundamental value are eventually doomed to failure.
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=14215012
Law was a brilliant mathematician who used his understanding of probability to help his gambling habit. Escaping from his native Scotland after killing a rival in a duel, he made friends with the Duke of Orleans, the regent of the young king Louis XV.
The finances of the French government were in a terrible mess. Louis XIV had spent much of his long reign fighting expensive wars. Tax collection was in the hands of various agents, who were more concerned with enriching themselves than the state. Not only was the monarchy struggling to pay the interest on its debt, there was also a credit crunch in the form of a shortage of the gold and silver coins needed to fund economic activity.
Law’s insight was that economic activity could be boosted by the use of paper money that was not backed by gold and silver. He was well ahead of his time.
Establishing confidence in a new monetary system was the trickiest part. Law had the benefit of working for an absolute monarchy which could decree that taxes should be paid in the form of notes issued by his new bank, Banque Générale. He also believed, having observed the success of the Dutch in exploiting the spice trade in the East Indies, that France could use paper money to develop its colonial possessions. Hence the Mississippi scheme, under which Law created the Compagnie d’Occident to exploit trade opportunities in what is now the United States. The money raised from these share issues was used to repay the government’s debts; on occasion, Law’s bank lent investors the money to buy shares.
Turn this into modern economic jargon and Law could be described as creating a stimulus package for French economic activity. But rather than rescuing sunset industries such as carmaking, Law was an early venture capitalist, financing the dynamic potential of the Mississippi delta.
The problem was that the delta was a mosquito-infested swamp. According to Niall Ferguson, a historian, 80% of the early colonists died from starvation or disease. Even though the company had monopolies over things like tobacco, it had little chance of generating enough income to fund the dividends Law had promised.
So a vicious circle was created, in which a growing money supply was needed to bolster the share price of the Mississippi company and a rising share price was needed to maintain confidence in the system of paper money. You can see parallels with recent times, in which money was lent on the back of rising asset prices, and higher prices gave banks the confidence to lend more money.
When the scheme faltered Law resorted to a number of rescue packages, many of which have their echoes 300 years later. One was for the bank to guarantee to buy shares in the Mississippi company at a set price (think of the various government asset-purchase schemes today). Then the company took over the bank (a rescue along the lines of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Finally there were restrictions on the amount of gold and silver that could be owned (something America tried in the 1930s).
All these rules failed and the scheme collapsed. Law was exiled and died in poverty. The French state’s finances stayed weak, helping trigger the 1789 revolution. The idea of a “fiat” currency was perceived to be the essence of recklessness for another two centuries and the link between money and gold was not fully abandoned until the 1970s, when the Bretton Woods system expired.
Of course, the parallels with today are not exact. Law’s system took just four years to collapse; today’s fiat money regime has been running for nearly 40 years. The growth in money supply has been less excessive this time. Technological change and the entry of China into the world economy have generated growth rates beyond the dreams of 18th-century man. But one lesson from Law’s sorry tale endures: attempts to maintain asset prices above their fundamental value are eventually doomed to failure.
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=14215012
27 August 2009
The Dollar, denial and money printing ~ News Review
Aug. 21 (Bloomberg) -- The dollar’s role as a good store of value is “questionable” and the currency has a high degree of risk, said Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz.
“There is a need for a global reserve system,” Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor, said at a conference in Bangkok today. Support from countries like China should ensure orderly discussions on a new reserve system, he added.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aH9O..zWjeHs
Denial is a psychotropic, mind-altering drug that by comparison makes crack cocaine look like health food, and addiction to it shuts down the brain. America’s denial about its out-of-control spending, non-repayable debt, financial sector fraud and deceit, decadent political institutions, epic dereliction of leadership duty, fiscal and monetary immorality, and disastrously dishonest system of cronyism is leading the nation into an economic nuclear winter of desolation and chaos.
http://www.24hgold.com/english/contributor.aspx?contributor=Stewart%20Dougherty&article=2289016786G10020
On average, people in the cities surveyed worked 1,902 hours per year, but in Lyon and Paris they worked 1,582 and 1,594 hours respectively. In Cairo, they worked 2,373 hours, while in Seoul they worked 2,312 hours.
The richest workers are in New York and Zurich, where they would have to work nine hours to buy an iPod nano, while workers in Mumbai needed to work 20 nine-hour days – nearly one month's salary – to buy the gadget.
Copenhagen, Zurich, Geneva and New York were the cities where employees had the highest gross wages.
In terms of the most expensive cities, London fell from the top of the list to the 21st place because of the pound's devaluation, the survey showed.
Oslo is the world's most expensive city now, followed by Zurich, Copenhagen, Geneva and Tokyo, while New York was on the list at number 6.
'76 percent of the Europeans estimate that the crisis will not be over by 2012' (GlobalEurometre June 2009)
A potted history of Fed chairpersons by Quinn.........
http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/quinn/2009/0825.html
US money printing goes full tilt....Summary
The Federal Reserve and the federal government are attempting to "plug the gap" caused by a slowdown of private credit/debt creation.
Non-US demand for the dollar must remain high, or the dollar will fall.
Demand for US assets is in negative territory for 2009
The TIC report and Federal Reserve Custody Account are reviewed and compared
The Federal Reserve has effectively been monetizing US government debt by cleverly enabling foreign central banks to swap their Agency debt for Treasury debt.
