LEAP/E2020 is of the view that the effect of States’ spending trillions to « counteract the crisis » will have fizzled out. These vast sums had the effect of slowing down the development of the systemic global crisis for several months but, as anticipated in previous GEAB reports, this strategy will only have ultimately served to clearly drag States into the crisis caused by the financial institutions.
Therefore our team anticipates, in this 42nd issue of the GEAB, a sudden intensification of the crisis in the second half of 2010, caused by a double effect of a catching up of events which were temporarily « frozen » in the second half of 2009 and the impossibility of maintaining the palliative remedies of past years.
As a matter of fact, in February 2010, a year after us stating that the end of 2009 would mark the beginning of the phase of global geopolitical dislocation, anyone can see that this process is well established: states on the edge of bankruptcy, remorseless rise in unemployment, millions of people coming to the end of their social security benefits, falling wages and salaries, limiting of public services and disintegration of the global governance system (failure of the Copenhagen summit, growing Chinese/US confrontation, return of the risk of an Iran/Israel/USA conflict, wars worldwide… (1)). However, we are only at the start of this phase for which LEAP/E2020 will supply a likely timeframe in the next GEAB issue.
The sudden intensification of the global systemic crisis will be characterised by the acceleration and/or strengthening of five fundamental negative trends:
. the explosion of the bubble in public deficits and a corresponding increase in state defaults
. the fatal impact of the Western banking system with mounting debt defaults and the wall of debt coming to maturity
. the inescapable rise in interest rates
. the increase in issues causing international tension
. a growing social insecurity.
In this GEAB issue our team expands on the first three trends of these developments including an anticipation on Russia’s position in the face of the crisis, as well as, of course, our monthly suggestions.
In this public announcement, we have chosen to analyse the « Greek case », on the one hand because it seems indicative of what 2010 has in store for us, and on the other because it is a perfect illustration of the way in which news and information on the world crisis is moving towards « make-believe news » between blocs and interests which are increasingly in conflict. Clearly it is a « must » to learn how to decipher worldwide news and information in the months and years to come which will be a growing means of manipulatory activity.
Progression of the percentage of net new U.S. debt bought by China, net new U.S. government borrowing, percentage of outstanding U.S. Treasuries owned by China (2002-2009) – Sources: US Treasury, Haver Analytics, New York Times
The five characteristics which make up the « Greek case » into the tree with which one tries to hide the forest
Let’s take a look at the « Greek case » which has concerned the media and experts for several weeks now. Before entering into the detail of what is happening, there are five key points to our anticipation on the subject:
1. As we stated in our anticipations for 2010, which appeared in the last GEAB issue (GEAB N°41, the Greek problem will have disappeared from the international media’s radar several weeks from now. It is the tree used to hide both a forest of much more dangerous sovereign debt (to be precise that of Washington and London) and the beginning of a further fall in the world economy, led by the United States (2).
2. The Greek problem is an internal issue for the Eurozone and the EU, and the current situation provides, at last, a unique occasion for the Eurozone leaders to require Greece (a case of « failed enlargement » since 1982) to leave its feudal political and economic system behind. The other Eurozone countries, led by Germany, will do the necessary to make Greek leaders bring their country into the XXIst century in exchange for their help, at the same time making use of the fact that Greece only represents 2.5% of Eurozone GDP (3) to test the stabilisation mechanisms that the Eurozone needs in times of crisis (4).
3. Ango-Saxon leaders and media are using the current situation (just like last year with the so-called banking tsunami coming from Eastern Europe which was going to carry the Eurozone away with it (5)) to hide the catastrophic progression of their economies and public debt and attempt to weaken the attractiveness of the Eurozone at a time when the USA and the United Kingdom have increasing difficulty in attracting the capital which they so desperately need. At the same time Washington and London (which, since the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty is completely excluded from any management of the Euro) would be overjoyed to see the IMF, which they control completely (6), brought into Eurozone management.
4. Eurozone leaders are very happy to see the Euro fall to 1.35 against the Dollar. They well know that it won’t last because the current problem is the fall in the value of the Dollar (and the Pound Sterling), but they appreciate this « whiff of oxygen » for their exporters.
5. The speculators (hedge funds and others) and banks heavily involved with Greece (7), have a common interest in trying to bring about rapid Eurozone financial support for Greece, since otherwise the rating agencies will, unintentionally, pull a fast one on them if the Europeans refuse to dig into their pockets (like the scandalous actions of Paulson and Geithner over AIG and Wall Street in 2008/2009): indeed a lowering of Greece’s rating will plunge this small world into the throes of serious financial losses if, for the banks, their Greek loans are similarly devalued, or if their bets against the Euro don’t work out in due course (8).
2008 comparison of the deficits and Eurozone GDP of Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France and Germany – Source: Der Spiegel / European Commission, 02/2010
Goldman Sachs’ role in this Greek tragedy… and the next sovereign defaults
In the « Greek case », just like in every suspense story, a « bad guy » is needed (or, following the logic of an old-style tragedy, a « deus ex machina »). In this phase of the global systemic crisis, the role of the « bad guy » is usually played by one of Wall Street’s big investment banks, in particular by the leader of the gang, Goldman Sachs. The « Greek case » is no different as indeed this New York investment bank is directly implicated in the budgetary conjuring tricks which allowed Greece to qualify for Euro entry, whilst its actual budget deficits would have disqualified it. In reality it was Goldman Sachs who, in 2002, created one of its cunning financial models of which it holds the secret (9) and which, almost systematically resurfaces several years later, to blow up the client. But what does it matter, since GS (Goldman Sachs) profits were the beneficiary!
In the Greek case what the investment bank proposed was very simple: raise a loan which didn’t appear in the budget (a swap agreement which enabled a ficticious reduction in the size of the Greek public deficit (10). The Greek leaders at the time were, of course, 100% liable and should, in LEAP/E2020’s opinion, be subjected to Greek and European political and legal process for having cheated the EU and their own citizens within the framework of a major historic event, the creation of the single European currency.
But, let’s be clear, the liability of the New York investment bank (as an accomplice) is just as great, especially when one is aware of the fact that Goldman Sachs’ vice-president for Europe was, at the time, a certain Mario Draghi (11), currently President of the Italian Central Bank and a candidate (12) to succeed Jean-Claude Trichet at the head of the European Central Bank (13).
Without wishing to pre-judge Mr. Draghi’s role in the affair of the loan manipulating Greece’s statistics (14), one should ask oneself if it wouldn’t be worthwhile to question his involvement in the affair (15). In a democracy, the press (16), like parliaments (in this case Greek and European), are expected to take on this task themselves. Considering the importance of GS in world financial affairs these last few years, nothing that this bank does should leave governments and legislators indifferent. It is Paul Volcker, current head of Barack Obama’s financial advisors, who has become one of the strongest critics of Goldman Sachs’ activities (17). We already had the occasion to write, at the time of the election of the current US President, that he is the only person in his entourage having the experience and skills to push through tough measures (18) and who, at this moment, knows what, or rather whom, he is talking about.
With this same logic, on the issue of transparency in financial activities and state budgets and using the ill-fated role of Goldman Sachs and of the large investment banks in general as an illustration, LEAP/E2020 takes the view that it would be beneficial for the European Union and its five hundred million citizens, to exclude former managers of these investment banks (19) from any post of financial, budgetary and economic control (ECB, European Commission, National Central Banks). The mixing of these relationships can only lead to even greater confusion between public and private interests, which can only be to the detriment of European public interests. To begin with, the Eurozone should immediately require the Greek government to stop calling on the services of Goldman Sachs which, according to the Financial Times of 01/28/2010, it still uses.
If the head of Goldman Sachs believes he is « God » as he described himself in a recent interview (20), it would be prudent to consider that his bank, and its lookalikes, can seriously behave like devils, and it is therefore wise to draw all the consequences. This piece of advice, according to our team, is valid for the whole of Europe, as well as every other continent. There are « private services » which clash with « public interests »: just ask Greek citizens and American real estate owners whose houses have been repossessed by the banks!
To conclude, our team suggests a game to convince those who seek where the next sovereign debt crisis will surface: simply look for those states which have called upon Goldman Sachs’ services in the last few years and you will have a serious lead (21)!
http://www.leap2020.eu/GEAB-N-42-is-available!-Second-half-of-2010-Sudden-intensification-of-the-global-systemic-crisis-Strengthening-of-five_a4294.html
12 March 2010
11 March 2010
Theory of Positive Thinking
Hat tip to Charles Powell. The divergence between economic conditions in Australia, hitched as it is to China and India and the US and UK is amazing. I would hazard a guess that things will be worse here on a six month outlook, but who can be sure.
I’ve seldom seen so much rubbish written by people who ought to know better in a single day. Many able people have heaped the scorn and incredulity on three articles, one a piece on Rahm Emanuel slotted to run in the Sunday New York Times Magazine, another an artfully packed laudatory piece on Timothy Geithner by John Cassidy in the New Yorker and a more even handed looking one (I stress “looking”) in the Atlantic.
Ed Harrison has skillfully shredded parsed the Geithner pieces . Simon Johnson thrashed the New Yorker story. A key paragraph below:
The main feature of the plan, of course, was – following the stress tests – to communicate effectively that there was a government guarantee behind every major bank or quasi-bank in the United States. Of course this works in the short-term – investors like such guarantees. But there’s a good reason we usually don’t guarantee all financial institutions – or act happy when other countries do the same. Unconditional bailouts lead to trouble, encouraging reckless risk-taking and undermining responsible governance. You can’t run any form of reasonable market system when some big players hold “get out of bankruptcy free” cards.
Banking expert Chris Whalen was so disturbed by the numerous distortions in the New Yorker piece that he had already fired off a long letter to the editor by the time I pinged him, with these starting paragraphs:
Jack Cassidy tells us that “Timothy Geithner’s financial plan is working—and making him very unpopular.” Unfortunately this is completely wrong. Cassidy’s comment just illustrates why the New Yorker has fallen into such obscurity, namely because it is more Vanity Fair than its vivacious sibling and unable to perform critical journalism.
In fact, the banking system is continuing to sink under bad loans and even worse securities losses. Telling the public that the banks are “fixed” is irresponsible. Unfortunately this false perception is widespread, including among major media such as CNBC and also with a number of my clients in the hedge fund world.
And from Marshall Auerback, who had a ringside view of the aftermath of the Japanese bubble:
Cassidy’s article brings to mind a retort by Chou En Lai when he was asked about the success of the French Revolution. He said, “It’s too early to tell”. Yet here we have John Cassidy from the New Yorker and Joshua Green from The Atlantic both making the assumption that the Geithner plan “worked”. This whole line about “taxpayers to recover bailout money” is based on an accounting fraud, because accounting abuses are the primary means by which TARP recipients have repaid bailout money — putting us at greater risk. That may seem paradoxical, but the rush to repay is driven by a desire to have unrestrained executive bonuses (a very bad thing associated with far greater accounting fraud and failures — requiring future, larger taxpayer bailouts) and accounting abuses produce the (fictional) ability to repay the United States (primarily by failing to recognize existing losses). The TARP recipients weakened their financial condition, and increased moral hazard, when they rushed to repay the TARP funds. Both factors increase the risk of making more expensive future bailouts more likely.
Yves here. The reason that people who can discern clearly what is afoot are so deeply disturbed is simple, and all the comments touch on it. The campaign to defend Geithner and Emanuel, both architects of the administration’s finance friendly policies has gone beyond what most people would see as spin into such an aggressive effort to manipulate popular perceptions that it is not a stretch to call it propaganda.
This strategy, of relying on propaganda to mask their true intent, has become inevitable, given the strategic corner the Obama Adminstration has painted itself in. And this campaign has become increasingly desperate as the inconsistency between the Adminsitration’s “product positioning” and observable reality become increasingly evident.
Recall how we got here. Early in 2009, the banking industry was on the ropes. Both the stock and the credit default swaps markets said that many of the big players were at serious risk of failure. Commentators debated whether to nationalize Citibank, Bank of America, and other large, floundering institutions.
The case for bold action was sound. The history of financial crises showed that the least costly approach is to resolve mortally wounded organizations, install new management, set strict guidelines, and separate out the bad loans and investments in order to restructure and sell them. An IMF study of 124 banking crises concluded that regulatory forbearance, the term of art for letting impaired banks soldier on, found:
The typical result of forbearance is a deeper hole in the net worth of banks, crippling tax burdens to finance bank bailouts, and even more severe credit supply contraction and economic decline than would have occurred…
Shuttering sick banks is hardly a radical idea; the FDIC does it on a routine basis. So the difference here was not in the nature of the exercise, but its operational complexity.
This juncture was a crucial window of opportunity. The financial services industry had become systematically predatory. Its victims now extended well beyond precarious, clueless, and sometimes undisciplined consumers who took on too much debt via credit cards with gotcha features that successfully enticed into a treadmill of chronic debt, or now infamous subprime and option-ARM mortgages.
Over twenty years of malfeasance, from the savings and loan crisis (where fraud was a leading cause of bank failures) to a catastrophic set of blow-ups in over the counter derivatives in 1994, which produced total losses of $1.5 trillion, the biggest wipeout since the 1929 crash, through a 1990s subprime meltdown, dot com chicanery, Enron and other accounting scandals, and now the global financial crisis, the industry each time had been able to beat neuter meaningful reform. But this time, the scale of the damage was so great that it extended beyond investors to hapless bystanders, ordinary citizens who were also paying via their taxes and job losses. And unlike the past, where news of financial blow-ups was largely confined to the business section, the public could not miss the scale of the damage and how it came about, and was outraged.
The widespread, vocal opposition to the TARP was evidence that a once complacent populace had been roused. Reform, if proposed with energy and confidence, wasn’t a risk; not only was it badly needed, it was just what voters wanted.
But incoming president Obama failed to act. Whether he failed to see the opportunity, didn’t understand it, or was simply not interested is moot. Rather than bring vested banking interests to heel, the Obama administration instead chose to reconstitute, as much as possible, the very same industry whose reckless pursuit of profit had thrown the world economy off the cliff. There would be no Nixon goes to China moment from the architects of the policies that created the crisis, namely Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, and Director of the National Economic Council Larry Summers.
Defenders of the administration no doubt will content that the public was not ready for measures like the putting large banks like Citigroup into receivership. Even if that were true (and the current widespread outrage against banks says otherwise), that view assumes that the executive branch is a mere spectator, when it has the most powerful bully pulpit in the nation. Other leaders have taken unpopular moves and still maintained public support.
Obama’s repudiation of his campaign promise of change, by turning his back on meaningful reform of the financial services industry, in turn locked his Administration into a course of action. The new administration would have no choice other that working fist in glove with the banksters, supporting and amplifying their own, well established, propaganda efforts.
Thus Obama’s incentives are to come up with “solutions” that paper over problems, avoid meaningful conflict with the industry, minimize complaints, and restore the old practice of using leverage and investment gains to cover up stagnation in worker incomes. Potemkin reforms dovetail with the financial service industry’s goal of forestalling any measures that would interfere with its looting. So the only problem with this picture was how to fool the now-impoverished public into thinking a program of Mussolini-style corporatism represented progress.
How did the Administration and financial services message control teams work together?
The first was the refusal to consider investigations of any kind. Obama is widely reported to have studied the early days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration for inspiration; it would be impossible for him to miss the dramatic steps FDR took, including supporting the continuation of a Senate Banking Committee investigation into the misdeeds of the Roaring Twenties, the Pecora Commission. The Pecora Commission not only kept the bankers on the defensive, but it also did the forensic work into the abuses. It was critical to bring the nefarious practices to light to devise durable and lasting reforms.
