The Coming Crash

Message from John L. Petersen on the Coming Crash

November 19, 2007


It appears that the world in general and the United States in particular are on the edge of a major disruption in the global financial system. Here's the summary as we see it.

At a recent Board meeting of The Arlington Institute, Dr. David Martin, CEO of M*CAM and one of the members of the Board was asked for his assessment of the global financial situation in the coming months.

Here are my notes from his response:

I stand by my commentary in July of '06.

The next shoe to fall is consumer credit
Currently as reports came in on the 3rd quarter, foreclosures were up 470% this quarter alone. They will be up over 500% this coming quarter (4th). A foreclosure in our terms is when the bank has officially declared an account insolvent and tries to regain the asset (if it exists). The person who is foreclosed upon can no longer secure any traditional consumer credit. This in turn goes straight to the banks as no one will be able to get the store issued charge cards.

A minority of people pay off their consumer debt every month. When one considers the combination of consumer credit card debt and the compounded debt of “home equity” financing, we estimate that less than 20% of people actually carry no consumer credit from one month to the next. Many of the ones who don't pay off their carried consumer debt have at least one credit card at its limit and therefore lack credit capacity. Most have their paycheck directly covering bills and servicing the minimum balance due.

Therefore people who are foreclosed upon will not be able to obtain credit and since their paychecks will be maxed out, there will not be extra cash left over from the paycheck to service a new debt.

Next, everybody buys things at Christmas. As much as 40% of retail sales are done in the 4th quarter of the year – i.e. the retail miracle. The purchase decline in retail goods this fourth quarter will occur because many credit-only consumers will lack the credit capacity mentioned above. Frequently, people overcharge their limit and the banks (albeit a profit center for subprime credit users) levy a penalty by increasing interest rates and charging additional fees. In the 4th quarter of 2007, the amount of people overcharging their limits will be too many for the banks to handle. We do not have a system in place to deal with overcharge on that scale. A substantial number of this December's purchases will go into an overdraft on credit limits.

CDO – Collateral Debt Obligation – Consumer Credit

Consumer credit pooled debt investment instruments (a form of CDO) are originated and rated based on underlying historical credit behavior and a complex series of predictive models for repayment dynamics. CDOs have “strips” which are a combination of similar profile tranches within a larger investment product. Based on the market's appetite for risk, investment performance guarantees (or credit enhancements) are packaged with the credits. These credit guarantees are issued by insurance companies, reinsurance companies, and other specialty finance companies – many operating with extra-territorial jurisdiction rendering fiscal oversight more complicated.

These strips come in several categories:

* Investment grade
* Almost investment grade
* Junk and
* Why did we give them a credit card?


All of these grades are priced on historical default rates. The credit insurance companies (AIG, MBIA, Ambac, Financial Security Assurance, Channel Re, XL, Zurich Re and other reinsurers) have, from time to time, issued credit guarantees to the securities. Banks sell debt in the form of a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO).

Minor shifts in default actuarial activity (+/- 25 basis points) from normative behavior is absorbed within pricing of these financial guaranty contracts. However fundamental shifts (hundreds or thousands of basis points in one quarter) are not built into the model and result in credit enhancement insolvency on a major scale. When the insurer cannot pay based on its own liquidity impairment, the bank is left with catastrophic (an insurance term for excessive loss outside of expected) exposure.

If in a single quarter we have an increased foreclosure rate of 400% (or 4000 basis points) the insurance contracts simply cannot handle that kind of drastic shift as evidenced by the write offs in the third quarter. When we will follow the drastic third quarter with a loss of 500% in the fourth quarter, the trajectory becomes clear.

Neither the banking nor the insurance industry has a historical experience in dealing with this type of challenge and neither has the liquidity linked to these contracts to support system wide collapse.

Where was the announcement of this? There was no announcement.

However Hank Greenberg is resurfacing in AIG leadership even during an SEC investigation because without him, no one else can remember where the counterparty risks are. In order to save the insurance industry, shareholders have looked past alleged SEC violations as there is no one with Mr. Greenberg's awareness of the market and counterparty agreements who can hope to navigate the coming challenges. In the 4th quarter, the US will have another record foreclosure announcement. Once you're over 25% (25 basis point) foreclosure, all models are broken.

Under a consumer credit melt-down, Capital One and/or Wachovia are likely going to put a massive foreclosure liability to an insurance company and the insurance company will not have liquidity to cover the exposure.

This is the problem we got into when we issued credit card debt on top of secondary mortgages – (inflated the value of the home) and gave out credit based on faux equity that no one really had.