The shell game that the Fed is currently playing obscures the fact that money is being printed out of thin air and used to buy US government debt.
http://www.chrismartenson.com/blog/shell-game-how-federal-reserve-monetizing-debt/25806
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/fed-enabling-foreign-central-banks-swap-out-their-agency-debt-treasuries
“There is a need for a global reserve system,” Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor, said at a conference in Bangkok today. Support from countries like China should ensure orderly discussions on a new reserve system, he added.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aH9O..zWjeHs
Denial is a psychotropic, mind-altering drug that by comparison makes crack cocaine look like health food, and addiction to it shuts down the brain. America’s denial about its out-of-control spending, non-repayable debt, financial sector fraud and deceit, decadent political institutions, epic dereliction of leadership duty, fiscal and monetary immorality, and disastrously dishonest system of cronyism is leading the nation into an economic nuclear winter of desolation and chaos.
http://www.24hgold.com/english/contributor.aspx?contributor=Stewart%20Dougherty&article=2289016786G10020
On average, people in the cities surveyed worked 1,902 hours per year, but in Lyon and Paris they worked 1,582 and 1,594 hours respectively. In Cairo, they worked 2,373 hours, while in Seoul they worked 2,312 hours.
The richest workers are in New York and Zurich, where they would have to work nine hours to buy an iPod nano, while workers in Mumbai needed to work 20 nine-hour days – nearly one month's salary – to buy the gadget.
Copenhagen, Zurich, Geneva and New York were the cities where employees had the highest gross wages.
In terms of the most expensive cities, London fell from the top of the list to the 21st place because of the pound's devaluation, the survey showed.
Oslo is the world's most expensive city now, followed by Zurich, Copenhagen, Geneva and Tokyo, while New York was on the list at number 6.
'76 percent of the Europeans estimate that the crisis will not be over by 2012' (GlobalEurometre June 2009)
A potted history of Fed chairpersons by Quinn.........
http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/quinn/2009/0825.html
US money printing goes full tilt....Summary
The Federal Reserve and the federal government are attempting to "plug the gap" caused by a slowdown of private credit/debt creation.
Non-US demand for the dollar must remain high, or the dollar will fall.
Demand for US assets is in negative territory for 2009
The TIC report and Federal Reserve Custody Account are reviewed and compared
The Federal Reserve has effectively been monetizing US government debt by cleverly enabling foreign central banks to swap their Agency debt for Treasury debt.
The shell game that the Fed is currently playing obscures the fact that money is being printed out of thin air and used to buy US government debt.
http://www.chrismartenson.com/blog/shell-game-how-federal-reserve-monetizing-debt/25806
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/fed-enabling-foreign-central-banks-swap-out-their-agency-debt-treasuries
21 June 2009
Gulf states central banks "aggressive" in hunt for gold
The WGC did not publish data regarding the UAE Central Bank's gold reserve apparently because the country has not disclosed its gold reserve to the IMF in the past six months. Two GCC countries – Saudi Arabia and Qatar – were shown were as having 11.9 and 3.1 per cent of their reserves in gold. The figure stood at 12.4 per cent and 3.7 per cent respectively for the two hydrocarbon rich countries in March 2009.
WGC CEO Aram Shishmanian had recently told Emirates Business that the GCC central banks are looking forward to improving their gold reserves. "Central banks with low reserves of gold are looking forward to increasing their reserves. They are trying to analyse what the right balance should be. They are getting aggressive," he had said.
http://www.business24-7.ae/Articles/2009/6/Pages/20062009/06212009_c0e95058f0ab435fae8c789e39688011.aspx
WGC CEO Aram Shishmanian had recently told Emirates Business that the GCC central banks are looking forward to improving their gold reserves. "Central banks with low reserves of gold are looking forward to increasing their reserves. They are trying to analyse what the right balance should be. They are getting aggressive," he had said.
http://www.business24-7.ae/Articles/2009/6/Pages/20062009/06212009_c0e95058f0ab435fae8c789e39688011.aspx
Fed to keep 0% rates for another year...
The US Federal Reserve will keep rates close to zero until 2011 to continue providing monetary stimulus to an economy that will slow down again next year after the current bounce, analysts said.
"We are changing our forecasts to indicate stronger GDP growth overall for both 2009 and 2010. But this stronger growth is caused by a temporary spurt in output during Q4 2009 and Q1 2010, when we see annualised growth reaching three per cent," said John Calverley, Standard Chartered bank's (SCB) Head of Research for North America.
"Later in 2010, as the fiscal stimulus reverses out and the inventory bounce comes to an end, economic growth will slow again, as the economy works through the aftermath of the financial crisis. Inflation will continue to fall back throughout 2009 and 2010, at least, and we expect the Fed to keep the Funds rate at the current near-zero level until 2011," Calverley wrote in a research note.
Stimulus boost
The first effects of the $1 trillion-plus (Dh3.67trn) US stimulus package have shown up in income growth in recent months via tax cuts. Starting this summer, SCB expects to see some of the infrastructure spending begin to kick in.
"The effects of the stimulus will add to GDP for three or four quarters and then, as the spending rate slows, there will be a negative effect on GDP, sometime later in 2010," Calverley said.
"A few months ago US lawmakers promised there would be more stimulus packages next year if necessary. Probably some Congressmen had hopes they would have the chance to legislate for more spending just ahead of the November 2010 mid-term elections!
"But the bond market, reinforced by the view of several foreign governments, has already squashed those hopes. Even if unemployment is still very high next year [as we anticipate], there will be no room for a major new stimulus. Indeed the Administration and Congress will need to demonstrate how they plan to reduce the deficit over time," he said.
State and local governments are struggling to deal with reduced revenues and some have already made or announced large cuts in spending, while others are finding ways to temporarily avoid them. Further cuts will be necessary in 2010-2011, the analyst said, "as opportunities for creative accounting and prevarication dwindle".