Why were there no inquiries into how the firms that needed bailouts got themselves into a mess? This was an obvious and comparatively easy avenue of inquiry which would make a great deal of useful background accessible and identified issues for further examination. For instance, after the rescue of UBS, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission required UBS to provide an extensive report of what went wrong, and also had the bank make considerable portions of that information public, via a special report to its shareholders. Yet no US firm has been asked to make any explanation of how it managed its affairs so badly as to require extensive public support to keep from failing.
The choice here was obvious. A refusal to investigate was tantamount to a refusal to reform. A good understanding of what had happened was essential, not merely to develop sound new rules, but also to keep the industry from muddying the waters, which would be easy to do, given how complex and opaque many of the products are
More compelling evidence of the Administration’s lack of interest in reining in the money-changers came via Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s first presentation on his reform plan, which was more accurately a plan to have a plan. It was widely criticized for its sketchiness, but most observers missed the true significance. Had the Obama transition team done any serious thinking about the financial crisis? Obviously not, because you don’t need to think too hard if the game plan is to go back to business as usual to the extent possible. Geither’s presentation came nearly three weeks after Obama was sworn in, and all its initiatives were Bush/Paulson wine in new bottles: a new go at the failed idea of having the government overpay for bad bank assets; “stress tests” to put more discipline around the process of handing out TARP funds to the needy; and a mortgage modification program which pretended to be able to square the circle of saving borrowers without taking on investors in mortgage securitizations.
Geithner’s not-much-of-a-plan exemplified the second tool in the Obama campaign to sell doing as little as possible to the financiers: the Theory of Positive Thinking.
.
That notion has a proud tradition in America and was much in evidence in the run-up to the crisis. It promises that the economy will be fine as long as everyone thinks happy thoughts about it. For instance, I noted in a March 2007 blog post that while the tone of the Financial Times as of March 2007 had become generally grim, the US had become a Tinkerbell market, where valuations are held aloft by faith, and participants conspire to stoke true belief. And as the crisis wore on, other magical personages intervened. As a hedge fund manager who writes as Augustus Melmotte noted,
The market responded with enthusiasm to reports that the Tooth Fairy has agreed to acquire Lehman. The purchase price has not yet been determined and will be set by Dick Fuld wishing upon a star, clicking his heels three times, and being transported back to that magical place where Lehman still sells for over $70 per share….. Meanwhile, the SEC has announced an investigation of mean, evil, bad short-seller David Einhorn. …. Einhorn reportedly suggested that the Tooth Fairy does not exist and that wishing upon a star is not a wholly reliable price discovery mechanism. Christopher Cox, chairman of the SEC, said, “Vicious rumors attacking the Tooth Fairy will not be tolerated. Our entire financial system and indeed the American way of life depend on the Tooth Fairy and wishing upon a star…” The SEC is reportedly planning to set up re-education camps for short-sellers.
Remember that the US has an entire cable channel devoted to the Theory of Positive Thinking, namely CNBC, and a goodly portion of the financial media falls into CNBC-style cheerleading with more than occasional abandon.
Now it is true that this idea has a kernel of truth. John Maynard Keynes attributed the Depression to a change in investor “liquidity preferences,” which meant they had suddenly become very risk averse and preferred to hold cash until they felt conditions had improved, with devastating consequences for economic activity. Uncertainty can morph into a self-reinforcing downcycle. But it is one thing to use confidence boosting as a tool, quite another to regard it as a magic bullet. Merely clapping our hands all together will not cure the long-standing ailments in the economy.
Moreover, the Theory of Positive Thinking has been used, upon occasion, to suggest that conditions will only deteriorate if the public examines the financial services industry critically. It isn’t hard to see whose interests benefit from that posture.
Now it is hard to prove in a tidy way that the tone of financial press coverage had shifted suddenly, and decisively, to optimism as of early March. But many professional investors in my circle started regularly talking of cheerleading. Two Wall Street veterans, Sandy Lewis and William Cohan, weighed in on this pattern at the New York Times:
Whether at a fund-raising dinner for wealthy supporters in Beverly Hills, or at an Air Force base in Nevada, or at Charlie Rose’s table in New York City, President Obama is conducting an all-out campaign to try to make us feel a whole lot better about the economy as quickly as possible… We’re concerned that nothing has really been fixed. We’re doubly concerned that people appear to feel the worst of the storm is over — and in this, they are aided and abetted by a hugely popular and charismatic president and by the fact that the Dow has increased by 35 percent or so since Mr. Obama started to lay out his economic plans in March.
This result relied on more than mere dint of personality. A Pew Research Center study found that roughly government and businesses originated over half the economics-related news after the crisis. Obama himself “dominated” the key images and ideas. The reporting had a clear arc. The early coverage focused on the struggles over the stimulus plan and the banking industry plans, and as those faded, so did coverage of the crisis in any form. The tacit assumption was that the crisis was over, and the performance of the supposedly forward looking stock market was proof. But as anyone with a modicum of detachment could see, the market was a false positive, treating an aversion of utter disaster as an imminent return to normalcy.
The stock market has rallied over 60% from its early March lows, enabling the wounded banks to sell new equity to the public and avoid further contentious taxpayer-funded rescue measures. But the justification for the soft glove treatment of the banking classes, that what was good for them would prove to be good for everyone else, has proven to be wildly false. When the Dow levitated over 10,000, mainstream news outlets celebrated the event, with nary a mention of the continued train wreck in the real economy. As Matt Taibbi observed, “the dichotomy between the economic health of ordinary people and the traditional ‘market indicators’ is not merely a non-story, it is a sort of taboo — unmentionable in major news coverage.”
But banking boosterism has succeeded all too well, allowing Team Obama to fantasize that it can get away with creating Potemkin prosperity in lieu of waging the pitched battles needed to lay the groundwork for the real thing.
Indeed, the adoption of the Theory of Positive Thinking has virtually guaranteed that nothing will change, unless there is sufficient deterioration in the real economy or the financial markets to provide compelling counter-evidence. One example is the “paying back the TARP” charade. As the banks continued to post improved earnings, no matter how phony they were, they argued that they were now healthy and should be allowed to pay back the TARP funding that had been crucial to their survival. The reason they were so keenly motivated to do should have been reason enough to deny their request: namely, that they wanted to escape restraints on executive compensation, virtually the only demand that the government had made. But overpaying staff and keeping too little in the way of risk reserves was precisely the behavior that led to the near collapse of the financial system. Going back to business as usual would virtually guarantee more looting of major financial firm and another series of collapses.
But the Obama administration miscalculated badly. First, it bought the financiers’ false promise that massive subsidies to them would kick start a economy. But economists are now estimating that it is likely to take five years to return to pre-crisis levels of unemployment. Obama took his eye off the ball. A Democratic President’s most important responsibility is job creation. It is simply unacceptable to most Americans for Wall Street to be reaping record profits and bonuses while the rest of the country is suffering. Second, it assumed finance was too complicated to hold the attention of most citizens, and so the (non) initiatives under way now would attract comparatively little scrutiny. But as public ire remains high, the press coverage has become almost schizophrenic. Obvious public relations plants, like Ben Bernanke designation as Time Magazine’s Man of the Year (precisely when his confirmation is running into unexpected opposition) and stories in the New York Times that incorrectly reported some Goldman executive bonus cosmetics as meaningful concessions have co-existed with reports on the abject failure of Geithner’s mortgage modification program. While mainstream press coverage is still largely flattering, the desperation of the recent PR moves versus the continued public ire and recognition of where the Adminsitrations’s priorities truly lie means the fissures are becoming a gaping chasm.
So with Obama’s popularity falling sharply, it should be no surprise that the Administration is resorting to more concerted propaganda efforts. It may have no choice. Having ceded so much ground to the financiers, it has lost control of the battlefield. The banking lobbyists have perfected their tactics for blocking reform over the last two decades. Team Obama naively cast its lot with an industry that is vastly more skilled in the the dark art of the manufacture of consent than it is.
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/03/the-empire-continues-to-strike-back-team-obama-propaganda-campaign-reaches-fever-pitch.html
I’ve seldom seen so much rubbish written by people who ought to know better in a single day. Many able people have heaped the scorn and incredulity on three articles, one a piece on Rahm Emanuel slotted to run in the Sunday New York Times Magazine, another an artfully packed laudatory piece on Timothy Geithner by John Cassidy in the New Yorker and a more even handed looking one (I stress “looking”) in the Atlantic.
Ed Harrison has skillfully shredded parsed the Geithner pieces . Simon Johnson thrashed the New Yorker story. A key paragraph below:
The main feature of the plan, of course, was – following the stress tests – to communicate effectively that there was a government guarantee behind every major bank or quasi-bank in the United States. Of course this works in the short-term – investors like such guarantees. But there’s a good reason we usually don’t guarantee all financial institutions – or act happy when other countries do the same. Unconditional bailouts lead to trouble, encouraging reckless risk-taking and undermining responsible governance. You can’t run any form of reasonable market system when some big players hold “get out of bankruptcy free” cards.
Banking expert Chris Whalen was so disturbed by the numerous distortions in the New Yorker piece that he had already fired off a long letter to the editor by the time I pinged him, with these starting paragraphs:
Jack Cassidy tells us that “Timothy Geithner’s financial plan is working—and making him very unpopular.” Unfortunately this is completely wrong. Cassidy’s comment just illustrates why the New Yorker has fallen into such obscurity, namely because it is more Vanity Fair than its vivacious sibling and unable to perform critical journalism.
In fact, the banking system is continuing to sink under bad loans and even worse securities losses. Telling the public that the banks are “fixed” is irresponsible. Unfortunately this false perception is widespread, including among major media such as CNBC and also with a number of my clients in the hedge fund world.
And from Marshall Auerback, who had a ringside view of the aftermath of the Japanese bubble:
Cassidy’s article brings to mind a retort by Chou En Lai when he was asked about the success of the French Revolution. He said, “It’s too early to tell”. Yet here we have John Cassidy from the New Yorker and Joshua Green from The Atlantic both making the assumption that the Geithner plan “worked”. This whole line about “taxpayers to recover bailout money” is based on an accounting fraud, because accounting abuses are the primary means by which TARP recipients have repaid bailout money — putting us at greater risk. That may seem paradoxical, but the rush to repay is driven by a desire to have unrestrained executive bonuses (a very bad thing associated with far greater accounting fraud and failures — requiring future, larger taxpayer bailouts) and accounting abuses produce the (fictional) ability to repay the United States (primarily by failing to recognize existing losses). The TARP recipients weakened their financial condition, and increased moral hazard, when they rushed to repay the TARP funds. Both factors increase the risk of making more expensive future bailouts more likely.
Yves here. The reason that people who can discern clearly what is afoot are so deeply disturbed is simple, and all the comments touch on it. The campaign to defend Geithner and Emanuel, both architects of the administration’s finance friendly policies has gone beyond what most people would see as spin into such an aggressive effort to manipulate popular perceptions that it is not a stretch to call it propaganda.
This strategy, of relying on propaganda to mask their true intent, has become inevitable, given the strategic corner the Obama Adminstration has painted itself in. And this campaign has become increasingly desperate as the inconsistency between the Adminsitration’s “product positioning” and observable reality become increasingly evident.
Recall how we got here. Early in 2009, the banking industry was on the ropes. Both the stock and the credit default swaps markets said that many of the big players were at serious risk of failure. Commentators debated whether to nationalize Citibank, Bank of America, and other large, floundering institutions.
The case for bold action was sound. The history of financial crises showed that the least costly approach is to resolve mortally wounded organizations, install new management, set strict guidelines, and separate out the bad loans and investments in order to restructure and sell them. An IMF study of 124 banking crises concluded that regulatory forbearance, the term of art for letting impaired banks soldier on, found:
The typical result of forbearance is a deeper hole in the net worth of banks, crippling tax burdens to finance bank bailouts, and even more severe credit supply contraction and economic decline than would have occurred…
Shuttering sick banks is hardly a radical idea; the FDIC does it on a routine basis. So the difference here was not in the nature of the exercise, but its operational complexity.
This juncture was a crucial window of opportunity. The financial services industry had become systematically predatory. Its victims now extended well beyond precarious, clueless, and sometimes undisciplined consumers who took on too much debt via credit cards with gotcha features that successfully enticed into a treadmill of chronic debt, or now infamous subprime and option-ARM mortgages.
Over twenty years of malfeasance, from the savings and loan crisis (where fraud was a leading cause of bank failures) to a catastrophic set of blow-ups in over the counter derivatives in 1994, which produced total losses of $1.5 trillion, the biggest wipeout since the 1929 crash, through a 1990s subprime meltdown, dot com chicanery, Enron and other accounting scandals, and now the global financial crisis, the industry each time had been able to beat neuter meaningful reform. But this time, the scale of the damage was so great that it extended beyond investors to hapless bystanders, ordinary citizens who were also paying via their taxes and job losses. And unlike the past, where news of financial blow-ups was largely confined to the business section, the public could not miss the scale of the damage and how it came about, and was outraged.
The widespread, vocal opposition to the TARP was evidence that a once complacent populace had been roused. Reform, if proposed with energy and confidence, wasn’t a risk; not only was it badly needed, it was just what voters wanted.
But incoming president Obama failed to act. Whether he failed to see the opportunity, didn’t understand it, or was simply not interested is moot. Rather than bring vested banking interests to heel, the Obama administration instead chose to reconstitute, as much as possible, the very same industry whose reckless pursuit of profit had thrown the world economy off the cliff. There would be no Nixon goes to China moment from the architects of the policies that created the crisis, namely Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, and Director of the National Economic Council Larry Summers.
Defenders of the administration no doubt will content that the public was not ready for measures like the putting large banks like Citigroup into receivership. Even if that were true (and the current widespread outrage against banks says otherwise), that view assumes that the executive branch is a mere spectator, when it has the most powerful bully pulpit in the nation. Other leaders have taken unpopular moves and still maintained public support.
Obama’s repudiation of his campaign promise of change, by turning his back on meaningful reform of the financial services industry, in turn locked his Administration into a course of action. The new administration would have no choice other that working fist in glove with the banksters, supporting and amplifying their own, well established, propaganda efforts.
Thus Obama’s incentives are to come up with “solutions” that paper over problems, avoid meaningful conflict with the industry, minimize complaints, and restore the old practice of using leverage and investment gains to cover up stagnation in worker incomes. Potemkin reforms dovetail with the financial service industry’s goal of forestalling any measures that would interfere with its looting. So the only problem with this picture was how to fool the now-impoverished public into thinking a program of Mussolini-style corporatism represented progress.
How did the Administration and financial services message control teams work together?
The first was the refusal to consider investigations of any kind. Obama is widely reported to have studied the early days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration for inspiration; it would be impossible for him to miss the dramatic steps FDR took, including supporting the continuation of a Senate Banking Committee investigation into the misdeeds of the Roaring Twenties, the Pecora Commission. The Pecora Commission not only kept the bankers on the defensive, but it also did the forensic work into the abuses. It was critical to bring the nefarious practices to light to devise durable and lasting reforms.
Why were there no inquiries into how the firms that needed bailouts got themselves into a mess? This was an obvious and comparatively easy avenue of inquiry which would make a great deal of useful background accessible and identified issues for further examination. For instance, after the rescue of UBS, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission required UBS to provide an extensive report of what went wrong, and also had the bank make considerable portions of that information public, via a special report to its shareholders. Yet no US firm has been asked to make any explanation of how it managed its affairs so badly as to require extensive public support to keep from failing.