The reason why this problem is the second shoe to fall (subprime mortgage collapse was the first shoe) is because consumer credit has a different foreclosure frequency than traditional mortgage credit.

December is when the maturity of the giant buyout of the economy moves.

By December, you'll have a second round of charge offs based on consumer credit. The real big problem – when you foreclose on consumer credit, people stop buying things. When people stop buying things, we don't have a tertiary way to pump liquidity into the market. People won't have extra cash from their paychecks and won't have capacity on their cards.

Try this case study:

Go to the mall and stand in front of counter at Victoria Secret. Watch what happens when someone wants to pay with cash. The clerk won't know how to ring up cash. They will need a manager to come over to give change and unlock drawers. When you don't have capacity on those cards, you don't buy things. VISA credit cards actually denigrate using cash in their run-up-to-Christmas add campaign.

Next, go to any savings bank data set. If you were going to spend $1000 in cash this Christmas, can you do it? For the most part, the answer would be “no” because we have had a net negative spending for the last 5 years.

Therefore there will be depressed consumer spending this Christmas but what is spent, people will overcharge. This will take what used to be good investments in CDOs and will change the dynamic. If you used to be a person who paid their bills on time, you will now only pay half. If the credit companies are counting on the top two tranches to pay their card off in full and they don't, they won't have liquidity to cover the rest. The banks cannot afford the top tranch paying half.

The estimates are out. There will be at least $400B in the first round of charge offs in the CDO market.

We're not going to be done with the subprime mortgage when the CDOs fall. Therefore we will have an insolvency problem with the banks that are mentioned above.

This is the kiss of death of a privately held Federal Reserve. For the Federal Reserve to function, its stakeholder banks (like JP Morgan Chase) must remain viable and liquid. When one of them, or any major bank in the U.S. (like Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York, Washington Mutual, etc.) is impaired or ceases to exist, the architecture of the Fed's capacity to respond to systemic challenges is unsustainable.

If the banks have no money, they can't pump liquidity into the market. Taking half of a trillion dollars out of market in a single distressed write down becomes problematic. The US banking system does not have the liquidity to take the hit.

The actual solvency of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is relatively indecipherable due to the fact that their treasury management processes (and the risks of their own investment strategies) are not uniformly disclosed with sufficient transparency. The FDIC was set up for isolated problems with a few bad banks but is NOT prepared to “insure” the system in an industry-wide crisis. The actual liquidity reserve of the “insurance” that Americans view as their safety net is 1/100th the actual exposure of outstanding deposits. The actual coverage ratio for the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) fell below 1.25% in 2002, the same year that less stable credit practices were adopted by America's leading banks.

The funny part is that the Federal Government will be on holiday when all of this happens. There will be no one to put freeze actions and moratoria on actions. The only way you stop the cataclysm is to put together civil actions on deposit withdrawals.

As I discussed previously, the Chinese currency wild-card may become relevant far sooner than expected. An effort by China to convert its $1.4 trillion U.S. Treasury holdings into euros is not viable for many reasons – not the least of which is the European Central Bank's inability to absorb such an event. As China continues its rush away from supporting U.S. Treasuries and as Middle Eastern investors are buying them up in more diversified holdings, a new “currency exchange” is unfolding. Realizing that they cannot liquidate their holdings, it appears that the Chinese are currently using their U.S. Treasury holdings as collateral for euro denominated purchases and long term infrastructure transactions. In other words, they may be “liquidating” their holdings as collateral and, in so doing, effectively migrating to non-dollar value without ever having to officially dump their current Treasury holdings.

Therefore, collateralize the credit in dollars – especially if you're long in dollars. The lender/financier won't call the note because you have it structured in such a way to both allow it to perform and hold illiquid collateral that no one wants. This essentially inflates euros. Although you can't sell dollars, the whole purpose of collateral is that it is a second source of payment – collateral is there to down rate the risk of the loan. Secondary becomes irrelevant.

When February comes, the Chinese are going to do something as they will have to decide what the exposure is going to be with the treasury. As I see it they have to just dump the treasury. They only keep it because they can use it – they have 43% direct/indirect of US treasuries so they'll dump them on the market.

The US Congressional pressures to decouple the RMB will work, but not in the way we want. Our plan includes helping them hold on to the treasuries, it does not involve them not holding the dollar anymore. The US wanted the tether to be part of the float. This will cause disenfranchisement of the US electorate (during primary season). February is also when public (media) will realize we won't pull out of this.

Side note: Mayor Bloomberg could enter the race at this point, being the savior candidate (at least economically), but has $1B dollars in non-liquid money so he may not be able to enter.