Hence, 2010-2011 overall is likely to see the first stages of a substantial tightening of fiscal policy. Markets have recently begun to price in a rise in the Fed Funds rate over the winter. "Our forecast of a recovery starting in Q3 and with some relatively robust GDP numbers over the winter would, at first sight, seem to support that view. Moreover, we have long argued that the Fed will not want to leave interest rates at ultra-low levels for too long for fear of inflating a new bubble and creating new imbalances," Calverley said.
"However, we believe that the Fed will remain on hold during this period for two reasons. First, we expect core inflation to continue to decline over the next year, with fears shifting again towards deflation. An inflation-targeting central bank – as the Fed is in all but name – should keep rates below 'neutral' as long as inflation is below target.
"Secondly, we expect that the Fed will be focusing closely on private final demand, along with unemployment. We expect private final demand to continue to show clear signs of weakness since the recovery will mostly be due to the inventory bounce and government spending, both of which are strictly temporary," he said.
"Meanwhile, unemployment will peak at more than 10 per cent next year, leaving substantial slack in the economy and making it uncomfortable for the Fed to raise interest rates. Instead they will more likely tighten liquidity by reducing the size of the Fed's balance sheet, selling securities into the market. Our guess is that they will not rush to sell back the Treasuries and mortgage securities being acquired this year but instead will sell short-term securities into the market to mop up the liquidity.
"By the middle of next year the Fed might be ready to think about rate increases but, by then, we expect the bounce in growth to be fading. Only in 2011 do we expect a stronger outlook for growth, allowing the Fed to finally push up rates. Even then we expect the new norm for Federal Funds rate, at least initially to be around 2-2.5 per cent rather than the 4-5 per cent of the last two economic cycles," Calverley said.
Inventories will provide lift
Economic recoveries in the US historically have been driven by a combination of an inventory rebound, a surge in house-building and a jump in car and other big-ticket purchases. The inventory rebound is almost a mechanical process, Calverley said.
"During a recession, business cuts output below sales to pull inventories lower and then, once inventories are on a downward path, production picks up again, generating the economic recovery. After the severe recessions of 1974 and 1982, this bounce gave a lift to GDP of around two to three per cent over the subsequent year.
"We expect a boost in the one to three per cent range this time, because inventories are a smaller share of GDP than in the past. The exact timing of this rebound is hard to predict, though as usual it will have a considerable impact on the quarterly path of GDP.
"It could start as early as Q3 but given the still very high level of inventories in relation to sales currently, inventory liquidation may stay very high during the summer so we forecast it starting Q4," Calverley said.
House-building recovery
The outlook for house-building in the near term is less promising. Recent levels of starts, at around 500,000 annually, are well below the rate of growth of household formation based on demographic and immigration trends. "So, at some point, we can expect house-building to move back up to around 1.5 million annually, an adjustment which will provide a boost to GDP of around two per cent," SCB said.
But any significant upward move is unlikely for some time, it added, given the overhang of unsold homes and continuing high foreclosures. "Housing starts exceeded the 1.5 million level throughout 2002-06 and we estimate that there is a surplus now of perhaps two million homes. Absorbing this surplus will take around two years at the current level of starts.
"House-building likely will creep up gradually, starting later this year but not fast enough to add a whole lot to GDP growth. That will probably have to wait until 2011-12. Still, Q4 this year may be the first quarter since 2005 that residential construction has not subtracted from GDP. "Unfortunately, the better news here will be offset by declining commercial construction as buildings are completed and few new ones are started, unless they are part of the government's fiscal stimulus package," Calverley said.
Car sales and production
There is a good chance that car sales will pick up from their current very depressed levels, the bank said. In 2006-07, sales were running at an annual rate of 16-17 million units, whereas recently the figure has been below 10 million. Sales have been depressed partly by the uncertain economic outlook and rising unemployment and partly by the difficulty of obtaining credit.
"As unemployment starts to top out, (in our view between 10-11 per cent), and auto financing becomes easier with the help of government programmes such as the TALF, sales should pick up. However, we would not expect a quick rebound to 2007 levels. For one thing, Americans probably bought too many cars during the last boom, with the help of surging wealth from real estate and stocks as well as zero-rate credit.
"So, despite recent low sales, it is much too early to talk of pent-up demand, as was often an important factor after past recessions. Still, over time, a recovery in car sales and production, perhaps initially into the 12-13 million range annually, will help boost the economy," Calverley said.
Consumer demand
All this implies that consumer demand is expected to remain sluggish, and that is bad news for an economy in which this accounts for 70 per cent of GDP. "The two key variables are real income growth and the savings rate, but it is hard to be optimistic on either," Calverley said. Income is being squeezed by rising unemployment, slowing wage growth and rising gas prices. There are reports from across the US of pay freezes and even pay cuts. Benefits are being shaved too.
"Of course we expect price inflation to moderate as well so real income growth will not slow as much as nominal income but companies are determined to raise margins so real income will still be squeezed. Consumers will not have much extra money to spend, nor will they be able easily to borrow.
"Banks continue to cut back on credit lines, while the fall in home prices is undermining wealth and collateral. Weak income growth due to rising unemployment is a particular problem right now and will restrain spending in Q2 and Q3," the bank said.
"Payroll losses should come to an end and, depending on oil price trends, real income growth should resume, though slowly. Then much will depend on the savings rate. It has already moved up to 5.7 per cent but we expect consumers to continue to push the savings rate higher," it said.
"We are changing our forecasts to indicate stronger GDP growth overall for both 2009 and 2010. But this stronger growth is caused by a temporary spurt in output during Q4 2009 and Q1 2010, when we see annualised growth reaching three per cent," said John Calverley, Standard Chartered bank's (SCB) Head of Research for North America.