The choice here was obvious. A refusal to investigate was tantamount to a refusal to reform. A good understanding of what had happened was essential, not merely to develop sound new rules, but also to keep the industry from muddying the waters, which would be easy to do, given how complex and opaque many of the products are
More compelling evidence of the Administration’s lack of interest in reining in the money-changers came via Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s first presentation on his reform plan, which was more accurately a plan to have a plan. It was widely criticized for its sketchiness, but most observers missed the true significance. Had the Obama transition team done any serious thinking about the financial crisis? Obviously not, because you don’t need to think too hard if the game plan is to go back to business as usual to the extent possible. Geither’s presentation came nearly three weeks after Obama was sworn in, and all its initiatives were Bush/Paulson wine in new bottles: a new go at the failed idea of having the government overpay for bad bank assets; “stress tests” to put more discipline around the process of handing out TARP funds to the needy; and a mortgage modification program which pretended to be able to square the circle of saving borrowers without taking on investors in mortgage securitizations.
Geithner’s not-much-of-a-plan exemplified the second tool in the Obama campaign to sell doing as little as possible to the financiers: the Theory of Positive Thinking.
.
That notion has a proud tradition in America and was much in evidence in the run-up to the crisis. It promises that the economy will be fine as long as everyone thinks happy thoughts about it. For instance, I noted in a March 2007 blog post that while the tone of the Financial Times as of March 2007 had become generally grim, the US had become a Tinkerbell market, where valuations are held aloft by faith, and participants conspire to stoke true belief. And as the crisis wore on, other magical personages intervened. As a hedge fund manager who writes as Augustus Melmotte noted,
The market responded with enthusiasm to reports that the Tooth Fairy has agreed to acquire Lehman. The purchase price has not yet been determined and will be set by Dick Fuld wishing upon a star, clicking his heels three times, and being transported back to that magical place where Lehman still sells for over $70 per share….. Meanwhile, the SEC has announced an investigation of mean, evil, bad short-seller David Einhorn. …. Einhorn reportedly suggested that the Tooth Fairy does not exist and that wishing upon a star is not a wholly reliable price discovery mechanism. Christopher Cox, chairman of the SEC, said, “Vicious rumors attacking the Tooth Fairy will not be tolerated. Our entire financial system and indeed the American way of life depend on the Tooth Fairy and wishing upon a star…” The SEC is reportedly planning to set up re-education camps for short-sellers.
Remember that the US has an entire cable channel devoted to the Theory of Positive Thinking, namely CNBC, and a goodly portion of the financial media falls into CNBC-style cheerleading with more than occasional abandon.
Now it is true that this idea has a kernel of truth. John Maynard Keynes attributed the Depression to a change in investor “liquidity preferences,” which meant they had suddenly become very risk averse and preferred to hold cash until they felt conditions had improved, with devastating consequences for economic activity. Uncertainty can morph into a self-reinforcing downcycle. But it is one thing to use confidence boosting as a tool, quite another to regard it as a magic bullet. Merely clapping our hands all together will not cure the long-standing ailments in the economy.
Moreover, the Theory of Positive Thinking has been used, upon occasion, to suggest that conditions will only deteriorate if the public examines the financial services industry critically. It isn’t hard to see whose interests benefit from that posture.
Now it is hard to prove in a tidy way that the tone of financial press coverage had shifted suddenly, and decisively, to optimism as of early March. But many professional investors in my circle started regularly talking of cheerleading. Two Wall Street veterans, Sandy Lewis and William Cohan, weighed in on this pattern at the New York Times:
Whether at a fund-raising dinner for wealthy supporters in Beverly Hills, or at an Air Force base in Nevada, or at Charlie Rose’s table in New York City, President Obama is conducting an all-out campaign to try to make us feel a whole lot better about the economy as quickly as possible… We’re concerned that nothing has really been fixed. We’re doubly concerned that people appear to feel the worst of the storm is over — and in this, they are aided and abetted by a hugely popular and charismatic president and by the fact that the Dow has increased by 35 percent or so since Mr. Obama started to lay out his economic plans in March.
This result relied on more than mere dint of personality. A Pew Research Center study found that roughly government and businesses originated over half the economics-related news after the crisis. Obama himself “dominated” the key images and ideas. The reporting had a clear arc. The early coverage focused on the struggles over the stimulus plan and the banking industry plans, and as those faded, so did coverage of the crisis in any form. The tacit assumption was that the crisis was over, and the performance of the supposedly forward looking stock market was proof. But as anyone with a modicum of detachment could see, the market was a false positive, treating an aversion of utter disaster as an imminent return to normalcy.
The stock market has rallied over 60% from its early March lows, enabling the wounded banks to sell new equity to the public and avoid further contentious taxpayer-funded rescue measures. But the justification for the soft glove treatment of the banking classes, that what was good for them would prove to be good for everyone else, has proven to be wildly false. When the Dow levitated over 10,000, mainstream news outlets celebrated the event, with nary a mention of the continued train wreck in the real economy. As Matt Taibbi observed, “the dichotomy between the economic health of ordinary people and the traditional ‘market indicators’ is not merely a non-story, it is a sort of taboo — unmentionable in major news coverage.”
But banking boosterism has succeeded all too well, allowing Team Obama to fantasize that it can get away with creating Potemkin prosperity in lieu of waging the pitched battles needed to lay the groundwork for the real thing.
Indeed, the adoption of the Theory of Positive Thinking has virtually guaranteed that nothing will change, unless there is sufficient deterioration in the real economy or the financial markets to provide compelling counter-evidence. One example is the “paying back the TARP” charade. As the banks continued to post improved earnings, no matter how phony they were, they argued that they were now healthy and should be allowed to pay back the TARP funding that had been crucial to their survival. The reason they were so keenly motivated to do should have been reason enough to deny their request: namely, that they wanted to escape restraints on executive compensation, virtually the only demand that the government had made. But overpaying staff and keeping too little in the way of risk reserves was precisely the behavior that led to the near collapse of the financial system. Going back to business as usual would virtually guarantee more looting of major financial firm and another series of collapses.
But the Obama administration miscalculated badly. First, it bought the financiers’ false promise that massive subsidies to them would kick start a economy. But economists are now estimating that it is likely to take five years to return to pre-crisis levels of unemployment. Obama took his eye off the ball. A Democratic President’s most important responsibility is job creation. It is simply unacceptable to most Americans for Wall Street to be reaping record profits and bonuses while the rest of the country is suffering. Second, it assumed finance was too complicated to hold the attention of most citizens, and so the (non) initiatives under way now would attract comparatively little scrutiny. But as public ire remains high, the press coverage has become almost schizophrenic. Obvious public relations plants, like Ben Bernanke designation as Time Magazine’s Man of the Year (precisely when his confirmation is running into unexpected opposition) and stories in the New York Times that incorrectly reported some Goldman executive bonus cosmetics as meaningful concessions have co-existed with reports on the abject failure of Geithner’s mortgage modification program. While mainstream press coverage is still largely flattering, the desperation of the recent PR moves versus the continued public ire and recognition of where the Adminsitrations’s priorities truly lie means the fissures are becoming a gaping chasm.
So with Obama’s popularity falling sharply, it should be no surprise that the Administration is resorting to more concerted propaganda efforts. It may have no choice. Having ceded so much ground to the financiers, it has lost control of the battlefield. The banking lobbyists have perfected their tactics for blocking reform over the last two decades. Team Obama naively cast its lot with an industry that is vastly more skilled in the the dark art of the manufacture of consent than it is.
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/03/the-empire-continues-to-strike-back-team-obama-propaganda-campaign-reaches-fever-pitch.html
10 February 2010
How Brussels Is Trying to Prevent a Collapse of the Euro
Hat Tip to charles Powell.
How Brussels Is Trying to Prevent a Collapse of the Euro
By Armin Mahler, Christian Reiermann, Wolfgang Reuter and Hans-Jürgen Schlamp
The problems facing Greece are just the beginning. The countries belonging to Europe's common currency zone are drifting further and further apart, and national bankruptcies are a distinct possibility. Brussels is faced with a number of choices, none of them good.
Men like Wilhelm Nölling, former member of the German Central Bank Council, and Wilhelm Hankel, an economics professor critical of the euro, have been out of the spotlight for years. In the 1990s, they fought against the introduction of the common currency, even calling on Germany's high court to prevent the creation of the euro zone. But none of it worked.
Now both men are in demand again, and the old euro critics' beliefs are more relevant than ever. Were the skeptics right back then, when they said Europe wasn't ready for the euro zone? Were the differences too great and the politicians too weak to ensure a strict and stable course?
"The euro should really be called the Icarus," Hankel suggested back then. He predicted the currency would meet the same end as the hero of Greek legend, who paid for his dream of flight with his life.
Is the euro's high flight over now too? The news these days is alarming. It's causing a commotion on financial markets and intense discussion in capitals across Europe, as well as in Frankfurt, seat of the European Central Bank (ECB).
Brussels took a hard line with Athens last week. Greece must cut costs drastically under close European Union supervision, a sacrifice of a share of its sovereignty. Risk premiums for Greek government bonds have risen drastically, and the country has to pay higher and higher charges.
The Possibility of State Bankruptcies
Accruing debt is becoming increasingly expensive for other countries in the euro zone as well, among them Portugal and Spain. The southern members of the euro zone are especially being eyed with mistrust. Speculators are betting that bonds will continue to fall and that, eventually, the countries won't be able to borrow any more money at all. State bankruptcies are seen as a possibility.
"We've reached a point where it's possible to deal individual countries a lethal blow by downgrading their credit and boycotting their government bonds," Nölling warns.
Many are now wondering how the stronger euro-zone countries should react -- whether it's possible to help the weaker ones without jeopardizing themselves and the common currency. Furthermore, there is a risk that euro-zone members will continue to grow apart economically, a trend that could cause the monetary union to eventually collapse.
Doing nothing is not an option. In light of the national debt in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, the euro zone is in danger of transforming from a "common destiny to a common liability," Nölling says.
And so it won't be any ordinary meeting when finance ministers from the 16-euro zone countries meet for a regularly scheduled get-together in Brussels next Monday. The European Commission plans to assign each country homework to be completed in the coming years.
Cohesion and Stability
The Commission doesn't hold Greece solely responsible for the current euro woes. Experts close to Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquín Almunia say nearly every participating country is compromising the cohesion and stability of the common currency.
"The combination of decreasing competitiveness and excessive accumulation of national debt is alarming," the experts wrote in a recent report, adding that if the member countries don't get their problems under control, it will "jeopardize the cohesion of the monetary union."
Differing economic development within the euro zone and a lack of political coordination are to blame, they say. In the more than 10 years since the euro was introduced, the Commission states, it has become clear that simply controlling the development of member states' budgets is not enough. What that means, more concretely, is that the stability provisions stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty to regulate the common currency aren't working, and member states need to better coordinate their financial and economic policy measures.
That is precisely what euro skeptics have said from the beginning -- that a common currency can't work in the long run without a common economic and financial policy. The member countries' governments ignored these objections, unready to give up a further aspect of their national sovereignty.
Now politicians are facing a difficult decision: Should they continue as they have, thus potentially undermining the euro's ability to function? Or should they yield a portion of their national sovereignty to Brussels?
Without common policies, the individual countries drift further and further apart. Before the euro was introduced, exchange rate adjustments served to dispel tensions. Now the common currency zone lacks the option of adapting by revaluing currencies.
Watching with Alarm
EU officials are watching with alarm as the various euro-zone countries' competitiveness diverges sharply. The differences are especially large between countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, which are characterized by current account surpluses, and countries with high budget deficits. Along with Greece, this second category includes especially Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
These countries' competitiveness has dropped steadily since the euro was introduced. They lived on credit for years, seduced by the unusually low interest rates within the euro zone, and imported far more than they exported.
When demand collapsed in the wake of the global financial crisis, governments jumped in to fill the gap, with serious consequences -- debt skyrocketed. Spain's budget deficit was at 11 percent last year, while Greece's was nearly 13 percent. Such high debt is simply not sustainable in the long term.
In the past, the solution for these countries would have been to devalue their currency, which in turn would make imports more expensive and exports cheaper. Such a move would stimulate their national economies and strengthen their competitiveness.
Now, however, these countries must submit to a drastic therapy regime at the hands of the European Commission. They need to balance their budgets, while simultaneously creating more competition on the labor and goods markets.
The directives from Brussels translate into difficult sacrifices for the citizens of the affected countries. Employees will have to scale back wage demands for years, and civil servants will see their salaries cut. Ireland has already embarked on this path; Greece and Spain will follow.
Is Germany to Blame?
The Commission has recommended that Spain, booming until recently, radically restructure its economy. Spain must significantly shrink its bloated construction sector and focus on economic sectors with higher productivity.
France and Italy have been given homework assignments of their own. Both countries are being asked to apply austerity packages and increase labor-market flexibility. France must also get its significant welfare and unemployment expenses under control.
Resentment is growing in the countries most directly affected. But that frustration is not directed, as might be expected, toward the Commission. Instead, it is increasingly surplus countries coming under fire -- with Germany at the forefront.
Representatives from Spain and Portugal especially -- but also from France -- hold Germany accountable for their current woes. They aren't alone in that opinion either. "The Greek crisis has German roots," says Heiner Flassbeck, chief economist at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in Geneva. It was German wage dumping that got the country's European neighbors in trouble, he says.
At Its Neighbors' Expense
EU officials don't phrase it quite so strongly, but they still accuse Germany more than any other country of gaining advantages for itself at its neighbors' expense, using its policy of low wages to make German products increasingly attractive relative to those from other countries.
As a precautionary measure, officials at Berlin's Finance Ministry have gathered arguments that Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble can put forward in the country's defense. Germany's position is that the countries now in crisis are themselves at fault for their situation. They lived beyond their means for years, the German government says, financing their economic boom on credit. Now the financial crisis has revealed their weaknesses.
Germany didn't have it easy with the euro in the beginning either, continues the argument, because the country wasn't competitive compared to other member countries -- but it regained its strength with a great deal of trouble and effort, through reforms.
German officials point to the fact that the country made its labor market more flexible through the Hartz package of welfare reforms and say that state finances are more stable than before, despite the crisis. They add that taking this same path would lead the currently troubled countries out of the crisis. And, they continue, the federal government is not responsible for lagging wage growth because, in Germany, salaries and wages are negotiated between employers and unions rather than being imposed by the government.
The German government also claims no responsibility for the country's export surplus. German firms are competitive not because of government policy, it says, but because of entrepreneurial decisions and the preferences of customers around the world.
Create More Competition
When this debate flared up recently within the euro-zone countries, Schäuble received support from the top for his position. The southern members of the euro zone shouldn't be ungrateful, warned ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet. After all, he reasons, Germany funded the deficits with its surpluses. Nonetheless, the Commission called on Germany to make further changes as well. The country should boost domestic demand, increase investment in infrastructure and create more competition in the service sector.
The Commission believes the currency union can exist in the long term only if member countries' governments implement reforms and coordinate their economic policies. Schäuble's experts agree. They are proposing -- partly with an eye toward mollifying France -- a common German-French initiative.
Both countries' governments should work toward better coordination, the German financial experts say. Merely monitoring deficits has turned out to be inadequate. In the future, they suggest, euro-zone governments should also focus on combating differing inflation rates and step in early when capital bubbles develop.
France, no doubt, would gladly accept such a proposal. Paris, after all, has long called for Europe-wide financial governance. Until now it was Germany that opposed the idea.
The euro-zone governments have started to rethink their positions, but will action necessarily follow? The past never lacked in good intentions either, but political calculation always won out in the end. How else would Greece have managed to become a member of the common currency zone? Why else would Brussels stand by for so long without taking action? It was far from secret that Greece had been cooking its books for years.
Financial Trickery
Back in the fall of 2004, Eurostat, the EU body in charge of statistics, calculated that Greece's officially announced debts of between 1.4 percent and 2.0 percent of gross domestic product between 2000 and 2003 were incorrect. In reality, the amount was nearly three times as high, falling between 3.7 percent and 4.6 percent. The statisticians surmised that Athens had whitewashed its finances in previous years, too. Greece, in fact, would never have met the conditions for membership in the common currency without such trickery.