March is when we realize that the dollar doesn't come back.

OPEC price with the whole fluctuation of oil futures presages the event. They are going to run the price of oil as high as they can get it on the dollar, while buying US treasuries from China with the money. When the dollar does collapse, they'll flip denominations. The wild card is long about March when the OPEC cuts spot oil off the dollar to the euro. One can look at the current oil price at close to $100/barrel and fail to see that, as this premium price is currently turning around and investing in a weakening dollar, the effective price (less the dollar investment hedge) is probably closer to $50/barrel than the spot price reflects.

Currency problems will change the game – they are financially structuring themselves to take the hit.

When we can't afford to buy oil commodities on a spot market – it compounds the problem however the consumer that Saudi Arabia ships to is liquid (China). In the US it is a big problem. There is still a market for oil; it just changes. When you come out of Straits of Hormuz, turn left.




RE: Key Paragraph Jacking Oil To Keep Up Dollar Demand... GrislyBear
NEW 11/20/2007 7:07:38 PM
OPEC price with the whole fluctuation of oil futures presages the event. They are going to run the price of oil as high as they can get it on the dollar, while buying US treasuries from China with the money. When the dollar does collapse, they'll flip denominations. The wild card is long about March when the OPEC cuts spot oil off the dollar to the euro. One can look at the current oil price at close to $100/barrel and fail to see that, as this premium price is currently turning around and investing in a weakening dollar, the effective price (less the dollar investment hedge) is probably closer to $50/barrel than the spot price reflects.

Several other analysts have made this point.

But since the USA consumes 25% of world oil, and less than 5% of world's population, the game can't go on much longer.
Specifically, at some point whether that be $150 or $200 oil, demand will crash and ironically, so will the USD price.
Weird.

RE: Thanks, notsure smokey
NEW 11/20/2007 8:20:09 PM
"This is the kiss of death of a privately held Federal Reserve. For the Federal Reserve to function, its stakeholder banks (like JP Morgan Chase) must remain viable and liquid. When one of them, or any major bank in the U.S. (like Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Bank of New York, Washington Mutual, etc.) is impaired or ceases to exist, the architecture of the Fed's capacity to respond to systemic challenges is unsustainable.
If the banks have no money, they can't pump liquidity into the market. Taking half of a trillion dollars out of market in a single distressed write down becomes problematic. The US banking system does not have the liquidity to take the hit. "

***

The Federal Reserve Banking system is based on collateralized debt. Before banks or other financial institutions can borrow from the system, they must offer something of equal value as collateral plus any added interest for the duration of the loan.

Ben Bernanke, in his "printing press" speech of 2002, either knowingly or unknowingly misspoke when he described the Fed's unlimited ability to provide liquidity to the markets.

The Fed injects liquidity into the financial system by buying certain assets like US treasuries. This process does not add any value to the system. It is the financial system which must use the injection of liquidity to add value through providing credit to entities which can then invest or speculate in appreciating assets.

As long as the financial/economic system is growing, banks and other financial entities will be able to use the credit issued by the Fed to grow their asset base by issuing their own credit to the expanding economy. They can then not only repay their loans from the Fed, but also buy US treasuries and other financial assets which can be used as collateral for future loans.

This mechanism works as long as appreciating assets in the system continue to expand the capacity for more debt. Financial bubbles of the recent past have been able to expand debt beyond its normal limits by hyperinflating the values of assets involved in the bubbles.

As long as these hyperinflating assets remained in the virtual reality of the financial markets like stocks, bonds and the derivatives thereof, they seemingly had infinite potential to appreciate.

But when the expansion of credit spread into the real economy through rising real estate prices, the asset appreciation began to be limited by the incomes of the real estate investors and speculators. This limitation of income then brought the expansion of credit to a dead-end through debt saturation.

The REAL economy brought the virtual expansion of financial assets to a screeching halt.

Without new assets with which to offer as collateral, the banks and large financial entities can no longer purchase the collateral necessary to expand their asset base through selling more credit. Therefore as the asset bubbles pop and defaults increase, the banks and their depositors are left holding the bag.

The Fed can lower interest rates down to zero, but without an expansion of the basis for collateral, the demand for credit will remain flat while the increasing defaults continue to destroy any possibility of credit expansion.

All talk of Weimar hyperinflation at this point is simply talk. The Federal Reserve banking system based on collateralized debt would have to be replaced with a nationalized banking system in order for a Weimar or Zimbabwe type hyperinflation of the monetary base to occur.

Of course, anything is possible.

Maybe Congress will forgo their upcoming paid holidays to abolish the Fed.

Ya think?