"Later in 2010, as the fiscal stimulus reverses out and the inventory bounce comes to an end, economic growth will slow again, as the economy works through the aftermath of the financial crisis. Inflation will continue to fall back throughout 2009 and 2010, at least, and we expect the Fed to keep the Funds rate at the current near-zero level until 2011," Calverley wrote in a research note.
Stimulus boost
The first effects of the $1 trillion-plus (Dh3.67trn) US stimulus package have shown up in income growth in recent months via tax cuts. Starting this summer, SCB expects to see some of the infrastructure spending begin to kick in.
"The effects of the stimulus will add to GDP for three or four quarters and then, as the spending rate slows, there will be a negative effect on GDP, sometime later in 2010," Calverley said.
"A few months ago US lawmakers promised there would be more stimulus packages next year if necessary. Probably some Congressmen had hopes they would have the chance to legislate for more spending just ahead of the November 2010 mid-term elections!
"But the bond market, reinforced by the view of several foreign governments, has already squashed those hopes. Even if unemployment is still very high next year [as we anticipate], there will be no room for a major new stimulus. Indeed the Administration and Congress will need to demonstrate how they plan to reduce the deficit over time," he said.
State and local governments are struggling to deal with reduced revenues and some have already made or announced large cuts in spending, while others are finding ways to temporarily avoid them. Further cuts will be necessary in 2010-2011, the analyst said, "as opportunities for creative accounting and prevarication dwindle".
Hence, 2010-2011 overall is likely to see the first stages of a substantial tightening of fiscal policy. Markets have recently begun to price in a rise in the Fed Funds rate over the winter. "Our forecast of a recovery starting in Q3 and with some relatively robust GDP numbers over the winter would, at first sight, seem to support that view. Moreover, we have long argued that the Fed will not want to leave interest rates at ultra-low levels for too long for fear of inflating a new bubble and creating new imbalances," Calverley said.
"However, we believe that the Fed will remain on hold during this period for two reasons. First, we expect core inflation to continue to decline over the next year, with fears shifting again towards deflation. An inflation-targeting central bank – as the Fed is in all but name – should keep rates below 'neutral' as long as inflation is below target.
"Secondly, we expect that the Fed will be focusing closely on private final demand, along with unemployment. We expect private final demand to continue to show clear signs of weakness since the recovery will mostly be due to the inventory bounce and government spending, both of which are strictly temporary," he said.
"Meanwhile, unemployment will peak at more than 10 per cent next year, leaving substantial slack in the economy and making it uncomfortable for the Fed to raise interest rates. Instead they will more likely tighten liquidity by reducing the size of the Fed's balance sheet, selling securities into the market. Our guess is that they will not rush to sell back the Treasuries and mortgage securities being acquired this year but instead will sell short-term securities into the market to mop up the liquidity.
"By the middle of next year the Fed might be ready to think about rate increases but, by then, we expect the bounce in growth to be fading. Only in 2011 do we expect a stronger outlook for growth, allowing the Fed to finally push up rates. Even then we expect the new norm for Federal Funds rate, at least initially to be around 2-2.5 per cent rather than the 4-5 per cent of the last two economic cycles," Calverley said.
Inventories will provide lift
Economic recoveries in the US historically have been driven by a combination of an inventory rebound, a surge in house-building and a jump in car and other big-ticket purchases. The inventory rebound is almost a mechanical process, Calverley said.
"During a recession, business cuts output below sales to pull inventories lower and then, once inventories are on a downward path, production picks up again, generating the economic recovery. After the severe recessions of 1974 and 1982, this bounce gave a lift to GDP of around two to three per cent over the subsequent year.
"We expect a boost in the one to three per cent range this time, because inventories are a smaller share of GDP than in the past. The exact timing of this rebound is hard to predict, though as usual it will have a considerable impact on the quarterly path of GDP.
"It could start as early as Q3 but given the still very high level of inventories in relation to sales currently, inventory liquidation may stay very high during the summer so we forecast it starting Q4," Calverley said.
House-building recovery
The outlook for house-building in the near term is less promising. Recent levels of starts, at around 500,000 annually, are well below the rate of growth of household formation based on demographic and immigration trends. "So, at some point, we can expect house-building to move back up to around 1.5 million annually, an adjustment which will provide a boost to GDP of around two per cent," SCB said.
But any significant upward move is unlikely for some time, it added, given the overhang of unsold homes and continuing high foreclosures. "Housing starts exceeded the 1.5 million level throughout 2002-06 and we estimate that there is a surplus now of perhaps two million homes. Absorbing this surplus will take around two years at the current level of starts.
"House-building likely will creep up gradually, starting later this year but not fast enough to add a whole lot to GDP growth. That will probably have to wait until 2011-12. Still, Q4 this year may be the first quarter since 2005 that residential construction has not subtracted from GDP. "Unfortunately, the better news here will be offset by declining commercial construction as buildings are completed and few new ones are started, unless they are part of the government's fiscal stimulus package," Calverley said.
Car sales and production
There is a good chance that car sales will pick up from their current very depressed levels, the bank said. In 2006-07, sales were running at an annual rate of 16-17 million units, whereas recently the figure has been below 10 million. Sales have been depressed partly by the uncertain economic outlook and rising unemployment and partly by the difficulty of obtaining credit.
"As unemployment starts to top out, (in our view between 10-11 per cent), and auto financing becomes easier with the help of government programmes such as the TALF, sales should pick up. However, we would not expect a quick rebound to 2007 levels. For one thing, Americans probably bought too many cars during the last boom, with the help of surging wealth from real estate and stocks as well as zero-rate credit.