But the country was not immediately banned from the euro zone, nor were other sanctions imposed. Instead, member countries discussed how the statistics could be improved and made more accurate. Not much emerged from all the talk.
Outgoing European Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry Günter Verheugen remembers all too well that, for a long time, the problem with Greece was simply not something that was talked about. He finds it hard to believe that this "disproportionate regard" for Greece had nothing to do with that fact that conservative allies of European Commission President José Manuel Barroso governed in Athens for five years.
Not until last fall's elections brought Greece's socialist opposition to power did new data arrive from Athens -- and new questions and accusations from Brussels.
The Greek parliament and government are now virtually stripped of power. They're not allowed to decide on any new expenditures without EU approval. Finance Minister Giorgos Papakonstantinou is required to report every four weeks on progress made in budget restructuring.
An EU Protectorate
Brussels, not Athens, now controls whether and how the austerity program takes effect. If "detailed and ongoing inspection" shows that the actual results fall short of those predicted, Almunia says, then Brussels' watchdogs will demand additional measures. There were even calls at the European Parliament last week to send a special EU representative with extensive authority to Greece. The small country has become little more than an EU protectorate.
The EU Commission and the euro-zone leaders hope these compulsory measures will steady markets. They also hope Greek unions and associations, from farmers to taxi drivers, won't mobilize against the reduction in the country's standard of living that will accompany these new measures.
German Finance Minister Schäuble and German Federal Bank President Axel Weber rule out giving aid to the struggling country. Indeed, EU treaties strictly forbid any such aid. The message is that Greece must help itself.
As a precautionary measure, though, both German officials, along with their colleagues in other EU countries, are keeping open the possibility of lending a hand anyway. The EU can't afford for a member state to go bankrupt, either politically or economically.
Out of the Question
The experts always debate the same possibilities. The first would be a common euro-zone bond, which would be placed at Greece's disposal. The advantages for Greece are obvious -- the country would receive funds more cheaply than it currently does because the euro zone as a whole wouldn't have to pay as high a risk premium as Greece alone does. The disadvantage is that countries with good credit, like Germany, would have to pay higher interest rates. Consequently, the German government insists that such a loan is out of the question.
An alternative would be bilateral financial aid. Solvent countries, such as Germany, would take out loans on the financial market at good rates and pass these on to Greece. But euro-zone governments are also reluctant to take this path.
The last option is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which could use its resources to help Greece out of its credit crunch. It would likely impose much stricter conditions on its aid money than the EU would. But the IMF's involvement would also mean a loss of face for the entire euro zone and a triumph for the Washington-based institution, which was always skeptical of the euro.
If Greece doesn't stabilize in the coming weeks, the euro-zone's leaders will be left facing a choice between a rock and a hard place, with the third option being even worse.
Translated from the German by Ella Ornstein
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,druck-676507,00.html
How Brussels Is Trying to Prevent a Collapse of the Euro
By Armin Mahler, Christian Reiermann, Wolfgang Reuter and Hans-Jürgen Schlamp
The problems facing Greece are just the beginning. The countries belonging to Europe's common currency zone are drifting further and further apart, and national bankruptcies are a distinct possibility. Brussels is faced with a number of choices, none of them good.
Men like Wilhelm Nölling, former member of the German Central Bank Council, and Wilhelm Hankel, an economics professor critical of the euro, have been out of the spotlight for years. In the 1990s, they fought against the introduction of the common currency, even calling on Germany's high court to prevent the creation of the euro zone. But none of it worked.
Now both men are in demand again, and the old euro critics' beliefs are more relevant than ever. Were the skeptics right back then, when they said Europe wasn't ready for the euro zone? Were the differences too great and the politicians too weak to ensure a strict and stable course?
"The euro should really be called the Icarus," Hankel suggested back then. He predicted the currency would meet the same end as the hero of Greek legend, who paid for his dream of flight with his life.
Is the euro's high flight over now too? The news these days is alarming. It's causing a commotion on financial markets and intense discussion in capitals across Europe, as well as in Frankfurt, seat of the European Central Bank (ECB).
Brussels took a hard line with Athens last week. Greece must cut costs drastically under close European Union supervision, a sacrifice of a share of its sovereignty. Risk premiums for Greek government bonds have risen drastically, and the country has to pay higher and higher charges.
The Possibility of State Bankruptcies
Accruing debt is becoming increasingly expensive for other countries in the euro zone as well, among them Portugal and Spain. The southern members of the euro zone are especially being eyed with mistrust. Speculators are betting that bonds will continue to fall and that, eventually, the countries won't be able to borrow any more money at all. State bankruptcies are seen as a possibility.
"We've reached a point where it's possible to deal individual countries a lethal blow by downgrading their credit and boycotting their government bonds," Nölling warns.
Many are now wondering how the stronger euro-zone countries should react -- whether it's possible to help the weaker ones without jeopardizing themselves and the common currency. Furthermore, there is a risk that euro-zone members will continue to grow apart economically, a trend that could cause the monetary union to eventually collapse.
Doing nothing is not an option. In light of the national debt in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, the euro zone is in danger of transforming from a "common destiny to a common liability," Nölling says.
And so it won't be any ordinary meeting when finance ministers from the 16-euro zone countries meet for a regularly scheduled get-together in Brussels next Monday. The European Commission plans to assign each country homework to be completed in the coming years.
Cohesion and Stability
The Commission doesn't hold Greece solely responsible for the current euro woes. Experts close to Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquín Almunia say nearly every participating country is compromising the cohesion and stability of the common currency.
"The combination of decreasing competitiveness and excessive accumulation of national debt is alarming," the experts wrote in a recent report, adding that if the member countries don't get their problems under control, it will "jeopardize the cohesion of the monetary union."
Differing economic development within the euro zone and a lack of political coordination are to blame, they say. In the more than 10 years since the euro was introduced, the Commission states, it has become clear that simply controlling the development of member states' budgets is not enough. What that means, more concretely, is that the stability provisions stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty to regulate the common currency aren't working, and member states need to better coordinate their financial and economic policy measures.
That is precisely what euro skeptics have said from the beginning -- that a common currency can't work in the long run without a common economic and financial policy. The member countries' governments ignored these objections, unready to give up a further aspect of their national sovereignty.
Now politicians are facing a difficult decision: Should they continue as they have, thus potentially undermining the euro's ability to function? Or should they yield a portion of their national sovereignty to Brussels?
Without common policies, the individual countries drift further and further apart. Before the euro was introduced, exchange rate adjustments served to dispel tensions. Now the common currency zone lacks the option of adapting by revaluing currencies.
Watching with Alarm
EU officials are watching with alarm as the various euro-zone countries' competitiveness diverges sharply. The differences are especially large between countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, which are characterized by current account surpluses, and countries with high budget deficits. Along with Greece, this second category includes especially Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
These countries' competitiveness has dropped steadily since the euro was introduced. They lived on credit for years, seduced by the unusually low interest rates within the euro zone, and imported far more than they exported.
When demand collapsed in the wake of the global financial crisis, governments jumped in to fill the gap, with serious consequences -- debt skyrocketed. Spain's budget deficit was at 11 percent last year, while Greece's was nearly 13 percent. Such high debt is simply not sustainable in the long term.
In the past, the solution for these countries would have been to devalue their currency, which in turn would make imports more expensive and exports cheaper. Such a move would stimulate their national economies and strengthen their competitiveness.
Now, however, these countries must submit to a drastic therapy regime at the hands of the European Commission. They need to balance their budgets, while simultaneously creating more competition on the labor and goods markets.
The directives from Brussels translate into difficult sacrifices for the citizens of the affected countries. Employees will have to scale back wage demands for years, and civil servants will see their salaries cut. Ireland has already embarked on this path; Greece and Spain will follow.
Is Germany to Blame?
The Commission has recommended that Spain, booming until recently, radically restructure its economy. Spain must significantly shrink its bloated construction sector and focus on economic sectors with higher productivity.
France and Italy have been given homework assignments of their own. Both countries are being asked to apply austerity packages and increase labor-market flexibility. France must also get its significant welfare and unemployment expenses under control.
Resentment is growing in the countries most directly affected. But that frustration is not directed, as might be expected, toward the Commission. Instead, it is increasingly surplus countries coming under fire -- with Germany at the forefront.
Representatives from Spain and Portugal especially -- but also from France -- hold Germany accountable for their current woes. They aren't alone in that opinion either. "The Greek crisis has German roots," says Heiner Flassbeck, chief economist at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in Geneva. It was German wage dumping that got the country's European neighbors in trouble, he says.
At Its Neighbors' Expense
EU officials don't phrase it quite so strongly, but they still accuse Germany more than any other country of gaining advantages for itself at its neighbors' expense, using its policy of low wages to make German products increasingly attractive relative to those from other countries.
As a precautionary measure, officials at Berlin's Finance Ministry have gathered arguments that Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble can put forward in the country's defense. Germany's position is that the countries now in crisis are themselves at fault for their situation. They lived beyond their means for years, the German government says, financing their economic boom on credit. Now the financial crisis has revealed their weaknesses.
Germany didn't have it easy with the euro in the beginning either, continues the argument, because the country wasn't competitive compared to other member countries -- but it regained its strength with a great deal of trouble and effort, through reforms.
German officials point to the fact that the country made its labor market more flexible through the Hartz package of welfare reforms and say that state finances are more stable than before, despite the crisis. They add that taking this same path would lead the currently troubled countries out of the crisis. And, they continue, the federal government is not responsible for lagging wage growth because, in Germany, salaries and wages are negotiated between employers and unions rather than being imposed by the government.
The German government also claims no responsibility for the country's export surplus. German firms are competitive not because of government policy, it says, but because of entrepreneurial decisions and the preferences of customers around the world.
Create More Competition
When this debate flared up recently within the euro-zone countries, Schäuble received support from the top for his position. The southern members of the euro zone shouldn't be ungrateful, warned ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet. After all, he reasons, Germany funded the deficits with its surpluses. Nonetheless, the Commission called on Germany to make further changes as well. The country should boost domestic demand, increase investment in infrastructure and create more competition in the service sector.
The Commission believes the currency union can exist in the long term only if member countries' governments implement reforms and coordinate their economic policies. Schäuble's experts agree. They are proposing -- partly with an eye toward mollifying France -- a common German-French initiative.
Both countries' governments should work toward better coordination, the German financial experts say. Merely monitoring deficits has turned out to be inadequate. In the future, they suggest, euro-zone governments should also focus on combating differing inflation rates and step in early when capital bubbles develop.
France, no doubt, would gladly accept such a proposal. Paris, after all, has long called for Europe-wide financial governance. Until now it was Germany that opposed the idea.
The euro-zone governments have started to rethink their positions, but will action necessarily follow? The past never lacked in good intentions either, but political calculation always won out in the end. How else would Greece have managed to become a member of the common currency zone? Why else would Brussels stand by for so long without taking action? It was far from secret that Greece had been cooking its books for years.
Financial Trickery
Back in the fall of 2004, Eurostat, the EU body in charge of statistics, calculated that Greece's officially announced debts of between 1.4 percent and 2.0 percent of gross domestic product between 2000 and 2003 were incorrect. In reality, the amount was nearly three times as high, falling between 3.7 percent and 4.6 percent. The statisticians surmised that Athens had whitewashed its finances in previous years, too. Greece, in fact, would never have met the conditions for membership in the common currency without such trickery.
But the country was not immediately banned from the euro zone, nor were other sanctions imposed. Instead, member countries discussed how the statistics could be improved and made more accurate. Not much emerged from all the talk.
Outgoing European Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry Günter Verheugen remembers all too well that, for a long time, the problem with Greece was simply not something that was talked about. He finds it hard to believe that this "disproportionate regard" for Greece had nothing to do with that fact that conservative allies of European Commission President José Manuel Barroso governed in Athens for five years.
Not until last fall's elections brought Greece's socialist opposition to power did new data arrive from Athens -- and new questions and accusations from Brussels.
The Greek parliament and government are now virtually stripped of power. They're not allowed to decide on any new expenditures without EU approval. Finance Minister Giorgos Papakonstantinou is required to report every four weeks on progress made in budget restructuring.
An EU Protectorate
Brussels, not Athens, now controls whether and how the austerity program takes effect. If "detailed and ongoing inspection" shows that the actual results fall short of those predicted, Almunia says, then Brussels' watchdogs will demand additional measures. There were even calls at the European Parliament last week to send a special EU representative with extensive authority to Greece. The small country has become little more than an EU protectorate.
The EU Commission and the euro-zone leaders hope these compulsory measures will steady markets. They also hope Greek unions and associations, from farmers to taxi drivers, won't mobilize against the reduction in the country's standard of living that will accompany these new measures.
German Finance Minister Schäuble and German Federal Bank President Axel Weber rule out giving aid to the struggling country. Indeed, EU treaties strictly forbid any such aid. The message is that Greece must help itself.
As a precautionary measure, though, both German officials, along with their colleagues in other EU countries, are keeping open the possibility of lending a hand anyway. The EU can't afford for a member state to go bankrupt, either politically or economically.
Out of the Question
The experts always debate the same possibilities. The first would be a common euro-zone bond, which would be placed at Greece's disposal. The advantages for Greece are obvious -- the country would receive funds more cheaply than it currently does because the euro zone as a whole wouldn't have to pay as high a risk premium as Greece alone does. The disadvantage is that countries with good credit, like Germany, would have to pay higher interest rates. Consequently, the German government insists that such a loan is out of the question.
An alternative would be bilateral financial aid. Solvent countries, such as Germany, would take out loans on the financial market at good rates and pass these on to Greece. But euro-zone governments are also reluctant to take this path.
The last option is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which could use its resources to help Greece out of its credit crunch. It would likely impose much stricter conditions on its aid money than the EU would. But the IMF's involvement would also mean a loss of face for the entire euro zone and a triumph for the Washington-based institution, which was always skeptical of the euro.
If Greece doesn't stabilize in the coming weeks, the euro-zone's leaders will be left facing a choice between a rock and a hard place, with the third option being even worse.
Translated from the German by Ella Ornstein
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,druck-676507,00.html
4 February 2010
Radical Shifts Take Hold in U.S. Manufacturing
America's industrial base is undergoing its most radical restructuring in decades as manufacturers rethink their businesses in the wake of the recession.
From Dow Chemical Co. to Intel Corp., iconic companies are telling stories of wrenching change -- both contraction and recovery -- as they report their earnings for 2009.
Dow Chemical said Tuesday it is aiming to shed some $2 billion worth of basic-chemical factories and other assets this year as it moves into more-profitable specialty chemicals. Appliance maker Whirlpool Corp. said it cut about a tenth of its capacity in 2009 as it struggled with a 9.6% drop in sales. Intel, by contrast, is investing billions of dollars in its U.S. plants as demand for computer gear recovers.
"We are emerging from one of the most challenging economic environments we've seen in decades," said Whirlpool Chief Executive Jeff Fettig, on a conference call Tuesday.
The latest moves are accelerating the U.S. manufacturing economy's longer-term shrinkage, as well as its shift away from heavy sectors, such as automobiles and basic chemicals, toward higher-tech products like super-fast computer chips. In some cases, as with auto makers, companies are stripping down to adjust to diminished U.S. demand or investing in smaller, more-efficient facilities. In other cases, as with chemical makers, they are relocating labor-intensive operations to countries where wages are cheaper.
During 2009, the nation's capacity to produce motor vehicles and chemicals fell 4.4% and 1.7%, respectively, the largest such declines since at least 1949, according to Federal Reserve estimates. Its capacity to produce semiconductors, by contrast, grew an estimated 10.4%. Overall, U.S. industrial capacity fell by an estimated 1% in 2009, the largest year-to-year decline on record, while goods-producing businesses shed more than 2.3 million jobs.
As a result, economists expect unemployment to remain high for many years as millions of American workers in the hardest-hit sectors struggle to find new jobs. And while some economists see the restructuring as necessary to make U.S. industry leaner and more profitable, others worry that the sheer scope of the cutbacks could doom companies that ought to survive.
"The earthquake that we felt was so big, and the aftershocks so strong, that we could easily destroy perfectly good manufacturers that are crucial in the supply chain," such as auto-parts makers that supply the entire industry, said Diane Swonk, chief economist at Mesirow Financial in Chicago. "That's the great danger, and it's still a risk."
The restructuring now under way offers insights into what kinds of goods the U.S. should produce, and in what volumes. In industries such as automobiles, housing and appliances, the move to shed capacity is at least partly correcting distortions that built up over many years of easy credit and profligate consumer spending. Now, companies are adjusting to lower demand.
Whirpool's Mr. Fettig, for example, said his company will "take out more" capacity in 2010, after shutting down some five million units in yearly capacity over the past 15 months -- including a factory in Evansville, Ind., that produced refrigerators and ice makers. Ford Motor Co. Chief Executive Alan Mulally forecast total U.S. auto and truck sales at between 11.5 million and 12.5 million units in 2010, far below their recent peak of 17.5 million in 2005.
For chemical makers, the recession has intensified an exodus from the U.S. that has been going on for at least a decade, amid rising energy costs, environmental concerns and growing demand in developing countries. In the past year, Dow Chemical, has closed, or announced plans to close, six plants producing ethylene-related chemicals in Louisiana and Texas.
"The chemical industry is leaving the United States, and it won't be back," said Peter Huntsman, chief executive of Texas-based chemical giant Huntsman Corp., which plans to report fourth-quarter earnings on Feb 19. "When demand picks back up, they'll build new capacity overseas -- in the Middle East, Singapore and China."
Huntsman, he said, is expanding its capacity in the Mideast and China to make chemicals used in products like insulation and high-speed railway construction. It now has about a third of its capacity in the U.S., down from more than four-fifths a decade ago. That capacity is increasingly focused on producing more-specialized chemicals, such as epoxies that can be used in building airplanes.
The situation is different for semiconductor makers, which saw U.S. demand recover sharply as computer makers scrambled to catch up with a spurt of business investment toward the end of 2009. Intel, which produces chips in Chandler, Ariz., Rio Rancho, N.M. and Hillsboro, Ore., boosted its capital investments to $1.08 billion in the fourth quarter, up 15% from the previous quarter and part of a two-year, $7 billion program to upgrade its U.S. plants.
A large chunk of semiconductor production takes place abroad, but many companies still prefer to produce in the U.S., particularly if their manufacturing entails little human labor or is highly complex. Being close to the U.S.-based design centers of major chip users like computer maker Dell Inc. and consumer-electronics maker Apple Inc. also can be an advantage.
"This is a kind of manufacturing that will make sense to do in the U.S. for a long time to come," said Tim Peddecord, chief executive of privately held memory-module producer Avant Technology, which recently opened a new 50,000-square-foot plant in Pflugerville, Texas. The new plant will boost the company's capacity to 800,000 modules a month from 500,000.
Mr. Peddecord said his company is bulking up after a shakeout that drove many rivals out of business. Manufacturing in the U.S., he said, allows Avant to turn around U.S. orders in 24 hours, an advantage in an industry where demand is volatile and clients try to keep inventories low. In addition, the reduced freight costs, compared with shipping goods from China, can offset the added cost of U.S. labor, since labor accounts for less than a hundredth of his average sales price.
-- Bob Tita contributed to this article.
From Dow Chemical Co. to Intel Corp., iconic companies are telling stories of wrenching change -- both contraction and recovery -- as they report their earnings for 2009.
Dow Chemical said Tuesday it is aiming to shed some $2 billion worth of basic-chemical factories and other assets this year as it moves into more-profitable specialty chemicals. Appliance maker Whirlpool Corp. said it cut about a tenth of its capacity in 2009 as it struggled with a 9.6% drop in sales. Intel, by contrast, is investing billions of dollars in its U.S. plants as demand for computer gear recovers.
"We are emerging from one of the most challenging economic environments we've seen in decades," said Whirlpool Chief Executive Jeff Fettig, on a conference call Tuesday.
The latest moves are accelerating the U.S. manufacturing economy's longer-term shrinkage, as well as its shift away from heavy sectors, such as automobiles and basic chemicals, toward higher-tech products like super-fast computer chips. In some cases, as with auto makers, companies are stripping down to adjust to diminished U.S. demand or investing in smaller, more-efficient facilities. In other cases, as with chemical makers, they are relocating labor-intensive operations to countries where wages are cheaper.
During 2009, the nation's capacity to produce motor vehicles and chemicals fell 4.4% and 1.7%, respectively, the largest such declines since at least 1949, according to Federal Reserve estimates. Its capacity to produce semiconductors, by contrast, grew an estimated 10.4%. Overall, U.S. industrial capacity fell by an estimated 1% in 2009, the largest year-to-year decline on record, while goods-producing businesses shed more than 2.3 million jobs.
As a result, economists expect unemployment to remain high for many years as millions of American workers in the hardest-hit sectors struggle to find new jobs. And while some economists see the restructuring as necessary to make U.S. industry leaner and more profitable, others worry that the sheer scope of the cutbacks could doom companies that ought to survive.
"The earthquake that we felt was so big, and the aftershocks so strong, that we could easily destroy perfectly good manufacturers that are crucial in the supply chain," such as auto-parts makers that supply the entire industry, said Diane Swonk, chief economist at Mesirow Financial in Chicago. "That's the great danger, and it's still a risk."
The restructuring now under way offers insights into what kinds of goods the U.S. should produce, and in what volumes. In industries such as automobiles, housing and appliances, the move to shed capacity is at least partly correcting distortions that built up over many years of easy credit and profligate consumer spending. Now, companies are adjusting to lower demand.
Whirpool's Mr. Fettig, for example, said his company will "take out more" capacity in 2010, after shutting down some five million units in yearly capacity over the past 15 months -- including a factory in Evansville, Ind., that produced refrigerators and ice makers. Ford Motor Co. Chief Executive Alan Mulally forecast total U.S. auto and truck sales at between 11.5 million and 12.5 million units in 2010, far below their recent peak of 17.5 million in 2005.
For chemical makers, the recession has intensified an exodus from the U.S. that has been going on for at least a decade, amid rising energy costs, environmental concerns and growing demand in developing countries. In the past year, Dow Chemical, has closed, or announced plans to close, six plants producing ethylene-related chemicals in Louisiana and Texas.
"The chemical industry is leaving the United States, and it won't be back," said Peter Huntsman, chief executive of Texas-based chemical giant Huntsman Corp., which plans to report fourth-quarter earnings on Feb 19. "When demand picks back up, they'll build new capacity overseas -- in the Middle East, Singapore and China."
Huntsman, he said, is expanding its capacity in the Mideast and China to make chemicals used in products like insulation and high-speed railway construction. It now has about a third of its capacity in the U.S., down from more than four-fifths a decade ago. That capacity is increasingly focused on producing more-specialized chemicals, such as epoxies that can be used in building airplanes.
The situation is different for semiconductor makers, which saw U.S. demand recover sharply as computer makers scrambled to catch up with a spurt of business investment toward the end of 2009. Intel, which produces chips in Chandler, Ariz., Rio Rancho, N.M. and Hillsboro, Ore., boosted its capital investments to $1.08 billion in the fourth quarter, up 15% from the previous quarter and part of a two-year, $7 billion program to upgrade its U.S. plants.
A large chunk of semiconductor production takes place abroad, but many companies still prefer to produce in the U.S., particularly if their manufacturing entails little human labor or is highly complex. Being close to the U.S.-based design centers of major chip users like computer maker Dell Inc. and consumer-electronics maker Apple Inc. also can be an advantage.
"This is a kind of manufacturing that will make sense to do in the U.S. for a long time to come," said Tim Peddecord, chief executive of privately held memory-module producer Avant Technology, which recently opened a new 50,000-square-foot plant in Pflugerville, Texas. The new plant will boost the company's capacity to 800,000 modules a month from 500,000.
Mr. Peddecord said his company is bulking up after a shakeout that drove many rivals out of business. Manufacturing in the U.S., he said, allows Avant to turn around U.S. orders in 24 hours, an advantage in an industry where demand is volatile and clients try to keep inventories low. In addition, the reduced freight costs, compared with shipping goods from China, can offset the added cost of U.S. labor, since labor accounts for less than a hundredth of his average sales price.
-- Bob Tita contributed to this article.
17 January 2010
Wall Street Thinks You Are a Jealous Little Malcontent
Jesse nails it.
After thinking it over, and listening carefully to the discussion on financial television and the news today in reaction to the proposal for a special bank tax, I can come to no other conclusion. Wall Street thinks that the American people, who came to their aid after the collapse of a monumental and most likely fraudulent bubble, are jealous little malcontents.
They believe that the public wants to limit the bonuses paid by Wall Street because they are just jealous. Or stupid and petty. At least they wish to leave their viewers and readers with that impression.
That's the long and short of it. You, average working stiff and retiree, are just a jealous little malcontent who envies the great success of the financial sector, much like some foreign agitator who attacks the West because they envy its freedoms.
And you are seeking retribution, revenge. That is what this bank tax is all about, retribution.
An economics professor just admitted that he too feels a need for retribution at times, as an emotional response, but being a more educated fellow he sees how negative that is. Instead he proposes that if we must have some bank tax that we divert the funds received into a bank holding fund, a kind of a TARP II, to pay for future financial disasters. Forget about reform. The banks are too smart for it.
I would not call it jealousy or a need for retribution.
I would say that the people as a whole have a sense of right and wrong, a sense of fairness and balance, a sense of outrage that is being held in check by patience, a remarkable forebearance, but wish to see justice done for themselves and their children, because it is the right thing, the only practical thing, to do.
But I can also understand why the Wall Street Bankers and the financial elite would see this as jealousy and envy.
Sociopath: (so⋅ci⋅o⋅path) a person, as a psychopathic personality, whose behavior is antisocial and who lacks a sense of moral responsibility or social conscience.
The most amoral, pathological son of a bitch I ever worked with, who by the way was enormously charismatic and charming when on public display, was a big tech entrepreneur from the Boston area. When his grandiose schemes started to fall apart, as much from the impracticality of his ego as from the fact that no one would trust him any longer, having senselessly betrayed everyone including his closest friends, he said to me in all the sincerity he could muster, "I am failing because people want to drag me down to their level."
And I can assure you, the halls of too many corporations and big government are infested with such power needing, neurotically driven personality types.
This is what renders any notion of self-regulation and efficient markets the romantic fantasy that they are. People are not uniformly rational and moderate in their behaviour. All people are not possessed of a natural goodness and a self-effacing moderation.
This is what makes the rule of law, the Constitution, so indispensable.
This is not to say that their enablers, the financial demimonde, are sociopaths. They are doing what enablers too often do; go along to get along, say and do whatever is required for pay. Camp followers, as they used to be called.
And as for what happened, well, as one well-heeled, successful young manager advised, "Older people are easy to handle. You just scare them. Then they do whatever they are told."
In his mind 'older' was anyone over 40. And as for the rest of the people, well, you just play on their other emotions like hatred and greed and prejudice. He saw absolutely nothing wrong with this, and was so straightfoward and unabashed in this view that it made my blood run cold, because it was clear that he was not alone in this perspective. And it is obvious that Tim, Ben, and Hank did exactly this, and it worked.
And so now they hit the theme that if the banks are taxed, they will just find ways around the restrictions, and keep doing what they wish to do with bonuses and speculation, but may stop lending to the people for their commercial and personal needs, to punish them.
So there you have it. You are a jealous, envious, little nobody desiring retribution from your betters in the land that your fathers fought and died for.
And not only that, but many of your middle class fellows would agree. They would not think this about themselves of course, but about you, the other. The lazy stupid one. There is no easier way to elevate yourself in your own mind than to just put down, impoverish, the other.
And the banks and their enablers in the government will use this, and shape your thinking with it.
You cannot say that you have not been warned. Many times. Money is power, and in a free republic power must be restrained with checks and balances, with a continuing effort and vigilance.
"Banks have done more injury to the religion, morality, tranquility, prosperity, and even wealth of the nation than they can have done or ever will do good." John Adams
There can be no easy truce, no peaceful resolution of the current crisis, until the banks are restrained, and the political and financial systems are reformed, and balance is restored to the economy.
"I believe that it is better to tell the truth than to lie. I believe that it is better to be free than to be a slave. And I believe that it is better to know than be ignorant." H. L. Mencken
Never allow yourself to succumb to hatred and a desire for retribution rather than justice. It is always wrong to hate, because the ultimate tragedy is that we become what we hate, we take the shape of that which possesses our passions, thoughts and attention, we adopt its methods and distortions, even if as in a mirror, until we too are misshapen and lost. And that is the real tragedy, how the whole world can descend into a whirlpool of madness, and become blind. So let us appeal to the law, and to justice, at every turn.
Mr. Obama. Reform these banks.
http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/01/wall-street-thinks-you-are-envious-and.html
After thinking it over, and listening carefully to the discussion on financial television and the news today in reaction to the proposal for a special bank tax, I can come to no other conclusion. Wall Street thinks that the American people, who came to their aid after the collapse of a monumental and most likely fraudulent bubble, are jealous little malcontents.
They believe that the public wants to limit the bonuses paid by Wall Street because they are just jealous. Or stupid and petty. At least they wish to leave their viewers and readers with that impression.
That's the long and short of it. You, average working stiff and retiree, are just a jealous little malcontent who envies the great success of the financial sector, much like some foreign agitator who attacks the West because they envy its freedoms.
And you are seeking retribution, revenge. That is what this bank tax is all about, retribution.
An economics professor just admitted that he too feels a need for retribution at times, as an emotional response, but being a more educated fellow he sees how negative that is. Instead he proposes that if we must have some bank tax that we divert the funds received into a bank holding fund, a kind of a TARP II, to pay for future financial disasters. Forget about reform. The banks are too smart for it.
I would not call it jealousy or a need for retribution.
I would say that the people as a whole have a sense of right and wrong, a sense of fairness and balance, a sense of outrage that is being held in check by patience, a remarkable forebearance, but wish to see justice done for themselves and their children, because it is the right thing, the only practical thing, to do.
But I can also understand why the Wall Street Bankers and the financial elite would see this as jealousy and envy.
Sociopath: (so⋅ci⋅o⋅path) a person, as a psychopathic personality, whose behavior is antisocial and who lacks a sense of moral responsibility or social conscience.
The most amoral, pathological son of a bitch I ever worked with, who by the way was enormously charismatic and charming when on public display, was a big tech entrepreneur from the Boston area. When his grandiose schemes started to fall apart, as much from the impracticality of his ego as from the fact that no one would trust him any longer, having senselessly betrayed everyone including his closest friends, he said to me in all the sincerity he could muster, "I am failing because people want to drag me down to their level."
And I can assure you, the halls of too many corporations and big government are infested with such power needing, neurotically driven personality types.
This is what renders any notion of self-regulation and efficient markets the romantic fantasy that they are. People are not uniformly rational and moderate in their behaviour. All people are not possessed of a natural goodness and a self-effacing moderation.
This is what makes the rule of law, the Constitution, so indispensable.
This is not to say that their enablers, the financial demimonde, are sociopaths. They are doing what enablers too often do; go along to get along, say and do whatever is required for pay. Camp followers, as they used to be called.
And as for what happened, well, as one well-heeled, successful young manager advised, "Older people are easy to handle. You just scare them. Then they do whatever they are told."