"So, despite recent low sales, it is much too early to talk of pent-up demand, as was often an important factor after past recessions. Still, over time, a recovery in car sales and production, perhaps initially into the 12-13 million range annually, will help boost the economy," Calverley said.
Consumer demand
All this implies that consumer demand is expected to remain sluggish, and that is bad news for an economy in which this accounts for 70 per cent of GDP. "The two key variables are real income growth and the savings rate, but it is hard to be optimistic on either," Calverley said. Income is being squeezed by rising unemployment, slowing wage growth and rising gas prices. There are reports from across the US of pay freezes and even pay cuts. Benefits are being shaved too.
"Of course we expect price inflation to moderate as well so real income growth will not slow as much as nominal income but companies are determined to raise margins so real income will still be squeezed. Consumers will not have much extra money to spend, nor will they be able easily to borrow.
"Banks continue to cut back on credit lines, while the fall in home prices is undermining wealth and collateral. Weak income growth due to rising unemployment is a particular problem right now and will restrain spending in Q2 and Q3," the bank said.
"Payroll losses should come to an end and, depending on oil price trends, real income growth should resume, though slowly. Then much will depend on the savings rate. It has already moved up to 5.7 per cent but we expect consumers to continue to push the savings rate higher," it said.
3 June 2009
Endless monetisation of US debt ahead ~ Jim Willie
Behind the bushes, a powerful billboard message can be seen by the trained eye, accompanied by loud signals audible to the trained ear. The US Federal Reserve will be forced to continue the gargantuan monetization scheme. The first round was announced in mid-March, for $300 billion in USTreasurys and $750 billion in USAgency Mortgage Bonds. Most did not give a second thought, that it was a one-time event. WRONG! The monetization news dealt a powerful blow to global confidence in the US financial system generally and the USDollar specifically. The $1 trillion monetization will be repeated, and even become a quarterly event, much like a constant sub-surface flow of water to remove a foundation built upon sand.
The trip to China by USDept Treasury Secy Geithner should be viewed as a key reassurance to these important creditors, later to be viewed as a betrayal. The Chinese audience responded with loud laughter when Geithner assured them that their $2 trillion in savings was safe and secure. This was a national humiliation event, as Geithner has been muzzled. If only the USCongress had such broad wisdom and deep courage to laugh when Goldman Sachs henchmen ‘(Made Men’) from the syndicate gave regular speeches laden with deception and rationalizations for their continued fraud. Then again, the Chinese audience is not on the receiving end of graft and bribery, nor the object of revolving doors.
PLIGHT OF PRIMARY DEALER PARTNERS
The group of 20 to 22 bond dealers with contracts to sell USGovt debt securities are under siege, suffering a grand new plight. This is perhaps the best kept secret in the entire credit market right now. The USFed primary bond dealers are being squeezed. They actually have some power to respond. They are at risk, and face a possible rapid extinction. Despite the rising long-term USTBond yield, money going into USTBond purchases in general is growing like a powerful torrent. Demand for USTBonds is growing fast, very fast. Bond supply is rising faster than demand though!! The role of primary bond dealers is to hold inventory as intermediaries, a prospect that makes those dealers LOSERS right away. Auction sizes one or two years ago used to be $5 billion, $10 billion, even $15 billion on a given month. Just last week the official auction was for $110 billion, a 10-fold increase. The pushback comes from these primary bond dealers, who collectively possess the power to tell the issuer (USDept Treasury) and the agent (USFed) that buyers just do not exist in sufficient volume to absorb such huge regular supply. Fear has entered the hearts and minds of the dealers. They will soon tell their bosses at Treasury and the USFed that more monetization must come in order to lighten the supply load, or else face a renewed crisis, at least horrendous negative publicity. The credit market trucks are breaking down from the weight. The $300 billion monetization sounded like a big amount, but it is not. That amounts to two or three months in supply, if the $1800 billion in USGovt deficits is to be financed. The $1 trillion monetization MUST BE REPEATED, and even become a quarterly event. Refusal by the Treasury and USFed to monetize could result in failed auctions, crushing losses by the primary dealers, and their possible disappearance. Remember what happened to private equity firms stuck with their own stock and bond inventory? They went bust. That is precisely the risk to these bond dealers.
FORCED MONETIZATION COMMITMENT
The trend is clear for those with open eyes. The official bond auctions will continue relentlessly, probably well over $100 billion per month, for perhaps twenty months at least. Worse, the USGovt federal deficits will be much bigger than estimated. Here is a sobering fact. The USGovt tax revenues are down 35% year over year. For the first time in US history, the tax collection month of April 2009 was a net negative month. Expect the USTBond supply pressures to build, not reduce. My conclusion is clear. PURE MONETIZATION WILL SOON BE A REGULAR QUARTERLY PROMISE. IF NOT, THEN A USTBOND DEFAULT THREAT LOOMS NEAR ON THE HORIZON, OR A POWERFUL SUDDEN STOCK MARKET COLLAPSE WILL ENSUE. A monetization commitment forestalls a USTBond default at a later date.
Meanwhile, the economic impact of this unremedied crisis will slowly be recognized. Watch the job losses, which continue in huge numbers. Watch the home foreclosures, which continue in accelerating numbers. Watch the national home prices, which continue in steady declines. Recall that the USEconomic recovery that began in 2001-2002 was built upon a housing bubble as a foundation. The burst of that bubble is absolutely not a completed process. The national insolvency will take its toll on USTreasurys as a certain reflection. The debt downgrade (imminent, scheduled, expected, who cares its label?) of the UKGilts two weeks ago should have awakened the world to the perception of the USGovt debt as Third World debt paper. The government finances of the United Kingdom are no better and no worse than those of the United States. The global reserve status of the USDollar and USTreasury, the greater size of the USEconomy, these only guarantee that the impact of the US fiasco have broader shock waves. The fiasco is tied to the USGovt committed debt being transformed into debt securities, the USTreasury Bonds. It is a gigantic hairball. It is like a rattle snake swallowing a goat.