In his mind 'older' was anyone over 40. And as for the rest of the people, well, you just play on their other emotions like hatred and greed and prejudice. He saw absolutely nothing wrong with this, and was so straightfoward and unabashed in this view that it made my blood run cold, because it was clear that he was not alone in this perspective. And it is obvious that Tim, Ben, and Hank did exactly this, and it worked.
And so now they hit the theme that if the banks are taxed, they will just find ways around the restrictions, and keep doing what they wish to do with bonuses and speculation, but may stop lending to the people for their commercial and personal needs, to punish them.
So there you have it. You are a jealous, envious, little nobody desiring retribution from your betters in the land that your fathers fought and died for.
And not only that, but many of your middle class fellows would agree. They would not think this about themselves of course, but about you, the other. The lazy stupid one. There is no easier way to elevate yourself in your own mind than to just put down, impoverish, the other.
And the banks and their enablers in the government will use this, and shape your thinking with it.
You cannot say that you have not been warned. Many times. Money is power, and in a free republic power must be restrained with checks and balances, with a continuing effort and vigilance.
"Banks have done more injury to the religion, morality, tranquility, prosperity, and even wealth of the nation than they can have done or ever will do good." John Adams
There can be no easy truce, no peaceful resolution of the current crisis, until the banks are restrained, and the political and financial systems are reformed, and balance is restored to the economy.
"I believe that it is better to tell the truth than to lie. I believe that it is better to be free than to be a slave. And I believe that it is better to know than be ignorant." H. L. Mencken
Never allow yourself to succumb to hatred and a desire for retribution rather than justice. It is always wrong to hate, because the ultimate tragedy is that we become what we hate, we take the shape of that which possesses our passions, thoughts and attention, we adopt its methods and distortions, even if as in a mirror, until we too are misshapen and lost. And that is the real tragedy, how the whole world can descend into a whirlpool of madness, and become blind. So let us appeal to the law, and to justice, at every turn.
Mr. Obama. Reform these banks.
http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/01/wall-street-thinks-you-are-envious-and.html
11 January 2010
China's green energy revolution ~ NYT.
C. H. Tung, the first Chinese-appointed chief executive of Hong Kong after the handover in 1997, offered me a three-sentence summary the other day of China’s modern economic history: “China was asleep during the Industrial Revolution. She was just waking during the Information Technology Revolution. She intends to participate fully in the Green Revolution.”
I’ll say. Being in China right now I am more convinced than ever that when historians look back at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, they will say that the most important thing to happen was not the Great Recession, but China’s Green Leap Forward. The Beijing leadership clearly understands that the E.T. — Energy Technology — revolution is both a necessity and an opportunity, and they do not intend to miss it.
We, by contrast, intend to fix Afghanistan. Have a nice day.
O.K., that was a cheap shot. But here’s one that isn’t: Andy Grove, co-founder of Intel, liked to say that companies come to “strategic inflection points,” where the fundamentals of a business change and they either make the hard decision to invest in a down cycle and take a more promising trajectory or do nothing and wither. The same is true for countries.
The U.S. is at just such a strategic inflection point. We are either going to put in place a price on carbon and the right regulatory incentives to ensure that America is China’s main competitor/partner in the E.T. revolution, or we are going to gradually cede this industry to Beijing and the good jobs and energy security that would go with it.
Is President Obama going to finish health care and then put aside the pending energy legislation — and carbon pricing — that Congress has already passed in order to get through the midterms without Republicans screaming “new taxes?” Or is he going to seize this moment before the midterms — possibly his last window to put together a majority in the Senate, including some Republicans, for a price on carbon — and put in place a real U.S. engine for clean energy innovation and energy security?
I’ve been stunned to learn about the sheer volume of wind, solar, mass transit, nuclear and more efficient coal-burning projects that have sprouted in China in just the last year.
Here’s e-mail from Bill Gross, who runs eSolar, a promising California solar-thermal start-up: On Saturday, in Beijing, said Gross, he announced “the biggest solar-thermal deal ever. It’s a 2 gigawatt, $5 billion deal to build plants in China using our California-based technology. China is being even more aggressive than the U.S. We applied for a [U.S. Department of Energy] loan for a 92 megawatt project in New Mexico, and in less time than it took them to do stage 1 of the application review, China signs, approves, and is ready to begin construction this year on a 20 times bigger project!”
Yes, climate change is a concern for Beijing, but more immediately China’s leaders know that their country is in the midst of the biggest migration of people from the countryside to urban centers in the history of mankind. This is creating a surge in energy demand, which China is determined to meet with cleaner, homegrown sources so that its future economy will be less vulnerable to supply shocks and so it doesn’t pollute itself to death.
In the last year alone, so many new solar panel makers emerged in China that the price of solar power has fallen from roughly 59 cents a kilowatt hour to 16 cents, according to The Times’s bureau chief here, Keith Bradsher. Meanwhile, China last week tested the fastest bullet train in the world — 217 miles per hour — from Wuhan to Guangzhou. As Bradsher noted, China “has nearly finished the construction of a high-speed rail route from Beijing to Shanghai at a cost of $23.5 billion. Trains will cover the 700-mile route in just five hours, compared with 12 hours today. By comparison, Amtrak trains require at least 18 hours to travel a similar distance from New York to Chicago.”
China is also engaged in the world’s most rapid expansion of nuclear power. It is expected to build some 50 new nuclear reactors by 2020; the rest of the world combined might build 15.
“By the end of this decade, China will be dominating global production of the whole range of power equipment,” said Andrew Brandler, the C.E.O. of the CLP Group, Hong Kong’s largest power utility.
In the process, China is going to make clean power technologies cheaper for itself and everyone else. But even Chinese experts will tell you that it will all happen faster and more effectively if China and America work together — with the U.S. specializing in energy research and innovation, at which China is still weak, as well as in venture investing and servicing of new clean technologies, and with China specializing in mass production.
This is a strategic inflection point. It is clear that if we, America, care about our energy security, economic strength and environmental quality we need to put in place a long-term carbon price that stimulates and rewards clean power innovation. We can’t afford to be asleep with an invigorated China wide awake.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/opinion/10friedman.html
I’ll say. Being in China right now I am more convinced than ever that when historians look back at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, they will say that the most important thing to happen was not the Great Recession, but China’s Green Leap Forward. The Beijing leadership clearly understands that the E.T. — Energy Technology — revolution is both a necessity and an opportunity, and they do not intend to miss it.
We, by contrast, intend to fix Afghanistan. Have a nice day.
O.K., that was a cheap shot. But here’s one that isn’t: Andy Grove, co-founder of Intel, liked to say that companies come to “strategic inflection points,” where the fundamentals of a business change and they either make the hard decision to invest in a down cycle and take a more promising trajectory or do nothing and wither. The same is true for countries.
The U.S. is at just such a strategic inflection point. We are either going to put in place a price on carbon and the right regulatory incentives to ensure that America is China’s main competitor/partner in the E.T. revolution, or we are going to gradually cede this industry to Beijing and the good jobs and energy security that would go with it.
Is President Obama going to finish health care and then put aside the pending energy legislation — and carbon pricing — that Congress has already passed in order to get through the midterms without Republicans screaming “new taxes?” Or is he going to seize this moment before the midterms — possibly his last window to put together a majority in the Senate, including some Republicans, for a price on carbon — and put in place a real U.S. engine for clean energy innovation and energy security?
I’ve been stunned to learn about the sheer volume of wind, solar, mass transit, nuclear and more efficient coal-burning projects that have sprouted in China in just the last year.
Here’s e-mail from Bill Gross, who runs eSolar, a promising California solar-thermal start-up: On Saturday, in Beijing, said Gross, he announced “the biggest solar-thermal deal ever. It’s a 2 gigawatt, $5 billion deal to build plants in China using our California-based technology. China is being even more aggressive than the U.S. We applied for a [U.S. Department of Energy] loan for a 92 megawatt project in New Mexico, and in less time than it took them to do stage 1 of the application review, China signs, approves, and is ready to begin construction this year on a 20 times bigger project!”
Yes, climate change is a concern for Beijing, but more immediately China’s leaders know that their country is in the midst of the biggest migration of people from the countryside to urban centers in the history of mankind. This is creating a surge in energy demand, which China is determined to meet with cleaner, homegrown sources so that its future economy will be less vulnerable to supply shocks and so it doesn’t pollute itself to death.
In the last year alone, so many new solar panel makers emerged in China that the price of solar power has fallen from roughly 59 cents a kilowatt hour to 16 cents, according to The Times’s bureau chief here, Keith Bradsher. Meanwhile, China last week tested the fastest bullet train in the world — 217 miles per hour — from Wuhan to Guangzhou. As Bradsher noted, China “has nearly finished the construction of a high-speed rail route from Beijing to Shanghai at a cost of $23.5 billion. Trains will cover the 700-mile route in just five hours, compared with 12 hours today. By comparison, Amtrak trains require at least 18 hours to travel a similar distance from New York to Chicago.”
China is also engaged in the world’s most rapid expansion of nuclear power. It is expected to build some 50 new nuclear reactors by 2020; the rest of the world combined might build 15.
“By the end of this decade, China will be dominating global production of the whole range of power equipment,” said Andrew Brandler, the C.E.O. of the CLP Group, Hong Kong’s largest power utility.
In the process, China is going to make clean power technologies cheaper for itself and everyone else. But even Chinese experts will tell you that it will all happen faster and more effectively if China and America work together — with the U.S. specializing in energy research and innovation, at which China is still weak, as well as in venture investing and servicing of new clean technologies, and with China specializing in mass production.
This is a strategic inflection point. It is clear that if we, America, care about our energy security, economic strength and environmental quality we need to put in place a long-term carbon price that stimulates and rewards clean power innovation. We can’t afford to be asleep with an invigorated China wide awake.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/opinion/10friedman.html
27 December 2009
Band-aiding the zombied and ponzied corpse of western finance with QE
As everyone is engrossed by assorted groundless Christmas (and other ongoing bear market) rallies, and oblivious to the debt monsters hiding in both the closet and under the bed, Zero Hedge has decided it is about time to present the ugliest truth faced by our 'intellectual superiors' and their Wall Street henchman who succeeded in pulling off Goal #1 for 2009 - the biggest ever bonus season (forget record bonuses in 2010... in fact, scratch any bonuses next year if what is likely to transpire in the upcoming 12 months does in fact occur).
If someone asks you what happened in 2009, the answer is simple - two things. There was a huge credit and liquidity crunch, and then there was Quantitative Easing. The last is the Fed's equivalent of band-aiding a zombied and ponzied corpse, better known as the US economy. It worked for a while, but now the zombie is about to go back into critical, followed by comatose, and lastly, undead (and 401(k)-depleting) condition.
In 2009, total supply of all USD denominated fixed income, net of maturities, declined by $300 billion from $2.05 trillion to $1.75 trillion. This makes sense: the abovementioned crunches stopped the flow of credit from January until well into April, and generally firms were unwilling to demonstrate to the market how clothless they are by hitting the capital markets until well into Q2 if not Q3. What happened was a move so drastic by the Fed, that into November, the worst of the worst High Yield names were freely upsizing dividend recap deals (see CCU) - the very same greed and stupidity that brought us here. Luckily, so far securitization and CDOs have not made a dramatic entrance. They likely will, at which point it will be time to buy a one-way ticket for either our southern or northern neighbor, both of which, in the supremest of ironies, transact in a currency that will survive long after the dollar is dead and buried.
Back to the math... And here is the kicker. Accounting for securities purchased by the Fed, which effectively made the market in the Treasury, the agency and MBS arenas, but also served to "drain duration" from the broader US$ fixed income market, the stunning result is that net issuance in 2009 was only $200 billion. Take a second to digest that.
And while you are lamenting the death of private debt markets, here is precisely what the Fed, the Treasury, and all bank CEOs are doing all their best to keep hidden until they are safely on their private jets heading toward warmer climes: in 2010, the total estimated net issuance across all US$ denominated fixed income classes is expected to increase by 27%, from $1.75 trillion to $2.22 trillion. The culprit: Treasury issuance to keep funding an impossible budget. And, yes, we use the term impossible in its most technical sense. As everyone who has taken First Grade math knows, there is no way that the ludicrous deficit spending the US has embarked on makes any sense at all... none. But the administration can sure pretend it does, until everything falls apart and blaming everyone else for its fiscal imprudence is no longer an option.
Out of the $2.22 trillion in expected 2010 issuance, $200 billion will be absorbed by the Fed while QE continues through March. Then the US is on its own: $2.06 trillion will have to find non-Fed originating demand. To sum up: $200 billion in 2009; $2.1 trillion in 2010. Good luck.
As we pointed, the number one reason why 2010 is set to be a truly "interesting" year is a result of the upcoming explosion in US Treasury issuance. Fiscal 2010 gross coupon issuance is expected to hit $2.55 trillion, a $700 billion increase from 2009, which in turn was $1.1 trillion increase from 2008. For those of you needing a primer on the exponential function, click here. But wait, there is a light in the tunnel: in 2011, gross issuance is expected to decline... to $1.9 trillion.
And while things are hair-raising in "gross" country (not Bill...at least not yet), they are not much better in netville either. Net of maturities, 2010 coupon issuance will be about $1.8 trillion, a 45% increase from the $1.3 trillion in FY 2009 (and the paltry $255 billion in 2008).
Now everyone knows that the average maturity of the UST curve has become a big problem for Tim Geithner: nearly 40% of all marketable debt matures within a year (a percentage that has kept on growing). In fact, the Treasury provided guidance in its November 2009 refunding, in which it stated that it intends "to focus on increasing the average maturity" of its debt after relying heavily on Bill issuance in H2. Once again, we wish Tim the best of luck.
Why our generous best intentions to the US Treasury? Because unless the US consumer decides to forgo the purchase of the 4th sequential Kindle and buy some Treasuries (and not just any: 30 Year Bonds or bust), the presumption that the Bond printer will have the option of finding vast foreign appetite for its spewage is a very myopic one. We already know that China is a major question mark, and will aggressively be looking at pumping capital into its own economy instead of that of Uncle Sam's - at some point the return on investment in its own middle class will surpass that of funding the rapidly disappearing US middle class. That tipping point could be as soon as 2010.
As for Japan - the country has plunged into its nth consecutive deflationary period. Whether or not the finance minister announces yet another affair with the Quantitative Easing whore on any given day, depends merely on what side of the bed he wakes up on. The country will have its hands full monetizing its own sovereign issuance, let alone ours.
Lastly, the UK - well, with the country set to have zero bankers left in a few months, we don't think the traditionally third largest purchaser of US debt will be doing much purchasing any time soon.
None of this is merely speculation: October TIC data confirmed these preliminary observations. It will only become more pronounced in upcoming months.
How about that great globalization dynamo: emerging markets? Alas, they have their hands full with issuing their own record amounts of both sovereign and corporate debt as well: in 2009 gross EM debt issuance reached an astounding $217 billion, $29 billion higher than the previous record in 2007. Gross EM issuance was particularly high in the last quarter at $73 billion, with October breaking the record for the largest ever monthly gross issuance of emerging market global bonds at $38 billion (January is traditionally the busiest month of the year.) With $81 billion, 2009 was notably a record year for sovereign bonds, while gross issuance of corporate bonds amounted to $136 billion, the second highest level after that of 2007 with $155 billion.
Bottom line: everyone has major problems at home, and is more focused on the supply than the demand side of the equation.
What options does this leave for the administration? Very few, and all of them are ugly. As we stated earlier on, the options for the Fed are threefold:
Announce a new iteration of Quantitative Easing. This will be met with major disapproval across all voting classes (at least those whose residential zip codes do not start with 10xxx or 068xx), creating major headaches for Obama and the democrats which are already struggling with collapsing polls.
Prepare for a major increase in interest rates. While on the surface this would be very welcome for a Fed that keeps hinting that deflation is the biggest concern for the economy, Bernanke's complete lack of preparation from a monetary standpoint (we are surprised the Fed's $200 million reverse repos have not made the late night comedy circuit yet) to a forced interest rate increase, would likely result in runaway inflation almost overnight. The result would be a huge blow to a still deteriorating economy.
Engineer a stock market collapse. Recently investors have, rightfully, realized there is no more risk in equities, not because the assets backing the stockholder equity are actually creating greater cash flow (as we demonstrated recently, that is not the case), but simply because taxpayers have involuntarily become safekeepers for the entire stock market, due to Bernanke's forced intervention in bond and equity markets. Yet the President's Working Group is fully aware that when the time comes to hitting the "reverse" button, it will do so. Will the resultant rush into safe assets be sufficient to generate the needed endogenous demand for Treasuries is unknown. It will likely be correlated to the size of the equity market drop.
If the Fed decides on option three, we fully believe a 30% drop (or greater) in equities is very probable as the new supply/demand regime in fixed income becomes apparent. We hope mainstream media takes the ideas presented here and processes them for broader consumption as indeed the Fed is caught in a very fragile dilemma, and the sooner its hand is pushed, the less disastrous the final outcome for investors. Then again, as Eric Sprott has been pointing out for quite some time, it could very well be that the US economy has become merely one huge Ponzi, and as such, its expansion or reduction on the margin is uncontrollable. We very well may have passed into the stage where blind growth is the only alternative to a complete collapse. We hope that is not the case.
Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays to all readers.
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/brace-impact-2010-private-demand-us-fixed-income-has-increase-elevenfold-or-else
If someone asks you what happened in 2009, the answer is simple - two things. There was a huge credit and liquidity crunch, and then there was Quantitative Easing. The last is the Fed's equivalent of band-aiding a zombied and ponzied corpse, better known as the US economy. It worked for a while, but now the zombie is about to go back into critical, followed by comatose, and lastly, undead (and 401(k)-depleting) condition.
In 2009, total supply of all USD denominated fixed income, net of maturities, declined by $300 billion from $2.05 trillion to $1.75 trillion. This makes sense: the abovementioned crunches stopped the flow of credit from January until well into April, and generally firms were unwilling to demonstrate to the market how clothless they are by hitting the capital markets until well into Q2 if not Q3. What happened was a move so drastic by the Fed, that into November, the worst of the worst High Yield names were freely upsizing dividend recap deals (see CCU) - the very same greed and stupidity that brought us here. Luckily, so far securitization and CDOs have not made a dramatic entrance. They likely will, at which point it will be time to buy a one-way ticket for either our southern or northern neighbor, both of which, in the supremest of ironies, transact in a currency that will survive long after the dollar is dead and buried.
Back to the math... And here is the kicker. Accounting for securities purchased by the Fed, which effectively made the market in the Treasury, the agency and MBS arenas, but also served to "drain duration" from the broader US$ fixed income market, the stunning result is that net issuance in 2009 was only $200 billion. Take a second to digest that.
And while you are lamenting the death of private debt markets, here is precisely what the Fed, the Treasury, and all bank CEOs are doing all their best to keep hidden until they are safely on their private jets heading toward warmer climes: in 2010, the total estimated net issuance across all US$ denominated fixed income classes is expected to increase by 27%, from $1.75 trillion to $2.22 trillion. The culprit: Treasury issuance to keep funding an impossible budget. And, yes, we use the term impossible in its most technical sense. As everyone who has taken First Grade math knows, there is no way that the ludicrous deficit spending the US has embarked on makes any sense at all... none. But the administration can sure pretend it does, until everything falls apart and blaming everyone else for its fiscal imprudence is no longer an option.
Out of the $2.22 trillion in expected 2010 issuance, $200 billion will be absorbed by the Fed while QE continues through March. Then the US is on its own: $2.06 trillion will have to find non-Fed originating demand. To sum up: $200 billion in 2009; $2.1 trillion in 2010. Good luck.
As we pointed, the number one reason why 2010 is set to be a truly "interesting" year is a result of the upcoming explosion in US Treasury issuance. Fiscal 2010 gross coupon issuance is expected to hit $2.55 trillion, a $700 billion increase from 2009, which in turn was $1.1 trillion increase from 2008. For those of you needing a primer on the exponential function, click here. But wait, there is a light in the tunnel: in 2011, gross issuance is expected to decline... to $1.9 trillion.
And while things are hair-raising in "gross" country (not Bill...at least not yet), they are not much better in netville either. Net of maturities, 2010 coupon issuance will be about $1.8 trillion, a 45% increase from the $1.3 trillion in FY 2009 (and the paltry $255 billion in 2008).
Now everyone knows that the average maturity of the UST curve has become a big problem for Tim Geithner: nearly 40% of all marketable debt matures within a year (a percentage that has kept on growing). In fact, the Treasury provided guidance in its November 2009 refunding, in which it stated that it intends "to focus on increasing the average maturity" of its debt after relying heavily on Bill issuance in H2. Once again, we wish Tim the best of luck.
Why our generous best intentions to the US Treasury? Because unless the US consumer decides to forgo the purchase of the 4th sequential Kindle and buy some Treasuries (and not just any: 30 Year Bonds or bust), the presumption that the Bond printer will have the option of finding vast foreign appetite for its spewage is a very myopic one. We already know that China is a major question mark, and will aggressively be looking at pumping capital into its own economy instead of that of Uncle Sam's - at some point the return on investment in its own middle class will surpass that of funding the rapidly disappearing US middle class. That tipping point could be as soon as 2010.
As for Japan - the country has plunged into its nth consecutive deflationary period. Whether or not the finance minister announces yet another affair with the Quantitative Easing whore on any given day, depends merely on what side of the bed he wakes up on. The country will have its hands full monetizing its own sovereign issuance, let alone ours.
Lastly, the UK - well, with the country set to have zero bankers left in a few months, we don't think the traditionally third largest purchaser of US debt will be doing much purchasing any time soon.
None of this is merely speculation: October TIC data confirmed these preliminary observations. It will only become more pronounced in upcoming months.
How about that great globalization dynamo: emerging markets? Alas, they have their hands full with issuing their own record amounts of both sovereign and corporate debt as well: in 2009 gross EM debt issuance reached an astounding $217 billion, $29 billion higher than the previous record in 2007. Gross EM issuance was particularly high in the last quarter at $73 billion, with October breaking the record for the largest ever monthly gross issuance of emerging market global bonds at $38 billion (January is traditionally the busiest month of the year.) With $81 billion, 2009 was notably a record year for sovereign bonds, while gross issuance of corporate bonds amounted to $136 billion, the second highest level after that of 2007 with $155 billion.
Bottom line: everyone has major problems at home, and is more focused on the supply than the demand side of the equation.
What options does this leave for the administration? Very few, and all of them are ugly. As we stated earlier on, the options for the Fed are threefold:
Announce a new iteration of Quantitative Easing. This will be met with major disapproval across all voting classes (at least those whose residential zip codes do not start with 10xxx or 068xx), creating major headaches for Obama and the democrats which are already struggling with collapsing polls.
Prepare for a major increase in interest rates. While on the surface this would be very welcome for a Fed that keeps hinting that deflation is the biggest concern for the economy, Bernanke's complete lack of preparation from a monetary standpoint (we are surprised the Fed's $200 million reverse repos have not made the late night comedy circuit yet) to a forced interest rate increase, would likely result in runaway inflation almost overnight. The result would be a huge blow to a still deteriorating economy.
Engineer a stock market collapse. Recently investors have, rightfully, realized there is no more risk in equities, not because the assets backing the stockholder equity are actually creating greater cash flow (as we demonstrated recently, that is not the case), but simply because taxpayers have involuntarily become safekeepers for the entire stock market, due to Bernanke's forced intervention in bond and equity markets. Yet the President's Working Group is fully aware that when the time comes to hitting the "reverse" button, it will do so. Will the resultant rush into safe assets be sufficient to generate the needed endogenous demand for Treasuries is unknown. It will likely be correlated to the size of the equity market drop.
If the Fed decides on option three, we fully believe a 30% drop (or greater) in equities is very probable as the new supply/demand regime in fixed income becomes apparent. We hope mainstream media takes the ideas presented here and processes them for broader consumption as indeed the Fed is caught in a very fragile dilemma, and the sooner its hand is pushed, the less disastrous the final outcome for investors. Then again, as Eric Sprott has been pointing out for quite some time, it could very well be that the US economy has become merely one huge Ponzi, and as such, its expansion or reduction on the margin is uncontrollable. We very well may have passed into the stage where blind growth is the only alternative to a complete collapse. We hope that is not the case.
Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays to all readers.
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/brace-impact-2010-private-demand-us-fixed-income-has-increase-elevenfold-or-else
Best of the Season
Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year to friends, readers and contributors. Thank You.
23 December 2009
Keiser talks to Aussie economist Steve Keen
Keiser speaks to economist Steve Keen about wages, deflation and zombie capitalism.
21 December 2009
PEAK CLIMATE - - PEAK RESOURCES
by Andrew McKillop
Former chief policy analyst, Division A Policy, DG XVII Energy, European Commission
December 18, 2009
Depreciating Global Warming and Appreciating Real Assets
"Hockey sticks in the air!" well summarises the Climate summit debacle and face-saving attempts by Europe's hardcore political defenders of "imminent climate catastrophe" to breathe more hot air and illusion into the Copenhagen chill, as the COP15 conference winds down and out. The attempt by Europe's climate conscious leaderships to surf the wave of public concern on so-called runaway global warming, and generate new export markets for the continent's overlevered, high output cost renewable energy corporations and companies with recession hit domestic markets, looks unlikely to succeed. The same applies to Obama, faced by a recalcitrant Congress with low conviction that now is exactly the right moment to launch an additional big government, big spending spree with borrowed public money - much of it overseas, on projects outside the USA.
One sure winner will be real resources. That is oil, natural gas, gold, some other metals and minerals, and many of the agrocommodities. The linkage is clear and easy for oil, and for natural gas: the big spending push in renewable energy (RE) is now delayed, although already proven and economically viable RE will continue to power ahead. Fast uptake of RE in the lower income countries - which would only be possible with major aid and big soft loans from richer nations - will now take a lot more time.
Both China and India will continue their own, already large RE and Cleantech development programs, but this will have little spillover to the lower income developing countries in the near term. Along with rising but confused signs of economic recovery in the US if not in Europe or Japan, and continued strong economic growth in the big Emerging Economies, the bottom line for world oil demand is clear. Demand is likely to pick up through Q1 2010. Traders will anticipate this in a trading context marked by a return to selling pressure on the dollar (presently upstaged by a falling Euro),signaling higher oil prices from the short term. To be sure, events such as the December 22 OPEC meeting will generate their own price moves, but the new fundamental for oil is that global demand is likely to grow.
Unlike the recent past, natural gas futures will also tend to rise in synch with oil, rather than falling anytime Brent and WTI rise, and rising anytime Brent and WTI fall. Gas is the clear winner from attempts at finding cheaper, lower carbon substitutes to oil, but its price has languished this year. With restored oil price growth, natural gas will this time also gain.
The J-Curve
Exactly like the global warming Hockey Stick, but real, delayed response to converging news in the trading rooms operates a J-curve for short-term prices. While traders are out to lunch and deciding how to react, their first action will be trimming positions and paring risk before they go out to a sushi meal of near-extinct red tuna. Like the impact of dollar devaluation on the monthly US trade deficit, the first impact is a deepened deficit. For traded real resources, increased and complex news that should generate price rises firstly generates lower day closing prices.
The complex news from the Copenhagen climate summit through its long, laborious and heated sessions is that this "qualified success" will do less than nothing to rapidly trim fossil energy demand in the emerging and developing countries, and probably little in the OECD group of rich nations with one-sixth of the world's population but consuming one-half of world oil production. In the OECD group and especially Europe, however, climate change business has become Too big to fail which for energy will generate higher prices across the energy space. Returning from lunch, the signs for traders will be clear that real resources are better placed to show asset growth than most mainline Equities on many markets, of course with ample exceptions, and for as long the global economy shows credible signs of coming out of recession.
This is far from radical as a near-term read out, and is reinforced by another J-curve, the reserve/production ratios which apply to an increasing swath of the real resources, aka the hard assets.
We can state this simply: Gold, copper or any other diminishing fossil or mineral asset, including the fossil fuels is still faced with relatively price inelastic, and recovering or increasing demand. Exactly as for per capita oil and gas consumption in the OECD countries relative to China and India, and therefore CO2 emissions per capita, the same stepwise difference in consumption applies to metals and minerals. Increasing world production to enable equalization of per capita demand is, to be sure, a theoretical target for global economic development, but is not possible.
Obligation to Perform
The obligation to perform overrides the almost philosophical question of deciding if the party will continue, or rather when the party's rules will change, which they will but not at Copenhagen. Easily explaining why China and India will in no way agree to global binding commitments reduce CO2 emissions, but will act to slow their increase, this simply conforms with long term trends of economising resource utilisation, recycling and substitution rarer and higher cost resources with more abundant and cheaper resources. This is a long-term factor in human history and the world economy.
Break points are however certain in a free-for-all where each player is unsure of the resources held by the rivals, each player has an obligation to perform, and many natural resources are becoming rare. As many examples show, late arrivers are not at all necessarily the losers, witness Angola or Canada for oil, Kazakhstan for uranium, Zimbabwe for platinum, and the present and future bioresource and renewable fuels exporters of Africa and Asia. Depending on technology change and metal, mineral, or fossil energy substitution potentials, this now-or-later choice will increasingly impact day traded and near-term commodity prices as global potentials for radical output hikes increasingly shrink.
Rising real asset prices have an interesting self-limiting production impact, running alongside physical depletion and rising environmental impacts from their extraction and production. When their daily market price rises, the future value of presently unexploited reserves increases, and forecast production needed for a given revenue (of course in devaluing paper money) decreases. For gold and other PMG metals there is a measurable and predictable impact of rising prices on physical output capacity, basically due to milling capacity, with easily made comparisons in other fossil extraction industries. For gold and the PMG metals, when prices rise, and if a producer moves to lower grade ores they will for some while operate the same milling capacity. Due to this, total output will fall with rising prices, not rise.
This is a stealthwise change of physical output capacities, finally impacting the obligation to produce, and aiding the policy shift to a preference for slower exploitation of depletable resources. This shift is in fact nothing more or less than an update of the old-time wisdom of gold miners. This was a simple one-liner: Worst grade first, best grade last.
Despite the fact that other considerations also count, this one-liner is hard to beat. Ecology minded economists going as far back as Georgescu-Roegen and Daly, and in fact even further back can echo this wisdom, with multiple caveats, drawing on ecosystem behavior and functions. More than 90% of the trophic hierarchy acts this way, allowing just a few breakthrough and emergent alpha male species to act otherwise. To be sure there is one really large difference: natural ecosystems are close to 99% based on renewable energy, but the global economy is around 84% based on non renewable fossil fuels, and 100% dependent on non renewable metals and minerals including uranium, phosphates and all other one-shot, only partly recyclable resources.
Obligation to Deplete
Only one remedy applies to maximising output of non renewable resources that start depleting and fading away: energy. When or rather if there was 'unlimited energy' we could imagine all manner of science fiction, and economic fiction futures. In the real world and in all history, we have neither the time nor energy for this.
The above theoretical aside can be terminated by looking at the way major gold mining, fossil energy and minerals producer companies have cozied up to host governments, and through a long period of about 1985-2005 chose suicidal producing strategies. Accelerated depletion is surely one large, but hidden real world driver of the loud public statements that we face "climate catastrophe" if national budget deficits are not further raised, this time to finance Green Energy rather than bail out near-bankrupt finance sector players. Fighting depletion of energy and other real resources is the scarcely hidden message of OECD leaders, which failed at Copenhagen.