SPOTTING THE USTREASURY BLACK HOLE
The USTreasury Bond supply (skyrocketing) is growing much faster than the rising demand. The untold story is that demand is rising in stride to take the rising bond supply, FOR NOW. A rising USTBond long bond yield does not mean necessarily that money exits. Price is determined as demand meeting supply. The rising bond supply will be continuing, not just for a month or two, but for a year or two or three, maybe four. Projected USGovt federal deficits are due to occur for as far as the eye can see. Bond analysts knew that big problems would result. They have begun. Huge USGovt debt commitments ensure a skyrocket of continued USTBond supply. It is sucking in funds all over the financial markets, like a Black Hole. The stock market is at growing risk for its available funds. The primary dealers have the ability to put pressure on fund managers of a wide variety. Those managers will be urged to purchase more bonds, to alter their allocation ratios, and to respond to government pressures. Some will be lured to earn future favors. The Dow Jones Industrial stock index and the S&P500 stock index have begun to stall, after quite a run powered by short covering, relaxation of accounting rules, and widespread talk of early sightings of recovery evidence. The gargantuan outsized USTreasury Bond auctions must find funds to feed the beast, and the stock market is a nearby target. The great Black Hole of USTBond issuance and sale has the potential to draw the entire stock market into its vortex. The conclusion is simple, and the USFed must respond. The $1 trillion monetization MUST BE REPEATED, and even become a quarterly event. Refusal by the Treasury and USFed to monetize could result in painful stock market declines, the effects from which the public observes and understands well. Their pain usually results in hue & cry, and if not addressed, panic.
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/willie/2009/0602.html
The trip to China by USDept Treasury Secy Geithner should be viewed as a key reassurance to these important creditors, later to be viewed as a betrayal. The Chinese audience responded with loud laughter when Geithner assured them that their $2 trillion in savings was safe and secure. This was a national humiliation event, as Geithner has been muzzled. If only the USCongress had such broad wisdom and deep courage to laugh when Goldman Sachs henchmen ‘(Made Men’) from the syndicate gave regular speeches laden with deception and rationalizations for their continued fraud. Then again, the Chinese audience is not on the receiving end of graft and bribery, nor the object of revolving doors.
PLIGHT OF PRIMARY DEALER PARTNERS
The group of 20 to 22 bond dealers with contracts to sell USGovt debt securities are under siege, suffering a grand new plight. This is perhaps the best kept secret in the entire credit market right now. The USFed primary bond dealers are being squeezed. They actually have some power to respond. They are at risk, and face a possible rapid extinction. Despite the rising long-term USTBond yield, money going into USTBond purchases in general is growing like a powerful torrent. Demand for USTBonds is growing fast, very fast. Bond supply is rising faster than demand though!! The role of primary bond dealers is to hold inventory as intermediaries, a prospect that makes those dealers LOSERS right away. Auction sizes one or two years ago used to be $5 billion, $10 billion, even $15 billion on a given month. Just last week the official auction was for $110 billion, a 10-fold increase. The pushback comes from these primary bond dealers, who collectively possess the power to tell the issuer (USDept Treasury) and the agent (USFed) that buyers just do not exist in sufficient volume to absorb such huge regular supply. Fear has entered the hearts and minds of the dealers. They will soon tell their bosses at Treasury and the USFed that more monetization must come in order to lighten the supply load, or else face a renewed crisis, at least horrendous negative publicity. The credit market trucks are breaking down from the weight. The $300 billion monetization sounded like a big amount, but it is not. That amounts to two or three months in supply, if the $1800 billion in USGovt deficits is to be financed. The $1 trillion monetization MUST BE REPEATED, and even become a quarterly event. Refusal by the Treasury and USFed to monetize could result in failed auctions, crushing losses by the primary dealers, and their possible disappearance. Remember what happened to private equity firms stuck with their own stock and bond inventory? They went bust. That is precisely the risk to these bond dealers.
FORCED MONETIZATION COMMITMENT
The trend is clear for those with open eyes. The official bond auctions will continue relentlessly, probably well over $100 billion per month, for perhaps twenty months at least. Worse, the USGovt federal deficits will be much bigger than estimated. Here is a sobering fact. The USGovt tax revenues are down 35% year over year. For the first time in US history, the tax collection month of April 2009 was a net negative month. Expect the USTBond supply pressures to build, not reduce. My conclusion is clear. PURE MONETIZATION WILL SOON BE A REGULAR QUARTERLY PROMISE. IF NOT, THEN A USTBOND DEFAULT THREAT LOOMS NEAR ON THE HORIZON, OR A POWERFUL SUDDEN STOCK MARKET COLLAPSE WILL ENSUE. A monetization commitment forestalls a USTBond default at a later date.
Meanwhile, the economic impact of this unremedied crisis will slowly be recognized. Watch the job losses, which continue in huge numbers. Watch the home foreclosures, which continue in accelerating numbers. Watch the national home prices, which continue in steady declines. Recall that the USEconomic recovery that began in 2001-2002 was built upon a housing bubble as a foundation. The burst of that bubble is absolutely not a completed process. The national insolvency will take its toll on USTreasurys as a certain reflection. The debt downgrade (imminent, scheduled, expected, who cares its label?) of the UKGilts two weeks ago should have awakened the world to the perception of the USGovt debt as Third World debt paper. The government finances of the United Kingdom are no better and no worse than those of the United States. The global reserve status of the USDollar and USTreasury, the greater size of the USEconomy, these only guarantee that the impact of the US fiasco have broader shock waves. The fiasco is tied to the USGovt committed debt being transformed into debt securities, the USTreasury Bonds. It is a gigantic hairball. It is like a rattle snake swallowing a goat.