Brave words are advanced on the theme that accelerated depletion of fossil energy will 'jumpstart' innovation in alternate energy, and speed the 'modernization' of the economy. For the non renewable resource of gold, this innovation in fact has a long pedigree. Taking gold as a fiduciary money base, it can be substituted by silver, then bronze, then iron, and why not aluminium, paper, plastic and most recently electrons ?
Debate on whether we can sustainably extract oil from tarsands , or copper and other metals from sea water is basically a question of energy. This is due to energy needs spiraling as leaner and leaner orebodies and resources are exploited. Stepping down in orebody richness does not generate a linear increase in energy needed to extract the same amount of metal, but much much more, determined by many convergent factors we can call 'entropic'. This stepwise increase in energy demand is only partly covered by technology progress - and is a major physical determinant of rising prices for current generation resources, and a marker for the certainly rising capital costs of future energy and minerals supplies.
The 'Climate Catastrophe'
The re-valorisation of gold and other real assets is taking place at a time of surreal change in economic policies and policy making, symbolised by the strident calls for a massive and massively rapid shift away from fossil fuels, to the renewable energy sources and systems. Failure of the Copenhagen farce, however, will surely reawaken media and public opinion to the real, and very complex trends of both natural and anthropogenic climate change, along with anthropogenic ecosystem disruption, degradation, and destruction. In the same list, ongoing and rising pressure on natural resource supply capacities for constantly growing human population numbers and even faster growing urban populations will exercise a constant impact.
Extreme flights of fancy of the world's deciders, hinged on global warming, are likely to be put on the back burner, for example attempts to save the US dollar, through proposals to replace it as the world reserve money, with a "CO2 Bancor". This new plaything for FX traders and central bankers could be cobbled together from a shifting pile of carbon finance instruments, CO2 offset bonds for 'soft energy' loans to developing countries, carbon tax revenues and their derivatives, and other creative paper promises of future value built on the shaky struggle to fight climate catastrophe. This will signal a return to normal business, in a context where both Equities and Commodities are now completely interdependent and interchangeable trading chips - for traders and financial market operators.
This changes nothing on the ground, or rather underground. Long-term trends to more sustainable resource development - meaning long term production strategies - will be accelerated in a context of higher energy prices. For gold mining this is already clear: companies who want to remain in business for more than a few decades have already started to shift back to mining at the marginal grade. This raises production costs, and caps output, moving the threshold up for future price corrections on exuberant and always exaggerated trading floors.
Higher commodity prices effectively cause the marginal grade of every gold mine to drop. In the energy space this shift will be intense, as the world shifts to lower intensity, harder to use and higher capital cost renewable energy which can only increase slowly, after big capital expenditure. The net result is simple to forecast: as for gold output which has shown little or no responses to a tripling of the dollar price since 2002, world energy supply is set in a relatively slow growth, or no growth outlook, we can summarise as net energy and natural resource output falling as prices rise and because prices rise.
© 2009 Andrew McKillop
http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/mckillop/2009/1218.html
Climate deal 'good but not perfect', says Flannery
Copenhagen Climate Council chairman Tim Flannery says a draft climate accord reached by world leaders is ‘‘good but not perfect’’, and has described Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s role at the summit as ‘‘outstanding’’.
Speaking in an online briefing from Copenhagen shortly after 11pm local time (9am AEDT), while final details of the draft accord were still to be announced, Professor Flannery said the science community believed the draft text was a few hundred gigatonnes short of ideal, but that he was ‘‘not entirely dissatisfied with the agreement’’.
Wealthy and key developing nations have agreed to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius, according to a US official, with each country required to list the actions they would take to cut global warming pollution by specific amounts.
‘‘We need a more aggressive reduction target by the US ... (we need) China to tighten up its emissions standards,’’ Professor Flannery said.
This, combined with a concrete agreement among European countries, he said, would ‘‘put us in a better position ... where we need to be’’.
But he said the talks in the Danish capital were ‘‘not the end of the story’’.
‘‘We’ve seen a huge advance at this meeting ... This is a step on a long road and I’m not entirely dissatisfied with the agreement.’’
The draft text was ‘‘good but not perfect’’, he said.
Professor Flannery said he was impressed by the direct and honest role played by Mr Rudd at the summit.
‘‘Our prime minister has played an outstanding role. I was at a briefing he gave on Thursday. He was frank and honest ...
He said he was doing his best but there was absolutely no guarantee of success.
‘‘He’s been working very hard the last few months,’’ he added.
http://www.smh.com.au/national/climate-deal-good-but-not-perfect-says-flannery-20091219-l67n.html
20 December 2009
The Four stages of a bear market ~ expect dashed hopes
Our starting point for developed-market equities is that we are not in a new secular bull market. Extended bull markets typically happen when: 1) the starting point valuation is very attractive; 2) growth is strong and sustained, and 3) credit is readily available, allowing greater use of leverage. None of these factors seems likely in this cycle. Once the current rally ends, we expect an extended period of choppy markets. Exhibit 1 shows a stylized picture of how this could play out (taken from Teun Draaisma's report entitled The Aftermath of Secular Bear Markets, 10 August).
What is likely to end the rally? We think the biggest risk is growth and earnings disappointment. As is typical, an expanding PE ratio led the rally. The PE expands from a market low due to improving risk appetite and investors factoring in better earnings to come. Next year equities will have to become more earnings-led, again as is typical.
GEAB N°40 is available! Spring 2010 – A new tipping point of the global systemic crisis: When the slip knot around public deficits....
LEAP/E2020 believes that the global systemic crisis will experience a new tipping point from Spring 2010. Indeed, at that time, the public finances of the major Western countries are going to become unmanageable, as it will simultaneously become clear that new support measures for the economy are needed because of the failure of the various stimuli in 2009 (1), and that the size of budget deficits preclude any significant new expenditures.
If this public deficit « slip knot » which governments gladly placed around their necks in 2009, refusing to make the financial system pay for mistakes (2) is going to weigh heavily on all public expenditure, it is going to particularly affect the social security systems of the rich countries in always impoverishing the middle classes and the retired, and setting the poorest adrift (3).
At the same time, the general context of the bankruptcy of an increasing number of states and other authorities (regions, provinces, federal states) will entail a double paradoxical event of increasing interest rates and the flight out of currencies towards gold. In the absence of an organised alternative to a weakening US Dollar and in order to find an alternative to the loss in value of treasury bonds (in particular US ones) all central banks will have, in part, to « reconvert to gold », the old enemy of the US Federal Reserve, without being able to state the fact officially. The bet on recovery having been, at this point, totally lost by governments and central banks (4), this Spring 2010 tipping point is thus going to represent the beginning of the huge transfer of 20,000 billion USD of « ghost assets » (5) in the direction of the social security systems of the countries which have accumulated them.
In GEAB N°40, the LEAP/E2020 team develops its anticipations on these various subjects, whilst also giving a detailed appraisal of its 2009 anticipations which achieved an overall success rate of 72% (6). Finally our researchers unveil their recommendations regarding this month in particular: commercial real estate, currencies and expatriates’ revenues.
The ten most vulnerable countries on a debt/GDP ratio (in blue; public debt; in orange: private debt) – Source: Crédit Suisse, 03/2009
Reality quickly fuelled GEAB N°39’s anticipation which indicated that 2010 would be a year noted for three trends, one of which would be state bankruptcy (7): from Dubai to Greece, via more and more worrying reports from the rating agencies on US and British debt, or the draconian Irish budget and the Eurozone suggestions for grappling with public deficits, states’ increasing incapacity to manage their debts is making press headlines. However at the centre of this press ferment, all the information isn’t of the same value: certain are no more than laborious works on the « finger » of the Chinese proverb (8), whilst others really stretch to the moon.
On the subject of laborious works on the « finger », this public announcement of the GEAB N°40 presents the case for its anticipations on Greece.
Greek debt crisis: A small problem for Frankfurt and a strong warning for Washington and London
Coming now to Greece, we find a theme similar to what our team showed up in the GEAB N°33 in March 2009, when the press gave widespread publicity to the idea that Eastern Europe was going to lead the European banking system and the Euro into a major crisis. We have explained that this « news » was not based on anything credible and that it was only « a deliberate attempt on the part of Wall Street and the City to create the belief of a crack in the EU and instill the idea of « deadly » risk weighing on the Eurozone, in continually publishing false stories on the « banking risk from Eastern Europe » and trying to stigmatise a Eurozone cowardness compared to American or British « willful » measures. One of the objectives is also to try and turn international attention away from the increasing financial problems in New York and London, all with the purpose of weakening the European position on the eve of the G20 summit ».
The Greek case is rather the same. Not that there isn’t a crisis in Greek public finances (that is the reality), but the supposed consequences for the Eurozone are overestimated, whereas this crisis indicates increasing tensions surrounding sovereign debt, the Achilles heel of the United States and Great Britain (9).
New sovereign debt issuance in 2009 (USD billions) – Source: PhoenixProject, 07/2009
First of all, one must remember that Greece remains the country above all others, which badly managed its EU accession. Since 1982, different Greek governments have done nothing but use the EU as an inexhaustible source of subsidies, without ever taking steps to modernise the financial and social framework of the country. With nearly 3% of GDP coming directly from Brussels in 2008 (10), Greece is indeed a country which has been on a European drip-feed for almost thirty years. The actual deterioration in the country’s public finances is, then, only another step in this drawn-out development. The Eurozone leaders have known for a long time that the Greek problem would materialise one day.
But with a country producing 2.5% of the Eurozone’s GDP (and 1.9% of the EU’s) we are far from a dangerous situation weighing on the single European currency and the Eurozone. By way of example, the California’s default (12% of US GDP) entails far more risks of destablisation of the Dollar and the American economy. Moreover, since the same analysts usually like to make lists of all the Eurozone countries facing up to a serious crisis in their public finances (Spain, Ireland, Portugal, to which we can add France and Germany), for the sake of completeness it should be pointed out that in the United States, besides the fact that the Federal State would be technically bankrupt (11) if the Fed weren’t printing Dollars in unlimited quantities for the purpose of buying, directly or indirectly, Treasury Bonds for an equal value, and besides California (the richest state in the Union teetering on the edge of the abyss for months), there are altogether 48 States out of 50 with growing budget deficits now (12). As summed up by the title of the December 14th edition of Stateline, an American website specialising in the US States and municipalities, said « Nightmare scenarios haunt the States », all the states of the United States are afraid of defaulting on their debt in 2010/2011.
The Eurozone, which has the largest gold reserves in the world (13), also includes countries which accumulated budget surpluses until last year, a foreign trade surplus and a central bank which hasn’t turned its balance sheet into a pool of « rotten or ghost » assets (contrary to the Fed in the last 18 months). So, if the crisis in Greek public finances clearly indicates something, it is not so much Greece’s situation or a specific Eurozone problem, but a wider problem which is going to become much worse in 2010: the fact that Government bonds are now a bubble on the verge of exploding (more than 49,500 billion USD worldwide, a 45% increase in two years (14)).
The deteriorating ratings published by US rating agencies since the Dubai crisis shows, as always, that these agencies don’t know how to (or can’t) anticipate these developments. Let’s remember that they didn’t see the sub-prime crisis coming nor the collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG, nor the Dubai crisis. Because they are dependent on the US government (15), they are unable, of course, to directly blame the two at the heart of present financial system (Washington and London). However, they show from which direction the next big shock is going to come, State bonds… and in this field, the two countries with the most exposure are the United States and Great Britain.
Besides, it is very instructive to see the subtle change in the tenor of the articles published by these agencies. In a few weeks we have gone from the same old explanation stating that the intrinsic quality of these two countries’ (16) economies and their management removes all risk of default on the part of their respective governments to a warning that, from 2010, it will be necessary to demonstrate these qualities and management skills in order to keep the coveted Triple A rating which allows borrowing at the lowest cost (17). If even the rating agencies start to ask for proof, it’s because things are going really badly.
To finish on Greece’s case, our team feels that the current situation is a triple positive for the Eurozone:
. it requires it to seriously consider the solidarity measures to put in place in this type of situation. The watchers are thus going to have to make a clear choice: either they treat Greece as an isolated example, or they treat it as a component of the Eurozone. But they can’t do both at once, adding the weakness of an isolated Greece to a weakened Eurozone caused by Greece.
. it requires, at last, the Greek authorities to carry out an operation of « Truth » on the financial state of their country and allows the EU to push forward the necessary reforms, notably to substantially reduce endemic corruption and cronyism (18).
. it should serve as an example to European governments (and others) who fudge economic and social statistics more and more, demonstrating that such fudging only results in plunging a country into crisis even more. Sadly, we are more doubtful on the idea that other leaders will follow the Greek Prime Minister’s example… certainly not before a change of government in Great Britain, the United States, France, or Germany.
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Notes:
(1) Consumption still remains lack-lustre in the United States and Europe as well (in spite of year-end celebrations). So-called Chinese growth (watch this eye-opening video by Al Jazeera on the reality behind the Chinese numbers) doesn’t even begin to stimulate its Japanese neighbour one little bit (which would have been a clear signal that there really has been a restart of the Chinese economy), requiring it to be the first major country to adopt a second economic stimulation package in less than two years (source: Asahi Shimbun, 09/12/2009). On the other hand the faking of statistics is beating all records: a « radical » fall in unemployment in the United States fed by temporary jobs related to the Christmas shopping period and a method of calculation as « theoretical » as before (source: Global Economic Trend Analysis, 04/12/2009), « Black Friday:// » which in fact saw the value of sales dropping compared to the year before (source: Reuters, 29/11/2009), unemployment which continues to rise, and business real-estate in free-fall in Europe (source: Les Echos, 10/12/2009, and an interesting visual stroll amongst empty office blocks in Amsterdam made by Tako Dankers, « reassuring » Chinese industrial production numbers in November 2009 since they were compared to the big fall in November 2008. Such fantastic results for the hundreds of billions of 2009 stimulus plans!
(2)And in believing the banks who told them that saving them would save the economy.
(3) Source: USAToday, 12/14/2009
(4) Source: CNBC, 08/12/2009; Yahoo/Reuters, 27/11/2009
(5) Two-thirds of the global amount estimated by LEAP/E2020 a year ago, out of which two-thirds haven’t yet gone up in smoke in the various financial and real estate markets of the world.
(6) This score is lower than the 80% of 2008 but still high, particularly for an exceptional year with regard to the unprecedented extent and number of interventions by the authorities, multiplying the factors at play.
(7) On the subject of « fiscal pressure », London and Dublin have just started the ball rolling. Sources: Times, 06/12/2009; Irish Times, 11/12/2009
(8) « When the wise man points at the moon, the fool looks at the finger »
(9) And of Japan to a lesser extent.
(10) Source: La Croix, 10/05/2009
(11) Source: New York Times, 11/22/2009
(12) Source: CBPP, 12/19/2009
(13) For instance, between national central banks and the ECB, the Eurozone possesses 10,900 tons of gold and the United States only 8,133 tons (source: FMI/Wikipedia, 11/2009). Or, more precisely: the US Treasury declares that the United States holds that amount of gold, knowing that there has been no independent audit of US gold reserves for over forty years. We will return to the subject of the true amount of US gold reserves in more detail in the next edition of GEAB (N°41). Indeed our team believes that in 2010, in a context of explosion of the Government bond bubble, gold is going to become an absolute necessity for central banks.
(14) Sources: DailyMarkets, 11/24/2009; Telegraph, 11/30/2009; Forbes, 11/24/2009
(15) Legally and even financially speaking, see previous editions.
(16) Sometimes we see the wildest surrealism in reading the views of these agencies.
(17) Source: Wall Street Journal, 12/08/2009
(18) Source: Financial Times, 12/11/2009
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