SPOTTING THE USTREASURY BLACK HOLE
The USTreasury Bond supply (skyrocketing) is growing much faster than the rising demand. The untold story is that demand is rising in stride to take the rising bond supply, FOR NOW. A rising USTBond long bond yield does not mean necessarily that money exits. Price is determined as demand meeting supply. The rising bond supply will be continuing, not just for a month or two, but for a year or two or three, maybe four. Projected USGovt federal deficits are due to occur for as far as the eye can see. Bond analysts knew that big problems would result. They have begun. Huge USGovt debt commitments ensure a skyrocket of continued USTBond supply. It is sucking in funds all over the financial markets, like a Black Hole. The stock market is at growing risk for its available funds. The primary dealers have the ability to put pressure on fund managers of a wide variety. Those managers will be urged to purchase more bonds, to alter their allocation ratios, and to respond to government pressures. Some will be lured to earn future favors. The Dow Jones Industrial stock index and the S&P500 stock index have begun to stall, after quite a run powered by short covering, relaxation of accounting rules, and widespread talk of early sightings of recovery evidence. The gargantuan outsized USTreasury Bond auctions must find funds to feed the beast, and the stock market is a nearby target. The great Black Hole of USTBond issuance and sale has the potential to draw the entire stock market into its vortex. The conclusion is simple, and the USFed must respond. The $1 trillion monetization MUST BE REPEATED, and even become a quarterly event. Refusal by the Treasury and USFed to monetize could result in painful stock market declines, the effects from which the public observes and understands well. Their pain usually results in hue & cry, and if not addressed, panic.
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/willie/2009/0602.html
29 May 2009
Repeat after me, Money is not wealth ~ Liu
The conventional terms of inflation and deflation are no longer adequate for describing the overall monetary effect of excess liquidity recently released by the US Federal Reserve, the nation's central bank, to deal with the year-long credit crunch.
This is because the approach adopted by the Treasury and the Fed to deal with a financial crisis of unsustainable debt created by excess liquidity is to inject more liquidity in the form of both new public debt and newly created money into the economy and to channel it to debt-laden institutions to reflate a burst debt-driven asset price bubble.
The Treasury does not have any power to create new money. It has to borrow from the credit market, thus shifting private debt into public debt. The Fed has the authority to create new money. Unfortunately, the Fed's new money has not been going to consumers in the form of full employment with rising wages to restore fallen demand, but instead is going only to debt-infested distressed institutions to allow them to deleverage from toxic debt. Thus deflation in the equity market (falling share prices) has been cushioned by newly issued money, while aggregate wage income continues to fall to further reduce aggregate demand.
Falling demand deflates commodity prices, but not enough to restore demand because aggregate wages are falling faster. When financial institutions deleverage with free money from the central bank, the creditors receive the money while the Fed assumes the toxic liability by expanding its balance sheet. Deleverage reduces financial costs while increasing cash flow to allow zombie financial institutions to return to nominal profitability with unearned income and while laying off workers to cut operational cost. Thus we have financial profit inflation with price deflation in a shrinking economy.
What we will have going forward is not Weimar Republic-type price hyperinflation, but a financial profit inflation in which zombie financial institutions turn nominally profitable in a collapsing economy. The danger is that this unearned nominal financial profit is mistaken as a sign of economic recovery, inducing the public to invest what remaining wealth they still hold, only to lose more of it at the next market meltdown, which will come when the profit bubble bursts.
Hyperinflation is fatal because hedging against it causes market failures to destroy wealth. Normally, when markets are functioning, unhedged inflation favors debtors by reducing the value of liabilities they owe to creditors. Instead of destroying wealth, unhedged inflation merely transfers wealth from creditors to debtors. But with government intervention in the financial market, both debtors and creditors are the taxpayers. In such circumstances, even moderate inflation destroys wealth because there are no winning parties.
Debt denominated in fiat currency is borrowed wealth to be repaid later with wealth stored in money protected by monetary policy. Bank deleveraging with Fed new money cancels private debt at full face value with money that has not been earned by anyone, that is with no stored wealth. That kind of money is toxic in that the more valuable it is (with increased purchasing power to buy more as prices deflate), the more it degrades wealth because no wealth has been put into the money to be stored, thus negating the fundamental prerequisite of money as a storer of value.
This is not demand destruction because decline in demand is temporarily slowed by the new money. Rather, it is money destruction as a restorer of value while it produces a misleading and confusing effect on aggregate demand.
Thinking about the value of any real asset (gold, oil, and so forth) in money (dollar) terms is misleading. The correct way is to think about the value of the money (dollars) in asset (gold, oil) terms, because assets (gold, oil, and so on) are wealth. The Fed can create money, but it cannot create wealth.
Central bankers are savvy enough to know that while they can create money, they cannot create wealth. To bind money to wealth, central bankers must fight inflation as if it were a financial plague. But the first law of growth economics states that to create wealth through growth, some inflation needs to be tolerated.
The solution then is to make the working poor pay for the pain of inflation by giving the rich a bigger share of the monetized wealth created via inflation, so that the loss of purchasing power from inflation is mostly borne by the low-wage working poor and not by the owners of capital, the monetary value of which is protected from inflation through low wages. Thus the working poor loses in both boom times and bust times.
Inflation is deemed benign by monetarism as long as wages rise at a slower pace than asset prices. The monetarist iron law of wages worked in the industrial age, with the resultant excess capacity absorbed by conspicuous consumption of the moneyed class, although it eventually heralded in the age of revolutions. But the iron law of wages no longer works in the post-industrial age in which growth can only come from mass demand management because overcapacity has grown beyond the ability of conspicuous consumption of a few to absorb in an economic democracy.
That has been the basic problem of the global economy for the past three decades. Low wages even in boom times have landed the world in its current sorry state of overcapacity masked by unsustainable demand created by a debt bubble that finally imploded in July 2007. The whole world is now producing goods and services made by low-wage workers who cannot afford to buy what they make except by taking on debt on which they eventually will default because their low income cannot service it.
All the stimulus spending by all governments perpetuates this dysfunctionality. There will be no recovery from this dysfunctional financial system. Only reform toward full employment with rising wages will save this severely impaired economy.
How can that be done? Simple. Make the cost of wage increases deductible from corporate income tax and make the savings from layoffs taxable as corporate income.
Henry C K Liu is chairman of a New York-based private investment group. His website is at http://www.henryckliu.com.
This is because the approach adopted by the Treasury and the Fed to deal with a financial crisis of unsustainable debt created by excess liquidity is to inject more liquidity in the form of both new public debt and newly created money into the economy and to channel it to debt-laden institutions to reflate a burst debt-driven asset price bubble.
The Treasury does not have any power to create new money. It has to borrow from the credit market, thus shifting private debt into public debt. The Fed has the authority to create new money. Unfortunately, the Fed's new money has not been going to consumers in the form of full employment with rising wages to restore fallen demand, but instead is going only to debt-infested distressed institutions to allow them to deleverage from toxic debt. Thus deflation in the equity market (falling share prices) has been cushioned by newly issued money, while aggregate wage income continues to fall to further reduce aggregate demand.
Falling demand deflates commodity prices, but not enough to restore demand because aggregate wages are falling faster. When financial institutions deleverage with free money from the central bank, the creditors receive the money while the Fed assumes the toxic liability by expanding its balance sheet. Deleverage reduces financial costs while increasing cash flow to allow zombie financial institutions to return to nominal profitability with unearned income and while laying off workers to cut operational cost. Thus we have financial profit inflation with price deflation in a shrinking economy.
What we will have going forward is not Weimar Republic-type price hyperinflation, but a financial profit inflation in which zombie financial institutions turn nominally profitable in a collapsing economy. The danger is that this unearned nominal financial profit is mistaken as a sign of economic recovery, inducing the public to invest what remaining wealth they still hold, only to lose more of it at the next market meltdown, which will come when the profit bubble bursts.
Hyperinflation is fatal because hedging against it causes market failures to destroy wealth. Normally, when markets are functioning, unhedged inflation favors debtors by reducing the value of liabilities they owe to creditors. Instead of destroying wealth, unhedged inflation merely transfers wealth from creditors to debtors. But with government intervention in the financial market, both debtors and creditors are the taxpayers. In such circumstances, even moderate inflation destroys wealth because there are no winning parties.
Debt denominated in fiat currency is borrowed wealth to be repaid later with wealth stored in money protected by monetary policy. Bank deleveraging with Fed new money cancels private debt at full face value with money that has not been earned by anyone, that is with no stored wealth. That kind of money is toxic in that the more valuable it is (with increased purchasing power to buy more as prices deflate), the more it degrades wealth because no wealth has been put into the money to be stored, thus negating the fundamental prerequisite of money as a storer of value.
This is not demand destruction because decline in demand is temporarily slowed by the new money. Rather, it is money destruction as a restorer of value while it produces a misleading and confusing effect on aggregate demand.
Thinking about the value of any real asset (gold, oil, and so forth) in money (dollar) terms is misleading. The correct way is to think about the value of the money (dollars) in asset (gold, oil) terms, because assets (gold, oil, and so on) are wealth. The Fed can create money, but it cannot create wealth.
Central bankers are savvy enough to know that while they can create money, they cannot create wealth. To bind money to wealth, central bankers must fight inflation as if it were a financial plague. But the first law of growth economics states that to create wealth through growth, some inflation needs to be tolerated.
The solution then is to make the working poor pay for the pain of inflation by giving the rich a bigger share of the monetized wealth created via inflation, so that the loss of purchasing power from inflation is mostly borne by the low-wage working poor and not by the owners of capital, the monetary value of which is protected from inflation through low wages. Thus the working poor loses in both boom times and bust times.
Inflation is deemed benign by monetarism as long as wages rise at a slower pace than asset prices. The monetarist iron law of wages worked in the industrial age, with the resultant excess capacity absorbed by conspicuous consumption of the moneyed class, although it eventually heralded in the age of revolutions. But the iron law of wages no longer works in the post-industrial age in which growth can only come from mass demand management because overcapacity has grown beyond the ability of conspicuous consumption of a few to absorb in an economic democracy.
That has been the basic problem of the global economy for the past three decades. Low wages even in boom times have landed the world in its current sorry state of overcapacity masked by unsustainable demand created by a debt bubble that finally imploded in July 2007. The whole world is now producing goods and services made by low-wage workers who cannot afford to buy what they make except by taking on debt on which they eventually will default because their low income cannot service it.
All the stimulus spending by all governments perpetuates this dysfunctionality. There will be no recovery from this dysfunctional financial system. Only reform toward full employment with rising wages will save this severely impaired economy.
How can that be done? Simple. Make the cost of wage increases deductible from corporate income tax and make the savings from layoffs taxable as corporate income.
Henry C K Liu is chairman of a New York-based private investment group. His website is at http://www.henryckliu.com.
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